

**10**  
YEAR  
ANNIVERSARY  
OF THE  
BOSTON  
MARATHON  
BOMBING

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

# 2023 DC INTEROPERABILITY SUMMIT

THE RACE TO  
**INTEROPERABILITY**

AFTER ACTION REPORT





## 2023 District of Columbia Interoperability Summit After Action Report

This document was prepared for the District of Columbia by the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP) as part of Work Order # WO23-210. Additional information about the program can be found at [www.dhs.gov/safecom/ictapscip-resources](https://www.dhs.gov/safecom/ictapscip-resources).



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# 2023 INTEROPERABILITY SUMMIT AFTER ACTION REPORT AND SUMMARY

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 5<sup>th</sup> annual District of Columbia (D.C.) Interoperability Summit marked the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Boston Marathon Bombing. The Summit highlighted interoperability and emergency communications successes and challenges through real-world accounts from responders who were on scene making efforts to save lives and complete the investigation that followed. The Summit also discussed how DC agencies might respond if a similar incident were to occur in the National Capitol Region (NCR) today.

The Summit goals included:

- Discuss best practices and lessons learned from the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing.
- Highlight critical opportunities to improve interoperable communications policy, products, and/or processes.
- Foster new relationships (physically and virtually).

## ATTENDEES

More than 600 Federal, State, Local, Territorial, and private sector officials registered for the two-day event. This is the 4<sup>th</sup> consecutive year that over 500 participants viewed the Summit, where they were able to network with and learn from leaders across the interoperable emergency communications ecosystem. Participants represented 33 states and territories ranging from Hawaii to the United States (U.S.) Virgin Islands. Participants represented a range of agencies including:



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- Baltimore County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
- Boston Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
- Coast Guard
- County Government
- Critical Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR)
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
- DC Government
- DC Water and Sewer Authority
- Department of Defense (DoD)
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
- Department of Interior Solicitor's Office
- Department of Veterans Affairs
- District Department of Transportation
- DC Government
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- Federal Law Enforcement Agencies
- Fire Departments
- Maryland Government
- Massachusetts Government
- National Guard
- Naval Information Warfare Center (NIWC)
- Not-for-Profits
- Private Firms
- Public Safety Answering Points
- Virginia Government

During the two-day Summit, participants heard over ten unique speakers provide remarks or talks and viewed six panels that included 36 emergency communications, cybersecurity, and public safety leaders. The panels and presentations covered a broad range of topics including the Boston Marathon Bombing and the investigation that followed, cybersecurity, coordination among various levels of public safety, modern leadership challenges, a review of after-action reports, and planning in the NCR. Major themes discussed by speakers included the importance of relationship building, training and exercises for both planned and unplanned events, government to public communications, and public to government communications. Further details on the presentations and panels are detailed throughout the remainder of report. Links to each presentation where permission to record was granted are provided in the following sections.



## SUMMIT PRESENTATIONS

### WELCOMING REMARKS – DAY 1

**Summit recording link:** [Welcoming Remarks - Day 1](#)

*Danny McCoy, Fusion Center Executive Associate Director for the Division of Operations and Intelligence, DC Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (DC HSEMA)*

- Provided administrative and safety announcements related to the 2023 DC Interoperability Summit before introducing Charles Guddemi for the Welcoming Remarks.
- Highlighted September as National Preparedness Month and announced the Summit theme as the 10th Anniversary of the Boston Marathon Bombing.

*Charles Guddemi, DC Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC)*

- Reviewed Summit Goals (listed in Executive Summary Section for reference).
- Provided an overview of Summit logistics and facts, recognizing that there were over 600 registrants representing over 33 states and territories.
- Noted updates made to the Summit from the results of last year's survey to include selection of the Boston Marathon Bombing as the theme, exhibitor booths to foster more interaction, and use of Whova platform to facilitate the Summit.
- Explained the purpose behind choosing the Boston Marathon Bombing as the theme, highlighting not only the game changing aspect of the incident but also the human factors involved.
- Reviewed the Emergency Communications Ecosystem and why events like the Summit are important to driving progress and connection.
- Emphasized the importance of Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) planning and highlighted the new PACE course available nationwide through CISA.

*Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, Director, DC HSEMA*

- Thanked Ed Davis (Retired Boston Police Commissioner), William Lessard (Boston EMS Captain), and Richard Fiske (Massachusetts SWIC) for their willingness to share their experiences from the incident as well as their partnership and commitment to advancing our collective knowledge.
- Indicated that we are here to learn from our past, look toward the future, build relationships, form new partnerships, and enhance our ability to communicate during emergencies to serve our communities.
- Asked participants to think about how an incident like the Boston Marathon Bombing would impact Washington D.C. and the NCR.



- Emphasized the importance of building relationships to build strong joint capabilities with all partners.

*Vincent Delaurentis, Deputy Assistant Director, CISA*

- Noted how each Summit provides an opportunity to look through lenses of different significant events to ensure that we continue to advance interoperable communications.
- Emphasized that a continual communications lifeline is critical to incident response.
- Used the “honeycomb effect” to stress the need for a seamless flow of emergency communications throughout the whole communications ecosystem.
- Raised the question of how to harness technology through governance and training to make sure communications are reliable.
- Described the strong partnership between HSEMA and CISA, with CISA offering a variety of technical assistance (TA) offerings including PACE training and priority services.

## **DHS CISA OFFICE FOR BOMBING PREVENTION**

**Summit recording link: [DHS CISA Office of Bombing Prevention](#)**

*Sean Haglund, Associate Director (AD), Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP), DHS*

- Described his career background which included 25 years as an explosive ordinance disposal technician in the military.
- Session Agenda
  - What is the Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Threat?
  - Terrorist Attack Cycle and Preventative Measures
  - Key Indicator Awareness
  - Special Event Planning Recommendations
  - Human Factor in the Aftermath
- Discussed how bombings are an enduring and effective tactic that are increasing on both the incident and threat side, requiring a national approach to effectively manage.
- Noted that while high consequence, high casualty domestic bombing attacks are not seen on a frequent basis; however, it is still important to know what that threat looks like and why it is relevant today.
  - Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Challenges and Domestic IED Threats.
  - High availability and flow of component materials.
  - Increase in technical knowledge and sharing of information online, through the dark web, and terrorist media on building a bomb.





- Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be queried to give detailed instructions on how to build a bomb.
- Sophisticated concealment and deployment.
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) enhancements to increase impact of device.
- No one-size-fits-all depiction of adversary.
- Studying intent and capability are important because if these factors are present, it suggests a period of heightened risk.
- Identified that the 2022 Domestic IED Threat Analysis showed a 23% increase in explosive incidents and a 35% increase in bomb threats.
  - There was a spike in bomb threats targeting Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) in early 2022. OBP provided in-person and online resources and training nationwide.
- Described the Terrorist Attack Cycle and preventative measures that can be taken against bombing attacks:
  - Bombing attacks typically run a 12–18-month window from ideation, target selection, surveillance, material acquisition, experimentation with smaller explosives, to point of attack. All stages represent an opportunity to disrupt the attack.
  - Some stages take longer and present more opportunity for disruption, which ideally occurs before the device is built.
  - CISA provides, either by itself or in conjunction with its partners, programs to aid in risk management across the Terrorist Attack Cycle from Prevention, Mitigation, Protection, to Response.
    - Tripwire- Information sharing platform open to the public, with a restricted access side for public safety professionals.
    - Extensive Bast Modeling- Tool that can be provided to venue owner and operators and simulates different devices in different locations to prepare for special events.
    - Bomb Making Materials Awareness Program- Raises awareness of retailers to recognize suspicious buying patterns and how to report it.
- Noted these efforts build a layered defense by targeting disruption across different steps in the attack cycle.
- Shared that the goal of protection measures is to prevent the placement of the IED on a target by using the 5 Ds of Security:
  - **Deter** - Fences, lighting, and cameras *deter* an adversary from attacking.
  - **Detect** - Screening points and checkpoints help *detect* an unauthorized access.
  - **Delay** - Bollards can *delay* access to a facility.
  - **Deny** - Swipe cards and more physical security presence help to *deny* access.



- **Defend** - Security and bomb technicians help *defend* against bomb.
- Emphasized consecutive layers of protective measures create a strong defense and reduces effectiveness of attack by forcing an attacker to overcome each layer.
- Introduced Key Indicator Awareness by explaining the use of the BOMBER acronym in recognizing and reporting suspicious activity:
  - **Baseline Establishment:** Understand what normal behavior in the environment looks like so that unusual behavior can be flagged.
  - **Operational Indicators:** Identify surveillance indicators such as taking pictures or video of security cameras/access points/security personnel, attempting to conceal recording devices, making notes/diagrams/sketches, paying unusual attention to Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems or ventilation systems, or observing security reaction drills or procedures; identify probing indicators such as sending hoax packages or devices, observations of response times/routes/personnel, or testing physical security barriers.
  - **Materials:** Be aware of unusual materials acquisition (i.e., unusual items, quantities, or combinations); electronics, weapons and ammunition, fuel/fertilizer/chemicals, unusual payment methods, abnormal online purchases, large purchases made with cash/gift card/pre-paid card, several small purchases of the same item made over time, suspicious purchasing behavior, or suspicious theft.
  - **Bomb-building Activity:** Detect activity through bomb building research (e.g., printed resources, online resources, social media, YouTube), testing of devices (e.g., loud unexplained noises/explosions/fires, strong chemical smells, or moving of supplies), or chemical exposure (e.g., discoloration on hands/arms/clothing), body injuries/lacerations/burns/scars, appearing intoxicated, red irritated eyes, or chemical odors.
  - **Elicitation:** Identify discreet information gathering, often appearing as a normal social or professional conversation.
  - **Respond:** Ensure everyone is aware and plays a key role in identifying suspicious behaviors.
- Gave special event recommendations from IED-specific response to broader security considerations:
  - Interoperability and a collaborative response are crucial to providing explosive security at large gatherings.
  - Involve the bomb squad in the planning phase to ensure their first time on-site is not when they are responding to an emergency.
  - Planning is most important phase and should occur well before the event. Planning includes assessing resources and capability gaps, understanding operational



- objectives, understanding current explosive threats, and designating a focused planning group.
- Understand what a response phase looks like, including evacuation and sweeping protocols.
- Explained human behavior following a targeted IED attack using a multi-phase study conducted with DHS Science and Technology on six bombing attacks (Boston Marathon, Manchester, Brussels Airport, Madrid, London 7/7, and Centennial Park).
  - Human reactions and behaviors following initial explosion were analyzed through extensive video footage. Five primary human behaviors were identified: evacuating, fleeing, freezing, gawking, and helping.
  - The next phase of the study is to discern where training can be tailored and provide the best information to the public and first responders.
  - Analysis from the Boston Marathon bombing showed an individual who received OBP training convincing restaurant patrons to shelter in place instead of moving towards the door and exiting. This implemented training proved effective as the second explosive device went off just outside the door.
  - OBP provides resources on a variety of topics including bombing prevention, active shooter, counter-unmanned aerial system (UAS), and exercises at no cost to the public.

## Questions

- Is there a federally accepted inventory system that vendors can implement to auto-flag suspicious purchases of potential bomb-making materials in hardware stores, pool stores, etc.?
  - Yes, OBP along with the Office of Chemical Security maintain a list through our Bomb-making Materials Awareness Program and Operation Flashpoint; please contact the office.
  - The list is tailored to retail partners and is subject to change based on the threat.
- What is the state of the art today in bomb detection sensors?
  - In DHS, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) represents the no-fail mission in preventing a device from getting on an aircraft and is where the pinnacle of that technology sits (e.g., aviation security).
  - The challenge is that the same level of security cannot necessarily be replicated in large gatherings and public events as commercial partners must balance safety with a positive/enjoyable customer experience.
  - There are magnetometers for metal detection and trace and swipe detections for explosive residue; ultimately, we would like to see technology advanced in standoff detection (i.e., direct detector at an individual from a distance).



- Explosive detection canines can be navigated through a crowd using a vapor wake and flag security to take individual in for questioning.

## **SUMMIT KEYNOTE – IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITY: BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING AND THE STRENGTH OF A CITY**

**Summit recording link: [In the Face of Adversity: Boston Marathon Bombing and the Strength of a City](#)**

*Edward Davis, President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Edward Davis Company and Boston Police Commissioner (Ret.)*

- Mr. Davis began by sharing that April 15th changed his appreciation for the importance of practice and preparation.
- He was a police officer during 9/11; he went to classes after 9/11 with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other agencies on National and International terrorist information after 9/11.
  - The class looked at New York as the place that something could happen because it was a center of economic activity and identified by the threat at the time.
  - After the events on January 6, 2021, Mr. Davis commented that we need to look at D.C. over the next couple of years as a place this could happen, and the District's systems need to be tweaked and pay close attention to what is happening across the country in this difficult time as this is the center of our political structure and government.
  - Mr. Davis also commented that this Summit is necessary to be able to respond properly to these existential threats and when you do it and how you do it are critical to your career.
- Mr. Davis described the events of April 15th including the normal activities associated with the Marathon:
  - He went to the scene of Marathon about 6:00AM and saw bomb dogs go down the street; they hit both sides of finish line which was one of the planned prevention procedures and the dogs did not hit on anything.
  - At 6:00 AM, there were 850 police officers on site with a year of planning with Boston Athletic Association to ensure things were in place and preventive measures were taken.
  - Mr. Davis mentioned his main job at the race was to get the elite runners across the finish line first because that was when the Governor was there to crown the elite female and male runners, and then the Governor and his detail leave.
  - It was about that time he noticed the media started breaking down cameras and the event was transitioning from an international sporting event to a local marathon. At



- that point he felt the threat of a terrorist event had been reduced, so he then left the course for a conference call with Vice President Biden.
- Shortly after the conference call ended, he received a call from his Chief of Department that there had been two explosions at the finish line, and he immediately got into car and headed back to the scene.
  - On the way there, Mr. Davis did three things as result of preparation and planning:
    1. Put together an impromptu command post.
    2. Asked for a SWAT team.
    3. Called Colonel for U.S. Police and requested his stock team.
  - When he arrived on scene, he could see the damage, and when he stepped on the ground he felt shrapnel under his feet.
    - He knew someone had devised a bomb, they were a sophisticated group of people, that the bombs created a lot of damage which meant the bombers were proficient, and there likely were multiple persons involved due to the two blasts being close together.
  - Mr. Davis then reviewed the explosion timeline:
    - Scene response: on the ground full scale exercises played a powerful role when it came to real incidents “perform the way we train”.
      - As a result of the blasts, there were about a dozen amputations performed on scene, 3 deceased, 264 injured, 12 block parameter set, and scene cleared with victims within 22 minutes.
  - At this point, Mr. Davis had to put aside the aftermath of this type of event, and focus on his main responsibilities:
    1. Clear and assist the injured.
    2. Secure the crime scene.
    3. Complete a vigorous investigation and find people responsible.
  - Federal authorities arrived within 12-15 minutes of the explosions and were on scene detecting and processing important evidence.
  - Mr. Davis focused on the investigation and coordinated with FBI and State Police to obtain video footage from nearby stores and businesses.
  - Mr. Davis mentioned the conference room that was provided to him was insufficient with only a push-to-dial telephone provided, causing issues with communications and connectivity.
    - Since communications started to break down upon setting up of command post, satellite phones were brought in but there was no signal; the one phone that was plugged into the wall was the only means of communication.
    - Mr. Davis then stressed the importance of securing the area and sending out detectives to get witness statements; he was informed that a recently double-



- amputated victim revealed that at the finish line he saw a suspicious man put down a backpack, the victim went to the backpack to kick it and the bomb went off.
- The man was integral in providing good composites of the suspect; while he was being amputated.
  - Law Enforcement Response: A press conference was started and they wanted Mr. Davis to deliver the bad news. Mr. Davis stressed the need to be aware of public relations and the rules of engagement.
  - Provided characteristics of the Bombers
    - Conducted an intense investigation was conducted 12 hours after the incident.
    - Presidential visit with congressional delegation.
    - 1,500 troops were guaranteed to be provided on site as soon as possible.
    - The Commissioner was told pictures of suspects were obtained with their faces and the suspect clearly had a backpack.
    - The Commissioner found it to be inconceivable to not share pictures of suspects, including his own officers.
    - Mr. Davis communicated that it is important to think about who you are going to need at the table if a bomb goes off or if there is an active shooter. You need to get to know them before it happens because you cannot develop a relationship during a crisis.
  - Described Key Events following Attack:
    - Presidential visit.
    - Mourning and burial of victims.
    - Intense investigation among all agencies.
    - Release of suspect photographs:
      - The night the photos were released, the Commissioner received news a Cambridge police officer was shot and killed.
      - Initially, appeared to be an unrelated incident, but rarely does a Cambridge officer get shot/killed.
      - Received another call that the suspects were shooting at them and throwing bombs.
      - The suspects stole a car, and the victim was able to get escape and notify Police Officers the Boston Bombers had his car and provide GPS details to locate them.
      - Suspects were located and started shooting and throwing bombs at the Police Officers.
      - Important Tactical Issue: Blue-on-blue friendly fire due to circular ambush is a common problem.



- Mr. Davis expressed the need for small unit tactics if we are going to give law enforcement rifles, we need to know what type of ambush is appropriate if you are going to be using military weapons.
- Shelter-in-Place was in effect in Boston and house-to-house searches were conducted in area the suspects were spotted.
- Suspect Apprehension: We were notified by a homeowner that suspect was in his boat in his backyard and eventually the Police got the suspect to come out of the boat and he is now at Supermax prison facility facing the death penalty.
- Systems worked but there are lessons we can learn from them, hope this helps with ongoing efforts to keep community safe.

## Questions

- Can you speak more about Urban Shield full-scale exercises and how those are beneficial to preparedness?
  - Urban Shield is one of two full scale exercises that we did in Boston in the years leading up to the incident.
  - Urban Shield allowed us to get medical professionals incorporated into our systems and understand NIMS and command structure.
  - The relationships we developed with the medical professionals beforehand were crucial when the Boston Marathon Bombing occurred.
  - The Operations Urban Shield is expensive and takes a lot of time, but it is incredibly worth it. It was funded by DHS.
- The roommates of Boston Bombers were charged for destruction of evidence, since the bombing has there been any effort to help train students in the area of what to look for, places to report anonymously so you can catch them beforehand in the future if this were to happen again?
  - We are doing constant outreach efforts; we send officers out to do orientation discussions with them but have not set up a specific anonymous reporting system for students.
  - The roommates were coconspirators and the combination of reaching out during orientation and federal prosecution sends a joint message you cannot do that.
- This was also a multi-jurisdictional effort, were all jurisdictional officers operating on the same radio channel?
  - Yes, the Boston Area Regional Police Radio Network (BAPRN) has been there for decades. Allows everybody to switch over to work mutual frequency, so that worked really well.
  - Motorola really saved the day as push to talk radios were the only way we could communicate and establish command and control.



- Redundancy is extremely important when you are thinking about preparation.
- How did the Universities work with you during a lockdown to keep students safe?
  - They were great, two years before this we had a Virginia Tech shooting and we worked very closely with them about securing facilities and during the course of this, they were extremely cooperative.
  - They are force multiplier for you, so you can think about them to really help out.
- What solutions have been implemented since the incident to improve critical communication connectivity and voice security?
  - I am contractor for AT&T and FirstNet has played a big role in allowing critical communication to be relied upon and it is not perfect, but it is certainly one of the solutions to come out of 9/11 and would have played an enormous role if we had had that then. It is great that it is rolling out across the country and I think that is one solution to it.
  - The other solution is to harden your radio systems and having a set system of inspections and review of critical infrastructure.
  - What about local critical infrastructure and how often do local officials think about if the lock is still working? Those kinds of audits are helpful and something you should consider.

## **BOSTON EMS MEDICAL RESPONSE TO THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING**

**Summit recording link: [Boston EMS Medical Response to the Boston Marathon Bombing](#)**

*William Lessard, Captain, Boston Emergency Medical Services*

- Described his career background which included a 35-year veteran of Boston EMS, having spent first 25 years on the overnight shift until transferring to the day shift under a position in the Office of Professional Standards.
  - It was also his first year transitioning from working the Marathon in the field to taking an assignment in the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MAC) out at the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA).
- Session Agenda:
  - Background
  - Department
  - Planning and Preparedness
  - Boston Marathon
  - Response to Bombings
  - Manhunt
  - Observations and Lessons Learned





- Provided a city profile of Boston in 2013:
  - Despite being a small city at 48.4 sq/miles, the city resident population was approximately 636,000, with an even greater daytime population of about 1.2 million.
- Provided an overview of Boston EMS:
  - It is a municipal 3rd service EMS and a Bureau of the Boston Public Health Commission, on a paramilitary structure, with a two-tiered system of operations:
    - Basic Life Support (BLS) is staffed by two emergency medical technicians (EMTS)
    - Advanced Life Support (ALS) is staffed by two paramedics.
- Explained how Boston EMS plans and prepares for major events:
  - Large events such as First Night (New Year's Eve), St. Patrick's Day Parade, Boston Marathon, Boston Calling Music Festival, 4th of July, Caribbean Festival, and sports championship parades are treated as controlled mass casualty incidents (MCIs); rallies, protests, and civil unrest are also planned for.
  - There is a focus on region-wide preparedness and training given the nine jurisdictions are classified as the Metro Boston Homeland Security Region (MBHSR).
  - Grant funding from the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) helps to provide equipment such as:
    - Helmets, high visibility reflective vests and coats, ballistic gear, portable radios with multi-channel functions, mass casualty extrication devices.
    - A mutual radio aid frequency, response and transport units, and a medical ambulance bus.
- Described the outline of the Boston Marathon:
  - The Marathon goes through eight cities and towns and ends in the Back Bay of Boston; it is unlike a loop marathon that stays in one city and thus requires partners from each city and town along the racecourse to plan together and with outside hospitals.
  - Along the route, there are 26 medical stations, 11 enhanced medical stations staffed with EMS personnel.
  - As a multi-day event, setup for the Marathon begins the week before along the finish line with multiple events hosted by the Boston Athletic Association (BAA) that Boston EMS supports.
  - On the day of the Marathon, Incident Command System (ICS) was implemented through and Incident Action Plan (IAP) with sections of the Marathon broken up into zones.



- Additional staffing of nine BLS ambulances and four ALS ambulances, with 11 EMTs and paramedics on bicycles, and assisted staffing the medical stations which consisted of stretcher teams, EMS gator teams, and personnel on golf carts.
  - The Dispatch Operations Center is where all 911 calls come in and get dispatched, and extra staffing is provided on event day.
  - Additional staffing is provided to MEMA and the Medical Intelligence Center (MIC) at Boston EMS Headquarters (HQ)
- Described the layout and protocol on the morning of the 2013 Boston Marathon:
  - At 5 AM, close to 20,000 runners descend upon the Boston Common and board buses to be transported out to the start line.
  - The EMS Compound, located adjacent to the medical tents, is where additional equipment for race day is stored; it is near the race finish line.
  - The Boston EMS conducted a morning briefing and crews checked out equipment and headed out for their assignments. The medical tents are staffed by doctors, nurses, physical therapists, and EMS personnel for critical patients.
- Reviewed timeline of the Marathon:
  - Around 2:30 PM the largest wave of amateur runners crossed the finish line.
  - At 2:49 PM the initial bomb goes off on Boylston Street, close to the finish line at Copley Square; people initially thought it was a manhole explosion.
  - 10 seconds later the second bomb goes off a block away:
    - It was difficult to get ambulances onto Boylston Street, mobile assets were relied on heavily to transport victims in stretchers and wheelchairs and even store shelving back to medical tents; EMS gators were critical in transporting patients.
    - The main medical tent was quickly transformed into a large trauma room, with most supplies coming from the EMS Compound adjacent to the tent.
    - Using a mutual aid radio network, mutual aid was requested early in the incident, 68 ambulances were provided from 11 different ambulance partners.
    - Staging for the ambulances had to be moved two to three times due to the large number of unattended bags that were left behind and the threats associated with them.
- Captain Lessard shared a video covering the finish line area when the first bomb went off.
- Continued to narrate the public and personnel response after the explosions:
  - The next day, the BAA set up a finish line when runners came to retrieve their belongings that were left at the start of the race, so that the runners could cross the finish line and receive their medals which gave them a sense of comfort and closure.



- 41% of critical patients were off the scene within 30 minutes, 75% of critical patients were off the scene in 45 minutes, and finally 100% of critical patients were off the scene in 60 minutes; no critical transports died.
- Recognized that successful hospital distribution and inter-facility communication was due to the hard work of folks in dispatch operations.
  - In addition to handling regular 911 calls, additional 911 personnel handled the event.
  - Used the Boston Area Ambulance Mutual Aid Network (BAMA).
  - Used a dedicated Disaster Radio Network which notifies all hospitals of disaster.
  - Staff of Central Medical Emergency Direction (CMED) provide medical direction for ambulances within in 62 towns and cities within the Boston area coming into hospitals.
  - CMED dispatcher looked at the Conference of Boston Teaching Hospitals (COBTH) and distributed patients so as not to overwhelm hospitals.
- Captain Lessard summarized the events as the week continued similarly to Commissioner Davis.
  - Gave details regarding Incident Command:
    - Treated major events as MCIs or “Planned Disasters”.
    - Routine implementation of ICS.
    - Quickly identified and relayed nature of incident.
    - Decided to rapidly evacuate viable patients.
    - Rapidly assessed needs and anticipated resource needs.
    - Notified hospitals and back-up providers via multiple means.
- Highlighted the discipline of personnel:
  - Discipline of Boston EMS Personnel in knowing the MCI plan and assignments, as well as holding their positions until called for.
  - Radio traffic was calm and controlled.
  - Given it was a five-day long event between the bombing, the manhunt, the Presidential visit, and the capture, very few personnel injuries were seen.
  - Call volume increased dramatically given “see something, say something” encouragement.
- Promoted system sustainability and need to recognize EMS’ critical public safety role.
  - Whether a third service, fire-based, public, or private, proper funding is needed with good medical oversight to provide fast/inexpensive/high-quality care.
  - The cost of readiness, including training, preparedness, and drills, provides for a successful response; 15 years of preparation went towards personnels’ response on April 15, 2013.
  - Grant availability for EMS providers is key to getting funding for vital equipment like gators or ballistic gear, as well as training.



- Discussed the lessons learned from the incident:
  - Responding in a high-threat environment in a timely manner saves lives.
  - Law enforcement and EMS collaboration in unsecured scenes is important to get to people faster.
  - EMS personnel are used to no supervisory oversight, underscoring the importance of autonomy and independence of personnel.
  - Tourniquets save lives - Sophisticated CAT tourniquets were not available back then and are now a part of regular compliment; each member is issued their own and each EMS vehicle out on the street has multiple hemorrhage control kits.
  - Reevaluate what can be done better in the future.
  - The triage tags used were not user-friendly and were pointless when used on people without limbs.
  - Bystanders, including family members, friends, or strangers, were critical in this event - Public safety needs to work with them and start providing training.
  - Preparedness is the key to effective incident management.

## Questions

- What solutions have been implemented since the incident to improve critical communications and patient care (i.e., technology protocol)?
  - Radio systems were already in place in terms of notifications to hospitals but were lacking in the MEMA bunker; since then, the State has built out communications so that EMS agencies have their own radio channels and can communicate with their crews.
- Regarding the triage tag issue, can you elaborate more on that and what you would do different with them in the future, and discuss challenges with patient tracking?
  - Since then, our triage tags have changed and are more user-friendly; using triage tape has worked much better so each ambulance and supervisor vehicle has fanny packs with triage tape ready.
  - Identifying patients was huge challenge because crews, who were driving to hospitals and coming right back to scene, did not write reports.
  - The Office of Professional Standards created a chart based on all the EMS reports that came in and then listened to radio traffic to match up patients with what crew transported them, which took weeks.
  - Crews cannot be asked to write them every time during incident due to urgency of transporting but should also not be written hours later.
- What do steady state operations look like for the Department's Special Operations team?
  - There is a special operations group headed by a captain with four or five members assigned.



- During major events, the team brings all the equipment to the site and then break it down after the event.
- During days and evenings, the team carries a host of extra supplies in case it is needed.
- What information was shared from EMS to the CMED operator, and vice versa?
  - On a typical day, the CMED operator is on a radio console and helps direct ambulances that are going to area hospitals to do entry notifications.
  - In addition to verbal communication, the operator with assistance of extra staff was able to distribute crews to the right hospitals.

## THE FBI'S ROLE IN THE RESPONSE AND INVESTIGATION OF THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING

Summit recording link: [Due to the sensitive information provided during this presentation, recording is not available.](#)

*Courtland Rae, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, FBI Washington Field Office*

- Recounted the facts and provided insights of the Boston Marathon bombing:
  - The Marathon was a state and locally run event with FBI support.
  - One death occurred from the first explosion and two deaths from the second explosion.
  - The explosive devices were classified as pressure cooker types with a remote-control car detonator, and information on them is readily available online.
  - It was the first time an attack like this took place in the age of technology, cell phones, social media, etc.
  - Three key areas of focus for FBI during investigation: forensic evidence, digital evidence from public, and cell phone activity.
  - FBI benefited from technology-savvy agents that were comfortable with and adept at using social media.
  - It is critical to know your partners and your capabilities. Communications were good at the local/federal/state level as everyone acted appropriately to their mandates and no pre-bombing intel was missed.



## DIGITAL CONTENT ANALYSIS AND HOW THE TECHNOLOGY HAS PROGRESSED IN THE 10 YEARS SINCE THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING

**Summit recording link:** [Due to the sensitive information provided during this presentation, recording is not available.](#)

*Richard W. Vorder Bruegge, Senior Physical Scientist, FBI*

- Provided key insights into the investigation of the Boston Marathon Bombing:
  - The incident was a watershed moment for FBI in terms of processing data.
  - While binary hash existed to analyze and trim image evidence, it still required manual review and there were over 80,000 still images in addition to over 10,000 video files to view; hundreds of agents and analysts manually reviewed the evidence on individual workstations.
  - The FBI learned how to organize review of video data from the Boston Marathon, and it was the first time to send digital evidence “faster than the plane could fly to Quantico”.
  - There was a lack of a common framework for reviewing image and video evidence among intelligence agencies and this was a wakeup call on the need to improve the ability to process and triage large volumes of multimedia and digital evidence.
- Provided updates on Digital Content Analysis and how the technology has progressed:
  - Under the Digital Content Analysis Platform (DCAP), hundreds of hours of digital media can be reviewed in an hour.
  - Digital evidence tracking tags have been implemented.
  - It is now possible to use the open internet, on a secure portal, to send content to state and local partners.

## FROM CLUES TO CLOSURE: RESPONSE TO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING

**Summit recording link:** [From Clues to Closure: Response to the Investigation of the Boston Marathon Bombing](#)

**Moderator:** *Keil Green, CISA Support*

**Panelists:**

- *Ed Davis, President and CEO of the Edward Davis Company, Boston Police Commissioner (Ret)*
- *Richard H Fiske, SWIC, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety*
- *William Lessard, Captain, Boston EMS*
- *Courtland D. Rae, ASAC, FBI Washington Field Office*



## Panel Discussion

- Mr. Fiske, as you are the only new speaker, please introduce yourself and talk about the role of the Massachusetts SWIC as well as initiatives you are working on currently/over the past few years:
  - *Mr. Fiske:*
  - Reports to the Undersecretary for Homeland Security up in the Executive Office of Public Safety.
  - Served as SWIC for three years and, before that, 17 years as law enforcement until he moved into a 911 role and emergency management at the state level.
  - Had a unique perspective having been a police officer and then a SWIC; was able to see communications and interoperability in the street and now as SWIC is able to have an impact and make a difference.
  - Deployed a statewide Next Generation I3 compliant 911 system, which allows all 250 PSAPS to seamlessly share data, calls, or mapping with each other.
  - Awarded a contract for a statewide land mobile radio (LMR) system upgrade, for a system called the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Interoperable Radio System (CoMIRS).
    - This is a \$130 million project supported by 911 and state funding to create a statewide LMR interoperable radio system that every public safety user in every discipline has access to for interoperability.
  - The Boston Area Regional Police Radio Network (BAPRN) was the first interoperable LMR solution in Massachusetts and has been widely built out to cover 27 cities and towns in and around Boston, the North Shore, and South Shore.
    - CoMIRS and BAPRN have been tied together for interoperability.
- Having mentioned the MEMA bunker, Captain Lessard, what was it like to be in an emergency operations center when a mass casualty incident occurred?
  - *Captain Lessard:*
  - 2013 was his first year doing a command post like that: one large room with everyone working – 78 people in the building that time.
  - The EMS department had no communications in the bunker, they only had two laptops: one for computer-aided dispatch (CAD) and another for the WebEOC, with no cell service.
- Commissioner Davis, let's talk about the phone calls you had made during the incident, what capabilities did you have and what capabilities did you wish you had? Other panelists may respond, as well.
  - *Commissioner Davis:*
  - Texting worked fine.



- Used to using a telephone for voice communication, as it was how operations were run in the police department; was really inhibited during incident when it was not available.
- Turned to push-to-talk radio but some of the conversations could not be held in the clear (unclassified/unsecured).
- When something like this happens, “the whole world wants to talk to you.”
- *ASAC Rae:*
- In addition to operational calls and emails coming in, well-wishers want to check in which leads to triaging of phone calls, emails, and text messages at the same time.
- Got a heavy volume of emails that go to phone, an additional factor that needs to be triaged.
- We have seen this idea of everyone wanting to help, including self-dispatch; Rich, can you speak to that as it relates to our conversation?
  - *Mr. Fiske:*
  - To the self-dispatch component, every cop in Massachusetts wanted to help which led to a logistical nightmare.
  - On the technology side, with factors that were not accounted for back then, the LMR system on certain police network channels operates statewide.
  - Some out of region law enforcement used their radio to try and discern information regarding the incident; technicians had to turn off the channels because the system was being killed due to overcapacity and loading.
  - Back then, robust networks were not available such as FirstNet, the bunkers did not have the boosters for cell phone connection, and we lacked core connected radio consoles.
- Regarding the rumor of Federal agents turning off the cellular networks so that they could not talk to each other, do you remember having to deal with this misinformation at the time? This can be either on the FBI side or the Boston Police side.
  - *Commissioner Davis:*
  - The biggest rumor was that the FBI or that the Boston Police had a secret device to shut down the cellphone networks, which is absolutely untrue...Misinformation was definitely a problem during the incident.
- Regarding data, was there information being shared between you all and how was it being shared in a response like this?
  - *ASAC Rae:*
  - From the FBI side, if local/state/federal partners join the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) then information sharing becomes seamless.
  - From an interoperability standpoint, we try to be as inclusive as possible in the JTTF.





- We had people deployed in the MEMA bunker, Boston Police Command Post, and the FBI Command Post which made communication flow better.
- *Captain Lessard:*
- One of our paramedics is assigned to the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) so that on a day-to-day basis we can get intelligence from the BRIC and pass it out to our crews.
- Commissioner, do you want to talk about partnerships?
  - *Commissioner Davis:*
  - Identify who your partners are going to be in bad situations and bring them in beforehand.
  - We would meet with the heads of other agencies frequently; we would all have breakfast together and knew each other personally so that information was easily attainable and could be trusted.
- Rich, the SWIC's job is really one of partnerships, I'll give you the final word on that topic.
  - *Mr. Fiske:*
  - The BRIC and the Commonwealth Fusion Center run by the state over the last several years has developed into more of a partnership than a competition; there is no silo.
- Where did social media fit in, was that something you were looking at to push information?
  - *Commissioner Davis:*
  - It was studied extensively after the incident because it was the first time that a police agency had used social media extensively to interact with the public.
  - Prepare to be met with dialogue and respond; do not treat it as a public announcement system, it takes away half the power by doing that.
  - *ASAC Rae:*
  - From the FBI standpoint, it was very much a source of leads.
  - There was quite a dialogue on Reddit.
  - We did not use it as proactively as the Boston Police in terms of communicating with the public at the time.
  - Have a plan in terms of how you are going to address the media leak issue because it will impact operations.
- Tell me a little bit more about the role of a 911 dispatcher in an incident like this?
  - *Captain Lessard:*
  - For people in our dispatch operations, everyone is an EMT or a paramedic first.
  - These dispatchers are well versed in handling big events; we have a tactical dispatcher who oversees an exclusive radio frequency for all dispatchers.



- We have a disaster radio network that notifies every hospital at once what the event is and how many patients they can expect.
- Where would NG911 fit into an incident like this?
  - Mr. Fiske:
  - Geographically, the incident happened in cities very close together; it would have greatly improved the call routing to the correct PSAPS.
  - PSAPS need to communicate with each other on a day-to-day basis to figure out where a call is coming from and know which PSAP answers it.
- Let's talk about the biggest advancement and biggest remaining challenge in the last 10 years.
  - *Commissioner Davis:*
  - FirstNet takes care of many problems that we previously worried about.
  - Video played an enormous role in this case, and we need more work on privacy concerns because it is such a contentious issue right now.
  - *Mr. Fiske:*
  - The broadband wireless component in 2013 proved to be a big problem and the system we have now is much improved in how it is able to process the volume of traffic that we need to process day-to-day.
  - Our investment in LMR systems for public safety in all disciplines at the regional level is going to prove invaluable in coverage and capacity for the first responders in our state.
  - Funding and sustainability in these systems will be a challenge; we need support from all our stakeholders at the regional level up to the federal level.
  - *Captain Lessard:*
  - Tourniquets proved their worth that day and continue to prove their worth.
  - Issues we still need to work on are funding, training, preparing, and staffing (particularly hospital staffing).
  - *ASAC Rae:*
  - FBI's ability to process vast quantities of data is greatly improved; now we have passed the point where we have a system, in other words, an infrastructure.
  - An existing issue is the proliferation of internet and social media; this has made it far easier for our adversaries to plan/hatch/initiate an attack without law enforcement knowing.
- What was the role of not-for-profits in the response and were they involved in the planning?
  - *Commissioner Davis:*
  - They played a huge role in stepping up.
  - The OneFund raised money for the people affected by the incident.



- The incorporation of public health tapped non-profit agencies to help in the recovery.

## THE CHALLENGES OF A MASS CASUALTY EVENT IN THE NCR

Summit recording link: [The Challenges of a Mass Casualty Event in the NCR](#)

*John Donnelly Sr., Chief, DC Fire and EMS (DCFEMS)*

*Jim Schwartz, Senior Fellow Harvard Kennedy School, Program on Crisis Leadership*

- What would the response look like to a similar event in the NCR?
  - Pre-planned MCI, there is already a command post set up (one in Arlington and one in DC).
  - Support is free to move freely among jurisdictions to support event.
  - Messaging would need to happen and would be coordinated between regional leaders.
  - Mutual aid plan in NCR; marathon deploys response units from across NCR/
  - It is easy to ask for resources from neighboring counties. Fire chiefs and operations chiefs are empowered to make phone call to discuss resource needs. This happened during January 6th.
  - Supporting each other is more than just responding during an emergency (Example firefighter in southern Maryland died in line of duty and fire fighters from Washington DC covered for the station so they could attend the funeral and mourn the loss of their own). Personnel were able to talk on radios which speaks to the interoperability.
  - The NCR has a lot of experience with ICS.
- ICS suggests everything is very linear.
  - Unified Command is only commanding when someone can make decisions.
- Regional mass casualty plans are socialized with hospitals, public health, and across NCR public safety agencies to appropriate staff.
- Scenario at Marine Core Marathon is like the Boston Marathon:
  - Need to protect incident site.
  - Shut down rail system.
  - Impacts may become more political than just operational.
- Most of the time operators do not need the involvement of policy makers.
  - Shutting down a transportation system, for example, doesn't need policy makers.
- The problem of self-deployment is a real issue.
  - Losing accountability jeopardizes safety of personnel.
  - Need to accept the citizen responders and make use of them; be flexible with plans.



- FEMA “You are the Help” program empowers citizens to act because there are not enough responders right away to assist all the injured during a mass casualty incident.
- With a big event like Marine Core Marathon, many technologies and tools will be brought in
  - Information on social media is very important, although assignments are ad-hoc.
- Our first responders are exposed to a lot of trauma, leading to behavioral health playing a much larger role in public safety now than it did in previous years.
- The behavioral health approach in the NCR:
  - Fire departments begin to think about it early in the incident, after the lives are saved, but early in the incident.

## CLOSING REMARKS – DAY 1

Summit recording link: [Closing Remarks – Day 1](#)

*Charles Guddemi, SWIC DC HSEMA*

- Looked at the theme of the 10-year anniversary of Boston Marathon; the goal of this Summit is to learn from the past and improve capabilities for the future.
  - Summarized key points from presentations.
  - AD Haglund
    - Five Ds of Security.
    - Over 250,000 retailers sell some sort of bomb-making materials or components.
    - Terrorist Attack Cycle.
    - BOMBER acronym.
    - UAS Threat.
  - Commissioner Davis
    - Received the call that the bombing occurred at the marathon.
    - They cleared the venue of casualties in about 22 minutes.
    - Used a slash and tag method learned from the Israelis to clear bags/render safe.
  - Captain Lessard
    - Planning and preparedness for the marathon was a controlled MCI.
    - Utilized UASI grant money.
    - Coordinating with eight cities in a complex manner.
    - Use of tourniquets was crucial.
    - Everyone that was transported survived.
  - ASAC Rae



- It was unclear whether incident was a domestic or international terrorist attack.
- Issue with self-deployment and weapons discipline.
- Issue with blue-on-blue attack.
- Mr. Vorder Bruegge
  - Processed 100,000 still images using binary hash and review manually.
  - Used lessons from Boston Marathon Bombing to analyze forensics for Navy Yard shooting.
- Mr. Fiske
  - Relationships are critical and must exist left of boom.
  - Misinformation with the media is an issue.
  - The use of social media came into play for Boston Marathon.
- Chief Donnelly
  - The origin of interoperability goes back to 1982 with Air Florida for LMR.
  - National Incident Management System (NIMS) plays a big part in standardizing operations.
  - Citizens are on our side and are not the enemy; they need management and training to be effective.



## WELCOME REMARKS – DAY 2

Summit recording link: [Welcome Remarks – Day 2](#)

*James Farley, Interoperability Program Analyst, DC HSEMA*

- Provided administrative and safety announcements related to the 2023 DC Interoperability Summit before Introducing Charles Guddemi for the Welcoming Remarks.
- Highlighted September as National Preparedness Month.

*Charles Guddemi, DC SWIC*

- Remarked on the Summit becoming a national program, with 33 states and territories participating this year.
- Highlighted the program’s goals to expand and spread the important message of interoperability.
- Emphasized that “if you’re worried about communications when you need them, then it’s too late”, underscoring the criticality of planning ahead of an incident.
- Described the agenda for Day 2, with presentations and panels focused on the emergency communications ecosystem.
- Promoted the 2024 Texas A&M University Interoperability Institute occurring May 6-10, 2024.

## CHANGING THE COURSE: NATIONAL TRENDS IN MANAGING SPECIAL EVENT COMMUNICATIONS

Summit recording link: [Changing the Course: National Trends in Managing Special Event Communications](#)

*Charles Guddemi, DC SWIC*

- Highlighted the purpose of the presentation: examine after-action reports from different types of special event incidents to identify common themes and align to recommendations/guidance.
- Noted that pre-planned special events provide opportunities and challenges with regards to communications.
  - Lack of disaster planning mindset can lead to significant communications challenges.
  - Mass-casualty incidents require the integration of public service partners (e.g., hospitals, public health) with public safety communications.
- Gave a detailed review of the events:



- **Station Nightclub Fire** - Unauthorized pyrotechnics at a Great White concert ignited a fire that decimated the club, killing 100 and injuring over 200 people. Classified as the 4<sup>th</sup> deadliest nightclub fire in US history.
- **Indiana State Fair Stage Collapse** - High winds from a severe thunderstorm occurring in the area caused the stage to collapse into the crowd waiting for Sugarland to perform, killing seven and injuring approximately 60.
- **Manchester Arena Bombing** - Islamic extremist Salman Abedi detonated a bomb in the area foyer after an Ariana Grande concert, killing 22 and injuring hundreds.
- **Route 91 Harvest Festival** - Stephen Paddock broke the windows of his 32<sup>nd</sup> floor suite in the Mandalay Bay Hotel and open fired onto the Route 91 Harvest Festival, killing 61 and wounding approximately 1,000. Motives remain unknown.
- **Astroworld Crowd Surge** - A crowd surge occurred during Travis Scott's set killing 10 people and injuring hundreds during Astroworld Festival.
- Discussed common themes between the events:
  - Breaks in the Interoperability Chain (Events: Route 91, Astroworld).
  - Special events may be staffed by third party/private services (e.g., EMS, security) that often do not have direct interoperability capabilities with local responders (fire and police).
  - Lack of radio communications delays and confuses response operations (e.g., determining, the nature, location, and magnitude of the problem).
  - Degradation of Service (Events: Manchester Arena Bombing, Astroworld, Route 91).
  - Phone/cellular systems are often strained due to high user volume at the special event, and then become completely overwhelmed, and/or fail from the additional influx of attempted usage when an incident occurs.
  - Event venue itself may compound these challenges.
  - PSAPs/ECCs become overwhelmed with incoming calls from the incident, often repeating known information and creating increased demand.
  - Strain on System/Capacity Issues/Equipment (Events: Astroworld, Route 91, Station Club Fire).
  - Inherent system constraints can result in loss of communications; systems are not designed for the volume of surge that occurs in MCI.
  - Lack of proper equipment (i.e., noise cancelling headsets, earpieces, etc.) may impact quality of communications.
  - Unified Command/Decision Authorities (All events).
  - Lack of clarity on who has the authority to start/stop the event can delay notification to attendees.
  - Unclear plan for alerts and notifications within the venue; event personalities may interfere with or confuse messaging to attendees.



- Need to manage recall and assignment of personnel, potentially multi-jurisdictional and reduce/manage self-deployment.
- Presented recommended practices that can be taken to address common issues:
  - Have integrated communications plans to support multi-agency/multi-jurisdictional interoperability.
  - ICS 205/217a and PACE plan developed by the Communications Unit.
  - Have a pre-planned MCI talk-group that includes third-party service providers (e.g., EMS, security).
  - Plan for data access and interoperability and ensure the ability to securely store large amounts of data.
  - Plan for the unique issues around patient data and transfer of care.
  - Ensure Alerts and Warnings capabilities are detailed in advance and integrated with event operations.
  - Promoted PACE training and its availability nationwide.

## THE CALL FOR HELP! ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF HIGH VOLUME 911 CALLS IN MASS CASUALTY SITUATIONS

Summit recording link: [The Call for Help! Addressing the Challenges of High Volume 911 Calls in Mass Casualty Situations](#)

### Moderator:

- *Keil Green, CISA Support*

### Panelists:

- *Scott Brillman, Director, Fairfax County 911*
- *Renee Gordon, Director, City of Alexandria Department of Emergency and Customer Communications*
- *Heather McGaffin, Director, Office of Unified Communications*

### Panel Discussion

- Moderator welcomed the panel and highlighted the main question regarding our preparedness as of today before beginning the conversation.
- What does a normal day look like?
  - *Ms. McGaffin:*
  - We get more calls in summertime, get 20 million visitors to D.C.
  - When you go to a city to visit, do you find out what's going on in that city?
  - We've had crazy storms in D.C., with different events that we haven't see before
  - It can happen on any day, often when we're least expecting it, so we need to be prepared.
  - 18-25 call takers on each day, historically at night we have less call volume.





- *Ms. Gordon:*
- There is no normal day, the other day we had two barricades break down.
- What's important is that police and fire understand what we're (911) going through as well.
- Sometimes you're getting advice from us because we've been through the same experiences many times so it's important that we train together and communicate what's going on, having those conversations and we're talking about interoperability here.
- What happens when one of these extraordinary incidents occurs?
  - *Mr. Brillman:*
  - We're used to call spikes, where an incident happens and over 100 calls pop up on the board.
  - We need to remember that we aren't fire or police, we can't just call in for backup.
  - When we're overloaded, we need to proactively reach out to our partners to start taking calls.
  - *Ms. McGaffin:*
  - No one comes to get us; we are in a save-ourselves situation.
  - You're not going to find a PSAP that's doing the same thing as you.
  - We're committed to finding common ground in how we operate but it's not easy.
- What does the call volume look like when unnecessary information gets in?
  - *Ms. McGaffin:*
  - We're fortunate, we push callers like that to 3-1-1.
  - The other big portion is reunification.
    - In the Connecticut Avenue shooting several springs ago, we were getting many calls from concerned parents wondering where to pick up their kids.
      - We train our 3-1-1 service representatives in reunification.
  - Call volume can be the same for hours, if not days.
  - *Mr. Brillman:*
  - It's everything except emergencies at that point (high call volume), we often blame our predecessors for teaching people how to call 911 well.
    - We need to do a better job of screening these calls before they go to an operator.
  - In Baltimore, during the Boston Bombing, we were getting calls from people seeing backpacks in the Inner Harbor being left and it could have been a kid leaving their things; something happening in one city doesn't necessarily happen in ours.
- How are you dealing with text to 911 and have we moved into NG911?
  - *Ms. Gordon:*
  - Text wasn't as big as we thought it would be.



- We have remote call takers, which people don't know about, but they're expensive.
- With the barricades, we had people remotely start taking calls because we were getting overwhelmed.
- *Ms. McGaffin:*
- On the national level, we're pushing the technology and mandates, but we leave these small states and regional areas behind.
- NG911 is expensive and costs the same regardless of state/local funding capabilities.
- Among the possible disruptions to 911 centers, let's talk about cybersecurity.
  - *Mr. Brillman:*
  - People with fire/police/911 backgrounds aren't very familiar with it.
  - We don't do enough to learn about the technology we use in 911.
  - What is cybersecurity, cyber resiliency, how should we respond?
  - Everyone in the 911 center needs basic cybersecurity awareness training.
- Where do you guys think you are in training and exercises? Is it still emerging?
  - *Ms. Gordon:*
  - In Alexandria, we have our IT dept that handles the cybersecurity part of it.
    - They force us to train.
    - The thought of getting attacked is scary; we need to know what to do and I'm not sure if we do.
    - We have the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) meeting coming up with all the PSAP directors, and the cybersecurity conversation needs to come up.
- Do you turn to each other for backup? Can you guys talk about that redundancy, how much of that is planned or do you just know each other well?
  - *Ms. McGaffin:*
  - If I'm getting a crazy thunderstorm they probably are too; our nearest neighbors really aren't the help in that situation.
  - On an event like January 6th, Alexandria was getting a lot of calls.
    - Our supervisors are doing the work and talking to each other and updating us.
  - When we have weather events, everyone is dealing with their own thing, so we must take that into consideration.
    - It's about getting that governance structure in place, those memorandums of understanding (MOUs).
    - At some point you must reciprocate, and what is that going to look like.
  - *Mr. Brillman:*
  - We have plans, backup plans, paper-and-pencil; if it's technology, it's subject to break.

- It doesn't have to be our computers it could be our software that could be controlled from somewhere else in the world, so understanding what to do in that case is key.
- *Ms. Gordon:*
- There's also the politics of it all: if I'm taking Heather's calls, who's taking my calls?
  - The residents would want to know those answers before we take on all of this.
  - That has gotten in the way of us coming up with MOUs that we can practice.
- *Ms. McGaffin:*
- Just because it's cloud-based doesn't mean it doesn't live somewhere.
  - Cutting some fiber could take out multiple counties in 911.
- Do you guys have a role in getting information back out to the public?
  - *Mr. Brillman:*
  - It depends which center you are at; some are responsible for mass notification and others rely on their emergency managers.
    - Those two entities need to marry each other.
      - In the past, about 10 years ago, 911 directors were buried underneath layers of police/fire department leadership and weren't participating in any type of Unified Command or conference calls to develop messaging to the public.
      - Now, we are at the level of people that are in a Unified Command structure.
  - We need to be in the mix developing that messaging to people.
    - You may get a rookie that says the wrong thing, and then we get call spikes.
    - It's important that police/fire understand us, and how their messaging impacts us.
- How do the partnerships get formed within the 911 centers, maintained, and any best practices?
  - *Ms. McGaffin:*
  - We all know each other from the Maryland PSAPs and through projects and collaborations we've got to know each other.
  - This industry is small, so we know a good majority of the people running the 911 centers.
  - We are at MWCOG meetings, where all the 911 directors come together.
  - Even if we all do things differently, the functionality is the same.
- What do you want people to be focused on in the 911 world?
  - *Ms. Gordon:*
  - Include us for those important decisions so that we can make sure we have enough staffing to support you.

- *Mr. Brillman:*
- We depend on our vendors for most of our technology.
- Message to our vendors, small or large, is that anything you do, make sure it's accessible to everyone and interoperable; don't create something for us that we can't share with our partners.
- *Ms. McGaffin:*
- 911 will always be a human-based service.
  - Text wasn't as big of a deal when it first came out; calls are still more reassuring than a text back.
- AI can't replace the men and women who take these calls every day.
- People can take between 70-80 calls a day, no one talks about how amazing this job is; we must be talking about how good the career is.
- We must be categorized (public safety) the same as the organizations (fire/police), telecommunicators are currently categorized as administrative personnel.

## Questions

- Can you speak to consistency of training for dispatchers across jurisdictions, what are the barriers for dispatchers assisting remotely from across the country during a disaster, and does OnStar help with call searches?
  - *Ms. McGaffin:*
  - OnStar does not, they use a call protocol processing system and gives you the information they gathered but they still have to contact us.
  - *Ms. Gordon:*
  - In Alexandria, we have a call-taker in Georgia and one in Tennessee, we may have one in California due to the benefit of the time difference.
    - In training these call-takers I need to use people who are former employees.
    - I don't have a training set up for them and training across the country is difficult, 'either you know my system, or you don't'.
  - *Mr. Brillman:*
  - Basic-level training is the same across the country.
    - If I need a call answered in the future, I could pick a state and they could answer the call using national standard protocol.
    - The difficulty is dispatching local units.
  - *Ms. Gordon:*
  - One of our biggest issues is the call type, and making sure that we are getting the right call in there.
  - The technology can translate what we want, so it is possible.
- There have been threat actors using artificial intelligence to spoof voices and disrupt 911 calls, is this something that your PSAPs are concerned about and what steps are you

taking to mitigate this emerging issue? How do you see your vetting process changing in response to NG911 and deep fake videos?

- *Ms. McGaffin:*
- There was one a couple weeks ago at the Capitol, the Capitol was then put on lockdown.
  - Our call taker realized something was off and we were able to put the call out and they immediately sent someone over.
- *Mr. Brillman:*
- For years we were only concerned with denial-of-service attacks but with new technologies comes new problems.
- I would urge elected officials to look at this as a serious problem and create laws to try and fight it.
- What are your current options for mass server NG911 type outages at your PSAPs for instance does D.C. reroute temporarily to Arlington?
  - *Ms. McGaffin:*
  - We can, we're using data centers just like everyone else; the data centers aren't here on our premises.
  - *Ms. Gordon:*
  - In Alexandria, we share a phone system with Arlington.
    - We have an A and B servers where we can go back and forth, that's our redundancy.

## **SECONDS COUNT: UNDERSTANDING THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF THE INITIAL MEDICAL/EMS RESPONSE IN MASS CASUALTY INCIDENTS**

**Summit recording link: [Seconds Count: Understanding the Vital Importance of the Initial Medical/EMS Response in Mass Casualty Incidents](#)**

### **Moderator:**

- *Tom Gagnon, CISA Emergency Communications Coordinator*

### **Panelists:**

- *Dr. Brian W. Amy MD, MPH, FACS, FACPM, Chief Medical Officer Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Administration (HEPRA), DC Department of Health*
- *Craig DeAtley PA-C, Director, Institute for Public Health Emergency Readiness at MedStar Washington Hospital Center*
- *Dr. Robert Holman, Medical Director DC FEMS*
- *Brendan Sinatro, Director Emergency Management DC Hospital Association/DC Health and Medical Coalition Hospital Unit Lead*

## Panel Discussion

- Moderator addresses attendees and welcomes panelists before beginning the conversation with a scenario; he proposes that there has been a bombing during the Marine Corps Marathon within the vicinity of the D.C./Virginia line. At least 100 runners are injured and people are starting to receive treatment and be transported.
- Dr. Holman, let's start with the process and immediate actions DC FEMS takes being boots-on-the-ground first?
  - *Dr. Holman:*
  - D.C. has a daytime population of 1.1 million.
  - Highest per capita 911 calls in country.
  - Initial responses are getting units to the scene.
  - We have EMS captains in our 911 call center coordinating responses to the scene.
  - If we have 100 people on the ground, we quickly declare the incident as a mass casualty.
  - Units begin SALT triage and set up Incident Command immediately.
  - Our Emergency Liaison Officers (ELOs) begin hospital distribution.
  - We will notify DC Health, DC Hospital Coalition Notification Center, HSEMA, the Executive Office of the Mayor (EOM).
- How does DC FEMS deal with chaos and fog of war?
  - *Dr. Holman:*
  - There will be a tremendous amount of chaos and people surrounding the scene will immediately post updates to social media.
    - Event will be amplified and confuse and create this fog of war.
  - Rumors will spread which makes establishing Incident Command and interoperability between partners very crucial.
  - Political leadership needs to get in front of cameras immediately to communicate updates and give advice.
- Craig, how are hospitals getting the heads-up of this and what are they doing to start preparing for the incoming casualties?
  - *Mr. DeAtley:*
  - Hospitals are getting information from several different sources, beginning with the ELOs and through our information sharing networks.
  - We will question units arriving to our facilities.
  - We will speak to patients that may arrive ahead of EMS.
  - The information from the ELO, who indicate the level of the MCI, will give us a starting point on how big the incident is.
  - A shared table with all hospitals will help us anticipate how many red, yellow, or green tag patients the hospital might be receiving.



- With patients arriving and hospitals approaching saturation, how does patient distribution come into the equation?
  - *Mr. DeAtley:*
  - The ELO is working with the on-scene Incident Command.
  - The hospital shared table helps with guidance.
  - Hospitals receiving patients and sharing information over time allows us to feed information back instead of waiting for information to come forward.
- Around this point, DC Health's HEPRA is starting to stand up. Dr. Amy, how does HEPRA turn on and how do they orchestrate the overall patient distribution?
  - *Dr. Amy:*
  - On an event like this, we're already prepared and on high alert.
  - We'll set up the Incident Command center if not already set up.
  - We send the ELO officer to HSEMA.
  - We'll alert our hospitals through Everbridge and the health and medical coalition.
  - Information and interoperability are key.
    - We will begin getting information from the scene and information from our hospitals as to their status. (We are fortunate in the District to have four trauma centers.)
  - As EMS begins to distribute patients, we all work with the same set of information.
    - With this unity of facts, we share information back to EMS.
- As a follow-up, how about critical life-saving equipment distribution?
  - *Dr. Amy:*
  - All the hospitals feed us information regularly and this is enhanced during emergencies.
  - We use information-based tools to provide information on what is needed and blood availability.
- Let's say we are in the situation where most of the hospitals are reaching the saturation point and we need to expand the radius of supporting hospitals; how does air medical get coordinated?
  - *Dr. Amy:*
  - DC Health plays an important part with ground transportation.
    - We also certify hospitals through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to bring in ambulances and personnel from neighboring states.
  - If we do any air flights, we are fortunate to have many air transports in the area.
  - We also begin asking for resources through HSEMA, our federal partners, and you will begin to see other federal and state entities come into play with additional support.



- *Mr. DeAtley:*
- It is key to understand that MedEvac could potentially have two roles, one to participate in scene transport and to assist with inter-facility transports to upgrade patient care.
- Mr. Sinatro, how does the coalition get involved in coordinating dispatch of patients?
  - *Mr. Sinatro:*
  - The health and medical coalition is a Multi-Agency Coordinating System
    - Has large depth and breadth.
  - When the Health Emergency Coordinating Center (HECC) with HEPRA is activated, it leverages associations to filter critical information.
  - We have the capability to activate blood products-on-hand dashboards and surge management dashboards that provide information on ICU beds and operating beds.
  - We use the Everbridge tool to understand EMS transport and understand saturation and bed availability.
  - We can do a call for bed availability once we have expanded beyond the red, yellow, green footprint outlined from the hospital table.
  - Get information from hospital- regular cadence of meetings.
  - We can get on situational teleconferences and get an assessment of our hospitals and what their needs are.
- Let's talk about family reunification, Brendan do you want to start?
  - *Mr. Sinatro:*
  - We have the Chesapeake Regional Information System for Patients (CRISP) tool that has a family reunification component.
    - Takes unique identifiers and ties it back to patients.
  - *Mr. DeAtley:*
  - A few authorized individuals can make a phone call or push a button to populate PII that can help locate patients.
  - The volume of patients may cause a change to emergency registration, that will involve a use of pseudonyms.
    - The CRISP system will not be effective until real names are put in.
  - All hospitals in Maryland are part of the CRISP system in D.C.
  - We rehearse the system quarterly.
- What trainings are happening in D.C. to prepare for this event?
  - *Mr. DeAtley:*
  - From a hospital perspective, all of us are Joint Commission accredited.
    - Joint Commission sets out regulatory standards in the arena of emergency management that we must meet.
    - Two exercises per year with D.C. partners and regional partners.
    - A substitution for drills and exercises can be real-world emergencies.





- The coalition does an annual exercise for the whole system.
- Is there an overarching governance body that pulls together these agencies or is it an informal collaboration process?
  - *Dr. Amy:*
  - HEPRA is only one of six administrations within DOH.
  - We work seamlessly at all levels daily.
    - Everyone comes under the umbrella of overarching government agencies.
    - We are all interlocked in our response and in our trainings.
  - *Dr. Holman:*
  - Our members have a great deal of experience with trauma.
  - Leadership is experienced with setting up special events operations and establishing cross agency partnership.

### Questions

- Information sharing is reliant on emergency management resources. What is the backup if that system becomes unavailable?
  - *Mr. Sinatro:*
  - We could look at our redundant systems and leverage the DOH radios and do a pen and paper call.
  - *Mr. DeAtley:*
  - Use the fax machine as an alternative to face-to-face and telecommunications.

## INTEGRATING HOSPITALS INTO THE WHOLE OF COMMUNITY THREAT DISASTER RESPONSE

Summit recording link: [Integrating Hospitals into the Whole of Community Threat Disaster Response](#)

*Dr. E. Reed Smith, Operational Medical Director Arlington County (VA) Fire and Police Departments*

- How do we improve survival?
  - First thing, as much as we love our military, this isn't military combat, and many assumptions have been made in the case of 'if it works for the military it works for us'.
  - Cannot assume that if it works for military it will work for us.
    - The injury pattern and wounds in active shooter events and bombings are different than what the military sees.
    - Less exsanguinating extremity wounds.
    - Higher severity blunt trauma than in combat.
    - Lower yield explosives are used in these bombings.
    - Higher casualty fatality rate since people aren't wearing body armor.

- Overall fewer potentially survivable wounds.
- Explained the system goal: zero preventable death.
  - If it is treatable, you can be prevented from dying.
  - Focused on bleeding and getting everyone a tourniquet.
  - We must look at torso and chest injury, head injury, airway problems, hypothermia, body disorders, etc.
- Discussed guidelines of Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC).
  - Civilian medical care framework for rapid patient stabilization in civilian high threat events.
  - This is the same process as our military, but it is civilian based.
- Walked through how to achieve maximal survival rate.
  - Empower immediate care to the wounded by other citizens.
  - Coordinate rapid access to wounded by first responders.
  - Rapidly apply stabilizing TECC treatments at or near the site of wounding.
  - Expediently evacuate to closest medical facility.
- Visualized the TECC chain of survival.
  - Past incidents have shown that to improve survival, we need a system of *coordinated* response and medical care.
  - The chain includes:
    - Active bystanders
    - Law enforcement
    - Fire/EMS
    - Community hospitals
    - Trauma centers
- What have we been doing all this time?
  - Law Enforcement TECC:
    - Improve survival by equipping and training law enforcement officers in TECC to fill the gap until EMS providers arrive.
      - “Stop the killing then stop the dying”.
  - Fire/EMS Warm Zone Ops:
    - Improve survival through coordinated rapid access to the wounded despite on-going risk; access to the injured is the first medical intervention.
    - Improve survival through training and equipping Fire/EMS teams to apply advanced TECC stabilization at or near the point of wounding.
  - Create Active Bystanders:
    - Immediate care is key.
    - Citizens are willing to help.
    - There are more bystanders than first responders; make bystanders part of the solution.

- Stop the bleed is not enough, stop the clock on all causes of preventable death.
  - Teach bystanders how to think, how to move a wounded person to safety, and provide psychological support for community.
- Hospital First Receivers:
- Success is equal to the integrity of the chain.
  - Hospitals play a critical role in the chain of survival and the overall successful mitigation of the event.
  - If hospital response falters, the reverberations will cause the whole chain to break.
- Hospital emergency planning.
  - Hospital disaster planning is mostly a check-the-box activity.
  - Often not supported/prioritized by the C Suite.
  - Often based on a variety of disaster myths not supported by evidence or case studies.
- Engaged the audience in busting common myths and providing evidence-based truths.
  - Hospital security:
  - Myth: hospitals are hallowed and sacred ground, considered to be universal safe havens from bombs, bullets, and brutalities.
  - Truth: Hospitals are the softest of soft critical infrastructure.
    - Incident creates large operational and psychological impact.
    - At least three dozen terrorist organizations advocate bombing civilian hospitals.
  - Event notification:
  - Myth: public safety will notify hospitals promptly of a disaster and the numbers/types/severity of casualties being transported.
  - Truth: Hospital notifications will not occur immediately.
    - The ‘fog of war’ and chaos in the initial response leads to delays in notifications.
    - The hospital will be notified with minimal, or no, time to prepare, often from arriving patients themselves.
    - Even when notified, hospital plans take time to implement.
  - Patient distribution:
  - Myth: Patient flow will be evenly distributed, and no hospital will receive a patient if it’s not ready.
  - Truth: patients arrive in overwhelming surges.
    - Route 91 Festival shooting:
      - The closest medical facility was a small boutique hospital (Desert Springs). One doctor working a single-staffed ER received 93 patients in one hour.
      - The second closest hospital (Sunrise), a level two facility, received 150 patients in 40 minutes.

- Myth: If a hospital is not a trauma center it doesn't need to worry about a mass casualty incident.
- Truth: "We aren't a trauma center" is not an excuse:
  - Patient movement is predictable. The closest hospital will get hit the hardest. People search for the closest hospital; the closer hospital will get way more patients than a nearby level one trauma center.
  - Hospital coordinating centers take time to get operational and get bed counts. In the first ten minutes, no information will be in the systems.
  - Under stress and confusion, EMS personnel tend to go where they know.
    - Even if the organization says to go somewhere else, the stressed provider may go screw it and go to what they know.
- Patient transport:
- Myth: All casualties will be transported to the hospital by ambulance.
- Truth: Citizens will not wait to be transported.
  - Expect non-EMS patient transports.
  - Disaster planning is based on bounded, controlled events.
    - Patients may be gone before EMS even get on scene.
    - In 46.3% of violent events, people are transported without being touched by EMS.- Go by cab, car, or police.
- Field treatment is not a guarantee:
- Hospitals are used to EMS delivering packaged patients.
- Hospitals need to be trained to do rapid primary stabilization.
- Effective on-scene triage:
- Reverse triage is the norm.
  - The minimally wounded are often able to self-evacuate and get to the hospital first.
    - Patients transported by a privately owned vehicle (POV) have a significantly lower injury severity score (ISS).
  - Worried well can significantly impact the ability to care for more seriously injured arriving later.
- Hospital triage:
- Myth: Hospitals will effectively manage patients and their severity of injuries.
- Truth: Current triage systems fail in hospital mass casualty.
  - Emergency Severity Index (ESI) triage is for normal front door operations. Nursing and physician staff have no idea about disaster training.
  - START/SALT triage will fail in the hospital.
    - Takes too long and is too complex.
    - Based on unreliable measured physiology.
    - Too difficult to recall under significant stress.
    - Fails to account for severe but ambulatory.

- Triage by an experienced provider based on ‘gut’ has been shown to be superior.
  - Should it be your senior trauma or ED doc? No proof that senior trauma or ED are any better than anyone else- and -it takes those providers away from critical patients.
- Patient tracking:
- Myth: Every patient will be appropriately tracked by EMS for efficient family reunification and family members will go to the family reunification centers to find their loved ones.
- Truth: Tracking in the field will fail or won’t be done.
  - Regional web- and EOC-based systems are too complicated and most likely will be abandoned.
  - Hospitals are central to the process, families will call or just come to the hospital when looking for loved ones.
  - Chaos will reign at first, have a plan for the first two hours at least.
    - First hour will be chaos and disorganization:
      - Not enough beds or staff to accept patients.
      - Equipment and supply shortages.
      - Non-ending phone calls from family, etc..
      - Law enforcement inquiries and evidence preservation needs.
      - Self-deploying staff without knowledge of plan.
    - Expect disruptive breakdowns and threats:
      - Failures in data systems and interfaces.
      - Media inquiries and intrusions.
      - Hospital Admin and VIPS demanding information.
      - Anxious and irate family members looking for family or demanding help for their loved one.
      - Active shooter and IED threats.
- Described the way forward:
  - We must tackle this as a whole integrated system, not as individual parts.
  - Conversations, planning, rehearsing across the chain.
  - Commit to the integration and preparation.
  - Build bridges between siloed hospitals.
  - Define the problem and discard plans based on magical thinking.
  - Stop lying about preparedness.
  - Be honest about horribleness of first hour.
  - Establish coordinated communication and planning with agencies in the system.
  - Integrate hospitals in whole of community approach.
  - Establish an all-hands monthly planning working group with the following goals:
  - Plan on evidence and predictable human behavior.



- Open/honest communication on strengths/weaknesses.
- Understand priorities and operations of all entities.
- Develop innovative, evidenced- and best-practiced based solutions to identified fail points and gaps.
- Co-develop public safety and hospital response plans for disruptive threats.
- Develop rapid hospital physical security plans for implementation at onset of any community event.
- Add ED Charge Nurse or other 24hr-on-duty hospital leadership to public safety notification.
  - Ensures early consistent notification of event outside of “telephone/telegraph/tell a firefighter”.
- Teach TECC to all; teach trauma nurses to not just focus on one patient.
- Plan together for intake and throughput of large numbers of patients.
- Develop Public Safety Hospital Response Task Force to assist with patient surge:
- They can bridge operations until hospital disaster plan is operational.
- Use first responders to assist with patient surge.
- Use EMS units to staff closest hospital.
- Police/fire can provide immediate dispatch to hospital.
- Potential roles for ALS personnel at hospital:
- Assist with triage.
- Assist with stabilization for untreated patients.
  - Functions essentially as RNs: pain medications, IV access, blood draws.
  - Rapid TECC interventions, can ensure advanced resuscitation, and can perform advanced procedures such as airway management.
- Potential roles for BLS personnel at hospital:
- Assist with stabilization for untreated patients; assist with worried well.
- Simple, coordinated patient tracking:
- Only track people once they get to the hospital.
- Everyone needs access to database.
- Develop plans for redistribution; send people away if they are stabilized.
- Develop plans for patient redistribution.



## COMPASSION IN CRISIS: EXAMINING THE IMPORTANCE OF VICTIM SUPPORT AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION DURING AND AFTER A MASS CASUALTY INCIDENT

**Summit recording link:** [Compassion in Crisis: Examining the Importance of Victim Support and Family Reunification During and After a Mass Casualty Incident](#)

### **Moderator:**

- Jim Schwartz, *Senior Fellow Harvard Kennedy School, Program on Crisis Leadership*

### **Panelists:**

- Justin Brown, *Deputy Administrator DC Department of Human Services*
- Nicole Peckumn, *Chief of Staff Office of the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice (DMPSJ)*
- Jerica Shackelford, *Associate Director for Mission Support & Chief of Staff DC HSEMA*
- Elizabeth Appleton, *Victim Specialist, FBI*

### **Panel Discussion**

- Imagine a bombing was to occur during the 2023 Marine Corp Marathon. Starting with Jerica, skipping operations, what is going on with HSEMA?
  - *Ms. Shackelford:*
  - We wouldn't have an EOC stood up for this event but rather a command bus.
  - First objective would be to help create Unified Command structure.
  - Call in EOC staff and liaisons from other district agencies and get the cadence of our coordination calls going.
  - Because of the size and magnitude of this event, we'd have an additional call with response and recovery agencies about needed policies and resources.
  - With this being a military-focused event, you'll have people that will be used to responding to crisis.
    - How do we work with DOD to manage that team?
  - Work with Department of Behavioral Health:
    - Receive an influx of donations.
      - Communicate what is needed and not needed with the public.
    - Compassion starts with staff first:
      - We must go into response and recovery mode; people who are responding have a personal connection to the event.
- Justin, let's talk about what your agency is doing in concert with HSEMA?
  - *Mr. Brown:*
  - First 60 minutes of chaos is important:
    - We try to teach that in our command courses.
    - What services should be provided upfront and what services should be held off until more order is established.
  - Disaster family reunification is the first thing we consider:



- Expectations from the public and political leaders are high.
  - People looking for family members will cause chaos.
  - Initial reunification and recovery must start immediately; we do not wait for people to feel comfortable before starting.
- Nicole, tell us about your office and take us through how we get to that smooth space of public information?
  - *Ms. Peckumn:*
  - During the first hour, we will have to have phone number for people to call.
  - Once activated, we contact all the District's PIOs to respond ASAP.
  - Must start building processes and be ready to announce that number.
  - Experts at deploying a wireless emergency alert (WEA) in real time; we are not skittish at releasing alerts when it is needed.
  - We use Nixle, a tool used for large community events that the public must sign up for.
  - WEA is the most effective in getting information out to the public; we refuse to rely on social media because of their uncertainty as an operation platform right now.
    - DC will be out very quickly communicating with the public.
  - Cannot release information until they receive it from field.
- Beth, tell us about FBI Victim Services, the work that it does, and what its contribution to this scenario would be.
  - *Ms. Appleton:*
  - We have three victim specialists in D.C. and three in Baltimore:
    - Our primary service is to provide support to victims in any investigation.
    - We ensure they know their rights as victims and connect them to community resources.
    - We do respond on scene.
  - In this scenario, we can assist by surging resources or through our victim services response team:
    - Victim specialists, agents, analysts with a sole purpose to support victims, their families, and provide resources.
  - Head of organization leading investigation would give green light to deploy the team:
    - Once on the ground, a primary action is to coordinate with NGO and local agencies to set up a family assistance center.
    - Will be there to greet families at center.
      - Victim specialist can sit down and do a needs assessment to connect to services inside and outside family assistance.
  - Many people will be missing cars, keys, wallets:
    - Sometimes it is last item that their loved one touched.





- Personal effects that service logistical life purposes, that are not collected as evidence, need to be returned.
- We set up a private room to return items; we do not know how item reunifications will impact someone:
  - There could be biohazardous material on items; we coordinate to have it professionally cleaned.
    - Make sure there are not cultural or religious reasons that it should not be cleaned.
  - Return items in a trauma-informed way.
- How much burden can the Bureau support in underfunded areas?
  - *Ms. Appleton:*
  - The FBI does a needs assessment to understand what is already available.
  - Will go to headquarters to see how to support any needs that cannot immediately be met.
  - In situations where there were not enough hotels to bring in extended family- solution was to bring in trailers as housing support.
  - In situations where the hospital is two hours away and we need to do family briefings, we won't ask them to leave their loved ones, we meet them at the hospital, and meet them where they are at in general.
    - Can bring resources and information to hospital.
- Justin, how do lessons from the Boston Marathon bombing apply to this scenario?
  - *Mr. Brown:*
  - Got to see apparatus at work, often get judged more on recovery than on response:
    - Boston did an excellent job on recovery and family reunification.
  - Environment has changed with voiceover ID calls and fake phone calls.
  - Use victims to squeeze community to make political point.
  - Family assistance and community assistance plans are analog and need to be updated to be more efficient and be interoperable.
- Who is mitigating misinformation and its potential effects on social media?
  - *Ms. Peckumn:*
  - The Joint Information Center (JIC) for the District gives assignments, one of which is social media monitoring. The JIC vets that information by either passing it to the EOC or fusion center.
  - JIC also works on one-pagers for officials containing key messages.
  - Need to ensure leaders are mindful of the impact of the event on their staff and will notice in real time when they should be remove staff, even if it is an excellent employee.
- Jerica, do you want to chime in on this point?
  - Ms. Shackelford:

- After the January 6th, we leveraged EMAC as a soft callout to get fusion center management support from across the country.
- EMAC gives us backup teams to give our teams a break.

### Questions

- How does the FBI ensure clients are not re-traumatized by interview? How do they get victim information?
  - *Ms. Appleton:*
  - As victim specialists, we do not interview victims, our primary goals are to identify their needs; the questions we ask have nothing to do with the investigation.
  - We coordinate with our advocates to make sure we get information and don't retraumatize.
- Is victim information shared between multiple agencies on secure platforms that several agencies have access to? Is there a system that exists?
  - *Mr. Brown:*
  - That is a challenge we are all still working on; this is one of the biggest gaps we have that needs to be addressed.
  - HSEMA has been a leader in building out our EOC platform.

## PREPARING FOR LEFT OF BOOM, RESPONDING TO RIGHT OF BOOM THE IMPORTANCE OF A STRONG, ALWAYS ON, CYBER SECURITY PROGRAM/TEAM

Summit recording link: [Preparing for Left of Boom, Responding to Right of Boom The Importance of a Strong, Always on, Cybersecurity Program/Team](#)

### Moderator:

- Tom Gagnon, *CISA ECC*

### Panelists:

- Teddy Kavaleri, *Deputy Chief Information Security Officer (CSIO), DC Office of the Chief Technology Officer (OCTO)*
- Boyden Rohner, *Deputy Assistant Director, CISA Integrated Operations Division (IOD)*
- Scott Scheurich, *Regional Cybersecurity Coordinator, Ashburn Consulting LLC subcontractor for Fairfax County, VA*

### Panel Discussion

- Starting with Boyden, can you give us a high-level overview of what CISA can provide for state localities tribes and territories?
  - *Ms. Rohner:*
  - We call ourselves America's cyber defense agency.



- Have a big role in convening the community for addressing critical infrastructure risks.
  - Able to do through our unique vantage point in the Federal government at the intersection of the intelligence community, international partners, state/local/tribal/territorial governments, and increasingly the private sector.
    - We bring together those relationships and put information sharing agreements in place so that we can get information out to critical infrastructure owners and operators.
- We are increasingly offering assistance and services to critical infrastructure owners and operators, as well as states and local governments.
- You mentioned that CISA is porous in that there's different ways to access these services. How do we get after these no cost services that CISA provides?
  - *Ms. Rohner:*
  - Big push to get our folks out into state/local/territorial places where we can promote the most change.
  - Big regional footprint and promote the “no wrong door” to enter CISA.
    - Know your cybersecurity advisor or ECC so they can help you get the Federal services you need.
- Teddy, cybersecurity is a team sport, talk about how you leverage resources (both people and technologies) to create a strong cybersecurity program for the District?
  - *Mr. Kavaleri:*
  - We take advantages of resources that CISA puts in place: Multi State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MSISAC). We take advantage of notifications, some of the monitoring capabilities.
  - We have a robust security setup here in the District.
  - 24/7 network operations center, security operations center and security engineering teams.
  - We leverage our partnerships and take advantage of advancements in cybersecurity and initiatives that these vendors have put in place.
- When you go out to a DC government entity, what are you looking for in both the good and bad?
  - *Mr. Kavaleri*
  - We have support all the way through the Mayor's Office.
    - The Mayor mandated that every employee in the District complete cybersecurity awareness training every year and during our annual test, phishing incidents decreased.
  - We try to educate other agencies by getting back to basics.
    - Do you know where all your assets are?
    - Do you know if the assets have been updated?
    - Who manages your servers and where are they?



- Scott, as a regional cyber player, how do you and your team look at that? Does it involve working with people you haven't worked with in the past?
  - *Mr. Scheurich:*
  - Does not have a team, his role is funded through UASI on behalf of the NCR.
  - MS-ISAC has a regional engagement person that we work with to know what capabilities MS-ISAC can bring to the table to a particular locality.
  - There are also paid-for services that help augment what maybe a local jurisdiction can't afford but because of the group buying power it is possible.
  - Cyber is proliferating into these work groups and committees that have been established for many years.
  - Human relationships are valuable - The region, since 2006, has evolved from fire/rescue/emergency management to more IT and cybersecurity.
  - We have monthly calls, for example with CISA's CISOs, to share information happening in our organization or types of threats we are seeing.
    - Indicators of compromise are shared.
- What are the immediate reactive actions of each of your agencies following a distributed denial of service attack and bombing in D.C.?
  - *Mr. Kavaleri:*
  - Start activating our contingency plans.
  - Is it 911, can we start doing public notifications if so?
  - Engage public relations team to engage with the public.
  - Make sure the operations of getting calls into the District is happening.
- Scott, what are you doing at the regional perspective?
  - *Mr. Scheurich:*
  - In 2020, the Cyber Annex to the Regional Emergency Communications Plan was written and it provides a way to respond to a regional event and still support the public.
  - The next exercise is in January and we hope to receive new recommendations for continued improvement.
- How do you start to track initial alerts that an incident is occurring and how does CISA know when to inject themselves in a positive way?
  - *Ms. Rohner:*
  - Could be reported by state/local government.
  - Have a preexisting relationship with cybersecurity advisor.
  - A partnership from the private sector.
  - Informally share information to receive a clearer picture of situation and realize role.
  - Act as information broker between the organization that observed the activity and the people impacted.



- How do we coordinate or deconflict the IT people bringing things back to normal?
  - *Ms. Rohner:*
  - While the FBI shows up to help prosecute a case, ultimately, they are there to do threat response.
  - At CISA, we liken ourselves more to emergency management: we help people get back on their feet.
  - *Mr. Kavaleri:*
  - It's about balancing the two parts: engage our police agency in determining what needs to be done to get things back online.
- Does D.C. law enforcement have dedicated people that can come in and collect the evidence?
  - *Mr. Kavaleri:*
  - They have jurisdiction in the District, so we would get their guidance on things we could do to get these services back online.

### Questions

- A local law enforcement agency was hit with ransomware in 2021, and information was released on the internet. Are you able to talk about how to protect our agencies on this type of threat?
  - *Mr. Kavaleri:*
  - There was communication involved, that is all I can say about it.

## ARE WE READY? RESPONDING TO AND INVESTIGATING A MASS CASUALTY/TERRORIST INCIDENT IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

Summit recording link: [Are We Ready? Responding to and Investigating a Mass Casualty/Terrorist Incident in the National Capital Region](#)

### Moderator:

- Keil Green, *CISA Support*

### Panelists:

- Commander Jason H. Bagshaw, *Commander Homeland Security Bureau, Special Operations Division, DC Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)*
- Robert Bohls, *Assistant Special Agent in Charge, FBI Washington Field Office*
- Christopher S. Cunningham, *Assistant Chief of Police, U.S. Park Police*
- Daniel W. McCoy, *Deputy Fire Chief Homeland Security and Special Operations, DC FEMS*
- David Povlitz, *Chief, Arlington County Fire Department*

## Panel Discussion

- Moderator welcomed panelists and explained how this panel is a fitting end to the day as they will discuss the preparations and hard work that has occurred since learning the lessons from the Boston Marathon bombing and other incidents.
- Introductions:
  - *Commander Bagshaw:*
  - Commander with the MPD, Special Operations Division.
    - Division handles all 1<sup>st</sup> amendment assemblies, special events, dignitary escorts, along with having the specialized assets of the bomb squad/SWAT team/air support/harbor patrol/K-9 operations in Washington DC
  - *ASAC Bohls:*
  - In the FBI Special Operations Branch.
    - Very similar to Commander Bagshaw, he oversees the specialty programs (e.g., SWAT, bombs, evidence response), which are all part of the National Capital Response squads.
      - The FBI Special Operations Branch would be involved in any critical incident, special event, or crisis event impacting Washington D.C.
  - *Chief Cunningham:*
  - Three Divisions fall under his command, one of which is the Homeland Security Division.
  - Within the Homeland Security Division are the Special Forces Assets and Special Events Unit.
  - The Special Events Unit (i.e., SWAT/K-9 Unit/Motorcycle Unit/Aviation Support), handles all the events for the National Park Service. The unit supports more than 4,000 events per year.
  - *Chief McCoy:*
  - Works on everyday emergencies and unplanned events. In addition, DC FEMS works hand in hand with our partners on planned and special events under Homeland Security.
  - *Chief Powlitz:*
  - Arlington Fire Department responds to emergencies and special events.
- Interoperability continuum is a good way to structure interoperability discussion. The first lane of the continuum is governance. How do you form and maintain partnerships?
  - *ASAC Bohls:*
  - Partnerships are vital for us; it is how we do business.
  - We have several different ways of building and keeping those partnerships.
    - We train together, have regular meetings, share intelligence; we are always talking either before or during planned and unplanned events.
    - If a relationship has not been built before we are responding to an incident, we are failing.



- Commonly have after action reviews where partners get together to discuss things done well and things that could be improved in incident response.
- DC is the best partnership city he has seen during his career. There is a long precedent of agencies working together on National Special Security Event (NSSE) and Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) events.
- *Chief Cunningham:*
- Large events in the NCR cannot happen without the help of their partners.
- Include partners early in the planning process to coordinate and deconflict issues we see early on.
- Do tabletop exercises together to build those partnerships.
- *Chief McCoy:*
- Regular information sharing, especially outside of formal conversations, is what builds these relationships and facilitates interoperability.
- We would not be able to operate as safely as we do without these partnerships.
- *Chief Povlitz:*
- We are fortunate in the NCR to have a model facilitating agent in the MWCOG.
  - It is going to bring the next leaders in 5-10 years through its technical-level committees up to management and executive level.
  - Within the Homeland Security portfolio, MWCOG meets regularly to assess all the threats in the region.
- *Commander Bagshaw:*
- Informal communications are very important and have grown the partnerships in the region tremendously in the last few years.
- Continuing the topic of partnerships, how does that coordination take place and where does technology fit into that?
  - *Chief Povlitz:*
  - The Teams platform was vital to maintain communications during the pandemic; we are trying to figure out how to operationalize this in real time.
  - We are surrounded by data, information, and intelligence. Have excellent person to person contact, but when it comes to large scale or concurrent incidents, we are going to need operational decision support. This is where we can, regionally, connect and share the data.
  - *ASAC Bohls:*
  - Our agencies will have different regulations in how we adopt this data and treat classified intelligence.
  - The bridge between that are the liaison and task force officers who are stationed in each other's Command post.
  - Building towards a unified adoption of technology and how we communicate is very important.

- If we were talking about one of these bombings, do you feel you have the technologies and rules of engagement for sharing that data?
  - *ASAC Bohls:*
  - It would be great if there was a secure platform where data could be shared immediately. It is a goal to develop such a platform.
  - The FBI cannot always widely share classified intel unless we can declassify it.
  - Currently can share information through MWCOCG and other regional meetings.
  - Agency will find a way to share information when it is necessary even if technology causes complications.
  - *Chief McCoy:*
  - One of the challenges is still not having a solid trust in social media or virtual meeting platforms.
  - We have tried to exercise Teams meetings more recently, for when we need to jump on and share information immediately.
- We often talk about training, what does that training look like, is it agency-specific, with other agencies? What are the big focus areas of training?
  - *Chief McCoy:*
  - For the fire department, we practice MCIs regularly.
  - We have MWCOCG and regional equipment to support our Mass Casualty Response Plan.
  - Education on pre-hospital care has come a long way.
  - *Commander Bagshaw:*
  - Training starts internally and is continually reinforced before being spread out to the NCR partners.
  - Jurisdictions overlap very closely in the NCR. We routinely do tabletop exercises and regular exercises with different agencies. The exercise is then replicated with other partner agencies.
- So, the training is not necessarily agency-specific, but it gets down to an event-specific training and exercise. Chief Cunningham do you want to talk about that?
  - *Chief Cunningham:*
  - Depending on the event it is not always the easiest to do boots-on-the-ground training, but we do formal and informal trainings in the form of tabletop exercises.
  - Within the Special Forces, they are more trained with practical exercises on a weekly/monthly basis.
  - *ASAC Bohls:*
  - At the tactical or operator level of training, there are hundreds of training events available each year- e.g., recently had an active shooter training at the Smithsonian with MPD Emergency Response Team (ERT) and FBI SWAT.





- *Chief Powlitz:*
- We are focusing on scalability and immediacy when determining what training to provide.
- For example, tactical emergency casualty care (TECC) is a skill needed in a variety of incidents and by a wide range of public safety personnel. So, we will prioritize the equipment and training to make TECC available.
- Do you feel like the 911 dispatchers get included, and are they critical in the training and preparation you're doing?
  - *Chief McCoy:*
  - Yes, it is critical for dispatchers to be included.
  - A planned event is a chance for other agencies to be involved such as dispatchers.
  - Recently, we reached out to other agencies to include them in our planning process to ensure we are not overlooking anyone.
  - *Chief Powlitz:*
  - Emergency communicators and emergency communications centers are a critical partner and their capabilities are expanding.
- Moving onto SOPs. What happens when someone arrives on scene, how does they grow from a structured command perspective?
  - *Chief McCoy:*
  - Through NIMS, in the fire and EMS service, we have clear guidelines such as the first unit on the scene will establish command.
  - It becomes different when we start to build out in the city.
    - On every large response, you have a Battalion Chief who is also dispatched. When the Battalion Chief arrives on scene, they would assume command.
  - We have guidelines for hazmat incidents/maritime incidents/house fire/mass casualty.
    - The direction is clear, but it is not necessarily what you have to do. You can use resources and apply them as applicable to the incident.
- With the Marine Corp Marathon, a planned event, how much of the ICS is built out before incident and how would it adjust if a bomb was to occur?
  - *Chief Powlitz:*
  - Not much adjustment; we had wise leaders in the past that set up the memorandum of agreements (MOAs) within Law/Fire/EMS that have specified the roles and responsibilities, the modes of communications, and the incident management system that we employ daily. It can easily be scaled up for the Marine Corp Marathon.
  - *Chief McCoy:*
  - We have our response systems built out through ICS; everything we would need for a planned event is in place. For an unplanned event, we must get to what we



would set up for a planned event as soon as possible so communications can flow efficiently and to keep each other safe.

- *Commander Bagshaw:*
- Looking at the Marine Corp Marathon, in our pre-planning stage we are developing an IAP (Incident Action Plan) internally for us.
- The multi-jurisdictional piece can be a challenge when we are talking about a critical incident and forming a Unified Command. What and where the incident occurs will determine who establishes command. The NCR is lucky to have strong partnerships that help each other and do not fight to establish command. They help each other during the incident and take feedback from other agencies.
- For ICS to be effective you must leave the politics behind because you are building out the structure in a way that's going to support the incident. What do our federal partners think?
  - *ASAC Bohls:*
  - It goes back to motivation, "we are going to protect people and try to solve the problem"
  - Some of the unique differences with the Federal side is, we will never be the first ones there at least for the FBI.
  - Each of us have our own unique challenges within our own agency, especially with ICS.
    - As we are dealing with that, we make sure to integrate always sending someone out on scene to be able to find out what is needed.
- How do you deal with the chaos of a large event incident?
  - *Chief Cunningham:*
  - Much of it is organized chaos, ICS is very effective, and it is all about command and control.
  - Each agency has their own IAP and response plans. We will all have separate pieces of the puzzle, and it comes down to the partnership to be able to execute as a whole.
  - We are fortunate in the NCR to have our agency representatives cohabitated in different Command Centers to help deconflict the challenges of self-dispatching.
  - *ASAC Bohls:*
  - With self-deployment, we can be our biggest enemy. Our first instinct is to help.
  - ICS brings order to chaos to a certain degree, but it is always about establishing a baseline when arriving on scene.
  - *Commander Bagshaw:*
  - The establishment of a Command Post is the biggest piece to controlling and managing chaos.



- We have put a good amount of work towards building that Unified Command and incorporating more of that management piece.
- Has self-deployment, in all the aspects we have discussed, become more of a focus in terms of training?
  - *Chief McCoy:*
  - Chaos comes from different directions. We need to decide which part of the chaos we can control to do the most good.
  - As the threats change, we need to continue to think of things we are not prepared for now.
  - *Chief Povlitz:*
  - We benefit from an amazing array of situational awareness tools and the information that flows from that.
  - We have a system that gives us a fair amount of heads-up and once that information starts to touch one of our agencies or functions that information will start to flow.
- Where does social media fit into a response like this?
  - *Chief McCoy:*
  - We learned to use social media to aid in our operations by increasing interaction with the public. The biggest challenge now is how to take that data and make it useable. Validating truth of information can be a challenge.
  - *ASAC Bohls:*
  - It is a huge resource on the investigative side:
    - Identifying a subject or looking into the background of a subject.
    - As people start uploading videos, we need to see all of it.
    - It opens the aperture for us in terms of investigative resources.
    - We have a dedicated part of our Command Post on that intel cadre.
- How are you communicating to each other during events?
  - *Commander Bagshaw:*
  - Usually by phone if communications is not happening in person.
  - In a preplanned event, communications are going through everyone's communications centers and being broadcasted out.
  - *Chief McCoy:*
  - We try to push our liaisons out early.
  - *ASAC Bohls:*
  - We still do press conferences, but instead of that being the only way we are talking with the public, our individual public information officers (PIOs) are getting together and working to send out social media messages.
  - It is about open communication and transparency with the public.

- With everything we covered, what is the thing that you still think we need to be focusing on?
  - *Chief Powlitz:*
  - The ability to be nimble and adapt.
  - We are recognizing that critical infrastructure and cybersecurity is core to the Homeland Security portfolio.
  - What is happening in Europe and the war theater? How can that affect us here locally?
  - How can technology and artificial intelligence be turned on us.
  - *Chief McCoy:*
  - Cybersecurity is important.
  - We plan for obvious things like terrorist attacks but what happens after that.
  - *Chief Cunningham:*
  - It comes down to how we communicate.
    - If we cannot communicate, how will we complete the mission.
  - *ASAC Bohls:*
  - The best thing we can do is to recruit good people who are going to be our successors and carry that same image.
  - *Commander Bagshaw:*
  - Training and communication.
    - Would a successor come mentally prepared and trained.
    - Push that training down and through internally.

## INTEROPERABILITY HAS NO BOUNDARIES

Summit recording link: [Interoperability has No Boundaries](#)

Gabe Elias, *SWIC, Commonwealth of Virginia*

- Defines the term boundary in relation to interoperability.
  - A boundary is something that indicates or fixes a limit or extent.
- Discussed topics for his session:
  - Identify three less-discussed boundaries.
  - Discuss each boundary and opportunities to overcome them.
  - Trip hazards and risks.
  - Calls to action.
- The Boundary is Us.
  - Discretely bounded, trigger-based thinking does not match the gradient, or at least jagged and hidden triggers in our real-life events:
  - “We become the frog in the boiling pot of water.”



- Our language in interoperability is often about waiting.
  - Upon declaration of an MCI, a channel can be established but what we have learned is that an MCI means we are all working.
  - Operability before interoperability is working against us.
  - We need interoperability-first language in our standard operating procedures (SOPs).
  - Acknowledge that if a fire department cannot communicate with itself, it is less concerned about communicating with others, but we can ‘walk and chew gum’.
- Silo hopscotch demonstration.
  - Playing silo hopscotch prevents us from achieving continuous, boundaryless interoperability.
  - Changing course and changing the channel.
    - Changing the channel is a good model, but for walking:
      - Crawl, walk, run is our goal.
      - Changing the channel constantly extends the supply lines for our information very far and gets “rickety”.
    - LMR: 90’s dial-up vs. always-on broadband.
      - Are we ‘dial-up’ interoperability?
        - We turn it on when we want and turn it off when we do not, and we normally keep it off.
      - Isn’t always-on interoperability what we want?
        - One large channel is not the solution.
        - We still need to deal with an always-on stream of information.
- Addressed invisible boundary of mismatched frames:
  - Recognize different frames or limit progress toward boundaryless interoperability.
  - Engage in non-event/incident conversations.
  - What is ‘need to know?’
  - What does ‘channel one comfort’ look like in continuous interoperability?
  - What are we really asking for when we see interoperability?
- Discussed trip hazards:
  - Shared systems are important and are on the continuum for a reason, but they do not solve problems by themselves.
  - We have an interoperability bias.
  - We need to watch out for hidden biases in public safety.
  - If there is work to do at the tactical level, there’s work to do at the comms level.
- Encouraged attendees to seek boundaryless interoperability:
  - Recognize incidents may not tell us when to shift (or shift back).
  - Review and revise practices and procedures.

- Smooth out discrete edge thinking.
- Look for the blank spaces, missing direction/authority.
- Empower those most able to facilitate interoperability.
- Learn from and teach other always-on components, especially broadband network concepts/ideas.
- Find invisible mismatched frames and have real discussions outside the planning cycle.

## CLOSING REMARKS – DAY 2

Summit recording link: [Closing Remarks – Day 2](#)

*Charles Guddemi, DC SWIC*

- Summarized the Day 2 presentations:
- Changing the Course:
  - Identified five different incidents and common themes.
  - Breaks in the interoperability chain.
  - Degradation of Service.
  - Strain on System/Capacity Issues/Equipment.
  - Unified Command/Decision Authorities.
- The Call for Help! Addressing the Challenges of High Volume 911 Calls in a Mass Casualty Situation.
  - D.C. stays busy with the large volume of calls coming in every day.
  - City of Alexandria maintains that there is no normal day.
  - Group emphasized the pressing need for call takers and dispatchers to be considered part of the scene.
  - They should train together and have a seat at the table.
  - Some jurisdictions have 911 operators designated as first responders and others do not; a unified front is crucial.
  - D.C. does not recognize its 911 dispatchers as first responders.
  - The City of Alexandria has a remote 911 capability, but it is very expensive.
  - At this time AI should not replace the human factor of speaking to a person over a 911 call.
- Seconds Count: Understanding the Vital Importance of the Initial Medical/EMS Response in Mass Casualty Incidents.
  - Information and rumors must be controlled in the “fog of war”.
  - Political or incident leadership needs to keep public calm and informed through camera appearances.
  - The level of MCI is important because it notifies hospitals what to expect.
  - Blood supply and other issues are handled through EMResource.



- There needs to be good coordination after ground transport gets saturated and air transport takes over.
  - Discussed the CRISP system and how it reunites patients with their families.
- Integrating Hospitals into the Whole of Community High Threat Disaster Response
  - It is more than just “stop the bleed,” it is “stop the clock”.
  - To the public, it does not matter if your facility is just a hospital or a trauma center, they just see a big H.
  - Need to be ready to respond to their needs.
  - Separated truths from myths.
  - What happens administratively on one side may not be what the operators in the field face.
  - Hospitals are easy targets; there is an emotional impact and a casualty multiplier.
- Compassion in Crisis: Examining the Importance of Victim Support and Family Reunification during and after an MCI.
  - HSEMA had the ability to transition from the command bus to Unified Command to an EOC.
  - Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) spoke about their work with the Red Cross and their role in family reunification.
  - FBI talked about the victim services response team, who serve as liaisons for each individual family to ensure they get the services they need.
  - During a drop-and-run event, much property is left behind.
    - They help them reunite with their property provided it is not a piece of evidence.
  - The FBI is prepared to expand their resources in areas that may be resource-challenged.
  - Misinformation during the disaster is real.
  - We should be managing the incident, do not let the incident manage us.
  - Take care of your people, if your people are not right, chances are your response will not be either.
- Preparing for Left of Boom, Responding to Right of Boom: The Importance of a Strong, Always On, Cyber Security Program/Team.
  - They have information sharing agreements and work with critical infrastructure with a focus on IT and communications.
  - OCTO talked about how they manage the District with their policies and procedures for D.C.
  - From a regional approach, they want to ensure operations are from a whole-community approach.
  - In the event of a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, it would be a local problem that spills into a regional problem, we’ll get some federal support.



- If you have cybersecurity insurance, and you bring in a third party, you may not be able to share that information.
- CISA established a Joint Cybersecurity Defense Collaborative (JCDC) with private entities.
- Are We Ready? Responding to and Investigating a Mass Casualty/Terrorist Incident in the National Capital Region.
  - The reason we are so strong in this region is our relationship built from planning for the frequency and magnitude of special events that occur.
  - This helps us prepare for the no-notice events.
  - It is all about relationships.
  - Continue training and utilizing NIMS.
  - Making sure we know the role and responsibilities and communications for inbound resources is important.
  - We will have a plan to backflow other resources to take care of the resources leaving other jurisdictions.
  - If more resources are need, we will rely on EMAC for resources outside of the NCR.
  - Continue to be nimble, flexible, and adaptable for the future.
  - Discussed succession planning and how to avoid breaking the chain of relationships.
- Interoperability has No Boundaries.
  - “Don’t be the frog.”
  - In terms of interoperability, the only boundaries are us.
  - Operability before interoperability. This can be done at the same time.
  - We are the ones following our own policies, not the bad guys nor the public.
  - Interoperability is a continuum.
  - Used a hopscotch analogy.
  - Change the channel.
  - Radios are programmed with multiple zones and talk-groups.
    - If you stay on channel one, all that capability means nothing.
- Mr. Guddemi gave his thanks to all attendees and staff of the Summit and promoted the Summit survey for participants to complete.



## APPENDIX

### SURVEY RESULTS




Survey Results as of September 22, 2023


**Question 1: How satisfied were you with the 2023 Interoperability Summit? (Respondents: 116)**

**93%** (average of 0-100%)


**Question 2: Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements about your overall experience at the 2023 DC Interoperability Summit. (Respondents: 160)**




**Question 3: How did you participate in the Summit? (Respondents: 161)**




**Question 4: (Hybrid and In-Person Attendees): Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements concerning the venue and in person experience. (Respondents: 95)**



**Question 4: (Virtual Attendees): Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements concerning the venue and in person experience. (Respondents: 66)**



**Question 5: Which party of Day 1 of Summit were most valuable? (Select all that apply) (Respondents: 149)**






**Question 6: Please provide feedback on what was most valuable about the selected session(s) for Day 1.**

- “This event was very informative and very much needed every year due to the modification of technologies, communication outlets, and new procedures and protocols.”
- “As an emergency manager, we try to learn from other events that have taken place not only in our own jurisdictions, but also those larger events that happen nationwide. I was able to gather a lot of information from the presenters on how things could have been different and was able to get different perspectives on a major incident happening.”
- “I thought the material and speakers were all very good. It was a great idea to focus on the Boston Marathon as this is a situation that could occur in DC or the greater DMV. The speakers were well prepared and adjusted their comments to make it relevant to existing challenges.”
- “Great to hear from speakers that were present after the bombing and hear how the team came together and researched and investigate the entire event with the clues they were given which lead them to the ending at the boat.”
- “Information on how to review and implement PACE communication plan at my agency.”
- “It was an opportunity to look back and look ahead to see how far we have come and to also note fundamental best practices that can be engaged and maintained within operational response programs.”
- “The weaving of the overall theme into each of the sessions provided consistency and a jumping off point from which participants could focus their learning.”

**Question 7: Which parts of Day 2 of the Summit were most valuable? (Respondents: 126)**



### **Question 8: Please provide feedback on what was most valuable about the selected session(s) for Day 2.**

- “Day 2 was amazingly helpful for me. The sessions on planning in the DMV, handling mass casualty call centers and Dr. Smith’s candor really stood out to me. Of course, there is nothing comparable to Charlie’s summarizations - they are wonderful in tying the sessions together with clarity and providing what a local news outlet calls “smart brevity.”
- “As somebody with operational and crisis management responsibilities for my company in the DMV area, the subject matter regarding mass casualties in our region, was critical and beneficial information for me.”
- “I thought there were some very interesting talks that focused on gaps that still exist and that is important to consider as we move forward.”
- “All the sessions I selected I enjoyed, but the one that stood out the most was Dr. Reed-Smith. The way he used firsthand experience, and common sense to turn the previous panel discussion completely on end was amazing.”
- “Again, all the presentations were insightful. It was particularly interesting to learn from the 911 panel more about how the call centers manage emergencies. It was good to have a dynamic speaker at the end of the day to
- keep attendees engaged. Charlie’s summary at the end of the day are always appreciated for reminding participants about all the topics that were addressed and filling in the blanks if anything was missed.”
- “I particularly liked Gabe Elias' session - very thought-provoking and introspective. Again, Charlie's wrap up was great, especially since I wasn't able to join every session this day.”

### **Question 9: What action items are you planning to take back to your home agencies/ organizations? Please explain below.**


- “I plan to update and expand out PACE implementation, both for our business, clients, and family members. I have already talked with these groups about the “unexpected/uninvited helper” issue.”
- “I will be taking back home the information I received from DC HSEMA & Domestic Preparedness- the essential items to include in a Build-a-Kit (An Emergency Kit for the homes and vehicles.”
- “Dusting off PACE and COOP. Take another look at the stakeholders - anyone new we should include (e.g., hospitals), anyone we should take off.”






- “Our company manufactures electronic security systems. We are consistently improving on our solutions to better help with force multiplication through artificial intelligence in our camera sensors and more. Understanding needs of responders will help us develop technologies to make communities and cities smarter and safer.”
- “Working on bringing our partners together to better serve our residents. Having local personnel on one channel to communicate events happening during a response is great, but if people cannot get out on the main channel are their better ways to communicate important information.”
- “Institutional knowledge and new information to be shared with office leadership for crisis management scenarios that may occur within our areas of responsibility.”
- “Try to tie in interoperable training between law enforcement and EMS.”
- “Interoperability has many components. As the summit emphasized, building relationships in advance of an event is imperative. So, bringing more people into the planning process is necessary.”

**Question 10: For future Summits, what incidents or events would you like to see headlined?  
(Respondents: 143)**



**Question 11: What topics would you like to see covered in future Summits? (Respondents: 150)**





**Question 12: How likely are you to recommend this Summit to a friend or colleague? (Respondents: 148)**


**97%** (Likely or Highly Likely)

**Question 13: Please provide any additional input you would like to see implemented in future DC Interoperability Summits.**

Themes from the additionally provided feedback:

- “Thought the whole conference was very well organized, and started on time and each session followed the schedule / agenda. Sometimes when watching online it can become a bit boring and tempting to multi-task and have the presentation playing in the background. This was engaging, fast paced and interesting. Well done.”
- “The planning and execution for this summit was by far the most seamless of almost any professional conference I have attended. Both the content and format was impressive and the caliber of speaker was well worth the time taken to attend.”
- “I’d like to see a summit focused on civil unrest - perhaps a blend of J6 and the George Floyd protests. It required DC area agencies to come together quickly to set objectives and solve complex problems.”
- “It would be interesting to have multi-jurisdictional panels to learn how issues are addressed in large vs. small cities, rural vs. urban, large budgets vs. small budgets, etc. One thing that was mentioned by several panelists at the Summit was that they were fortunate to be in the NCR, where mutual aid and resources are plentiful. The Summit has grown to attract a nationwide audience, so it would be helpful to hear about the interoperability lessons learned from jurisdictions that are not as fortunate and how they are overcoming their challenges. The NCR has numerous best practices to share with the country, but some areas may have trouble applying them to their operations because of structural and financial hurdles.”
- “This was my first Summit, and I’m looking forward to upcoming ones. The one thing I would think about changing is making the panel discussions interactive. Maybe have the panel give a quick overview of their topic, then take questions from the audience.”

# INTEROPERABILITY CONTINUUM





## LETTER FROM THE DC SWIC

Greetings,

This year marks the 10-year anniversary of the Boston Marathon Bombing. We remember the victims from this event, but also the dedication, commitment, and strength of those who responded on that day.

To mark this event and all that has transpired since April 15, 2013, the 5th annual D.C. Interoperability Summit examined the Boston Marathon Bombing including how communications across the ecosystem shaped a successful response and investigation to a major terrorist attack.

Collectively, our efforts to learn from past incidents strengthens our resilience. The Interoperability Summit connects participants across the country to discuss the emergency communications ecosystem and how we can collaborate in our work to keep the Nation connected and secure.

Thank you for accepting our invitation to participate in this important event, and we look forward to your participation in future Summits.

Sincerely,

Charles J. Guddemi

Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC)

District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency



## AGENDA

### SEPTEMBER 6, 2023

Time	Speaker/Panel
0700-0815	<b>Registration In-person or Virtual-Breakfast-Networking</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Boston Marathon Bombing coverage video until welcome remarks</i></li> </ul>
0815-0845	<b>Welcome Remarks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Master of Ceremony:</b> Daniel J. McCoy, DC HSEMA           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Charles Guddemi, <i>DC SWIC</i></li> <li>○ Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, <i>Director, DC HSEMA</i></li> <li>○ Vince DeLaurentis, <i>Deputy Executive Assistant Director CISA Emergency Communications Division</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul>
0845-0930	<b>DHS CISA Office for Bombing Prevention</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Sean W. Haglund, <i>Associate Director, Office for Bombing Prevention, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency</i></li> </ul>
0930-1030	<b>Summit Keynote - In the Face of Adversity: Boston Marathon Bombing and the Strength of a City</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Edward Davis, <i>Boston Police Commissioner (Ret), President and CEO of The Edward Davis Company</i></li> </ul>
1030-1100	<b>Natick Water Stop</b>
1100-1200	<b>Boston EMS Medical Response to the Boston Marathon Bombing</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Captain William Lessard, <i>Boston EMS</i></li> </ul>
1200-1300	<b>Lunch</b>
1300-1400	<b>The FBI's Role in the Response and Investigation of the Boston Marathon Bombing</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Courtland D. Rae, <i>Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Washington Field Office, FBI</i></li> </ul>
1400-1430	<b>Digital Content Analysis and how the Technology has Progressed in the 10 Years Since the Boston Marathon Bombing</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Richard W. Vorder Bruegge, <i>Senior Physical Scientist-Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)</i></li> </ul>
1430-1500	<b>Wellesley Water Stop</b>
1500-1545	<b>From Clues to Closure: Response to and the Investigation of the Boston Marathon Bombing</b> Facilitator: Keil Green, <i>U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Support</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ed Davis, <i>Boston Police Commissioner (Ret), President and CEO of The Edward Davis Company</i></li> <li>2. Captain William Lessard, <i>Boston EMS</i></li> <li>3. Courtland Rae, <i>Assistant Special Agent in Charge, FBI Washington Field Office</i></li> </ol>



	4. Richard Fiske, <i>Massachusetts Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC)</i>
1545-1615	<b>The Challenges of a Mass Causality Event in the NCR</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Chief (Ret) James Schwartz Fireside Chat with the District of Columbia's Fire and EMS Department Chief John Donnelly</i></li> </ul>
1615-1630	<b>Closing Remarks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Charles Guddemi, <i>DC SWIC</i></li> </ul>

## SEPTEMBER 7, 2023

Time	Speaker/Panel
0700-0815	<b>Registration In-person or Virtual-Breakfast-Networking</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Video replay</li> </ul>
0815-0830	<b>Welcome Remarks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Master of Ceremony:</b> James Farley, <i>DC HSEMA</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Charles Guddemi, <i>DC SWIC</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul>
0830-0900	<b>Changing the Course: National Trends in Managing Special Event Communications</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Charles Guddemi, <i>DC SWIC</i></li> </ul>
0900-0945	<b>The Call for Help! Addressing the Challenges of High Volume 911 Calls in a Mass Causality Situation</b> <b>Facilitator:</b> Keil Green, <i>U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Support</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Heather McGaffin, <i>Director, District of Columbia Office of Unified Communications</i></li> <li>2. Scott Brillman, <i>Director - Fairfax County 911 Fairfax County 911</i></li> <li>3. Renee Gordon, <i>Director, Department of Emergency and Customer Communications, City of Alexandria</i></li> </ol>
0945-1015	<b>Newton Water Stop</b>
1015-1100	<b>Seconds Count: Understanding the Vital Importance of the Initial Medical/EMS Response in Mass Causality Incidents</b> <b>Facilitator:</b> Tom Gagnon, <i>U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Integrated Operations Division (IOD), Emergency Communications Coordinator</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Dr. Brian W. Amy, MD, MPH, FACS, FACPM, <i>Chief Medical Officer, Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Administration (HEPRA), District of Columbia Department of Health</i></li> <li>2. Brendan J. Sinatro, MPH, <i>Director, Emergency Management, District of Columbia Hospital Association</i></li> <li>3. Dr. Robert P. Holman, M.D, <i>Medical Director, District of Columbia Fire and EMS</i></li> </ol>



	<p>4. Craig DeAtley-PA-C, <i>Director of the Institute for Public Health Emergency Readiness at MedStar Washington Hospital Center</i></p>
1100-1145	<p><b>Integrating Hospitals into the Whole of Community High Threat Disaster Response</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Dr. E. Reed Smith, MD, FACEP, <i>Operational Medical Director, Arlington County (VA.) Fire and Police Departments</i></li> </ul>
1145-1245	<p><b>Lunch</b></p>
1245-1330	<p><b>Compassion in Crisis: Examining the Importance of Victim Support and Family Reunification during and after a Mass Casualty Incident</b>  <b>Facilitator:</b> Jim Schwartz, <i>Consultant, advisor, and lecturer on public safety leadership, retired Fire Chief, Arlington County, VA</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Jerica Shackelford, CPM, <i>Associate Director, Chief of Staff, Division of Mission Support, DC HSEMA</i></li> <li>2. Justin Brown, <i>Deputy Administrator for Emergency Management, District of Columbia Department of Human Services</i></li> <li>3. Elizabeth "Beth" Appleton, <i>Victim Services, Baltimore Field Office, FBI</i></li> <li>4. Nicole Peckumn, <i>Chief of Staff, District of Columbia Office of the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice</i></li> </ol>
1330-1415	<p><b>Preparing for Left of Boom, Responding to Right of Boom The Importance of a Strong, Always On, Cyber Security Program/Team</b>  <b>Facilitator:</b> Tom Gagnon, <i>U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Integrated Operations Division (IOD), Emergency Communications Coordinator</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Teddy Kavaleri, <i>Deputy CISO, Office of the Chief Technology Officer (OCTO)</i></li> <li>2. Scott Scheurich, <i>Regional Cybersecurity Coordinator, National Capital Region</i></li> <li>3. Boyden Rohner, <i>Associate Director for Vulnerability Management, DHS CISA</i></li> </ol>
1415-1445	<p><b>Brookline Water Stop</b></p>
1445-1545	<p><b>Are We Ready? Responding to and Investigating A Mass Causality /Terrorist Incident in the National Capital Region</b>  <b>Facilitator:</b> Keil Green, <i>CISA Support</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Commander Jason H. Bagshaw, <i>Homeland Security Bureau, Special Operations Division, DC Metropolitan Police Department</i></li> <li>2. Daniel W. McCoy, <i>Deputy Fire Chief, Homeland Security and Special Operations, DC FEMS</i></li> <li>3. Christopher S. Cunningham, <i>Assistant Chief, United States Park Police</i></li> <li>4. David Povlitz, <i>Fire Chief, Arlington County Fire</i></li> <li>5. Robert Bohls, <i>Assistant Special Agent in Charge, FBI</i></li> </ol>





	<i>Washington Field Office</i>
1545-1615	<b>Interoperability has No Boundaries</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ Gabe Elias, <i>Virginia Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC)</i></li></ul>
1615-1630	<b>Closing Remarks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ Charles Guddemi, <i>DC SWIC</i></li></ul>

## SPEAKER BIOS



### **Boyden Rohner**

Integrated Operations Division (IOD), Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

Deputy Assistant Director

Boyden is a member of the senior leadership team at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA). As America's Cyber Defense Agency and the National Coordinator for critical infrastructure resilience and security, CISA leads the national effort to understand, manage, and reduce risk to the cyber and physical infrastructure that American's rely on every hour of every day. Boyden assists with leading the team responsible for delivering CISA's services locally and ensuring that CISA's constituents get the information they need to make the best risk-informed decisions.



## **Brendan Sinatro**

DC Hospital Association / DC Health and Medical Coalition Hospital Unit Lead

Director Emergency Management

Brendan Sinatro, MPH, oversees the activities designed to elevate the preparedness, response and recovery capabilities of the DC Hospitals through the DCHA Emergency Management Committee. Brendan is responsible for the grant management of the Hospital Preparedness Program. Brendan also serves as the Preparedness Association Liaison for DCHA to further support advocacy efforts on behalf of the hospitals and optimize coordination efforts across all DC Health and Medical Coalition stakeholders as well as partners from the National Capitol Region. Member Association Services include but not limited to Grant Management, Technical Assistance, Emergency Planning, Training and Exercise Development as well as serving as the Hospital Unit Lead for the DC Health and Medical Coalition.



## **Brian W. Amy MD, MPH, FACS, FACPM**

Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Administration (HEPRA), District of Columbia  
Department of Health

Chief Medical Officer

Dr. Brian Amy is the Chief Medical Officer and State EMS Officer of the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Administration (HEPRA) for the District of Columbia Department of Health (DC Health). Joining DC Health as the Medical Director of HEPRA in 2009, he later served as the Senior Deputy Director of HEPRA. Dr. Amy completed the Homeland Security Executive Leaders Program at the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security in Monterey, CA in 2017.

Dr. Amy is the former State Health Officer and Executive Director of the Mississippi State Department of Health and led the state agency's response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. For his leadership, he received the 2006 ASTHO Presidential Meritorious Service Award for "Outstanding Leadership during Hurricane Katrina." On several occasions, he testified before the United States Congress on public health and emergency preparedness related issues. He has authored or co-authored numerous book chapters, journal articles, abstracts, and presentations.

Dr. Amy received his medical degree from the Louisiana State University School of Medicine in New Orleans. He received a Master of Science degree in Microbiology from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, and Master of Health Administration and Master of Public Health degrees from Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine. He completed his General Surgery residency at Charity Hospital-LSUMC in New Orleans, and became board-certified by the American Board of Surgery, and then a Fellow of the American College of Surgery. After decades of clinical practice, he returned to New Orleans, completed a residency in General Preventive Medicine and Public Health at Tulane University School of Medicine and Public Health, and became board-certified by the American Board of Preventive Medicine, and then a Fellow of the American College of Preventive Medicine.



## Charles Guddemi

DC HSEMA

Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC)

Charles (Charlie) Guddemi is the District of Columbia’s Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency’s (HSEMA) Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC). He is responsible for coordinating interoperability and communications projects involving voice, data, and video. Charlie chairs the District’s Interoperable Communications Committee (ICC) and Cellular Industry/WiFi Provider Working Group. He serves as the secretary for the Statewide Interoperability Executives Council (SIEC), is a member of the National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators (NCSWIC) and current co-chair of FEMA’s Region III Regional Emergency Communications Coordinators Working Group (RECCWG). He also participates on several Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) committees and working groups. Charlie Guddemi joined HSEMA after a 25-year career with the United States Park Police (USPP). His assignments included working in Washington, D.C., New York Field Office, San Francisco Field Office, and the National Park Service Northeast Regional Headquarters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He achieved the rank of Deputy Chief serving as the Commander of the Services Division. During his USPP career, Charlie worked six Presidential inaugurations, including serving as the Principle Planner and Executive Steering Committee member for the United States Park Police 2013 Inauguration. After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Charlie designed and implemented the multiplex, defense in depth, multi-jurisdictional, security plan for the Statue of Liberty National Monument and Ellis Island Immigration Museum located in New York Harbor. In 2008, he was awarded the first ever Department of the Interior, Office of Law Enforcement and Security, Excellence in Security Award for his efforts in safeguarding the Statue of Liberty/Ellis Island Complex.



## **Christopher S. Cunningham**

United States Park Police

Assistant Chief of Police

Christopher S. Cunningham is a 24-year veteran of the United States Park Police and has held a myriad of positions during his career. These assignments included operational and administrative positions with the Force as a Patrol Officer, Field Training Officer, Motorcycle Officer, Supervisor of the Special Events Unit, Sergeant within Motorcycle Unit (M-1), Commander of the Rock Creek Station (D-3), SWAT/Canine Unit, Internal Affairs & Employee Labor Relations Unit, and Commander of the Icon Protection Branch, which oversees the Central District (D-1) and Special Forces (Aviation, SWAT/Canine, Motorcycle Unit, Special Events Unit). He is also a graduate of the 281st session of the FBI National Academy.



## Christopher Rodriguez

HSEMA Director

Dr. Christopher Rodriguez is the Director of the Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA). In this role, Dr. Rodriguez serves as the Homeland Security Advisor and State Coordinating Officer for the District of Columbia. He also is the State Administrative Agent for all homeland security federal grants awarded to the District and the National Capital Region which includes parts of Northern Virginia and Maryland. HSEMA is responsible for emergency planning, preparedness, response, and recovery for the City, including operations for a 24-hour emergency operations center and the District's intelligence fusion center. Under Dr. Rodriguez's leadership, HSEMA, in partnership with the Metropolitan Police Department and Mayor's Office of Religious Affairs, launched the Interfaith Preparedness Advisory Group to improve preparedness and the resiliency of the District's faith-based organizations for all types of hazards. Additionally, he has supported Mayor Muriel Bowser as Incident Commander for some of the District's most complex, simultaneous emergency responses between COVID-19, First Amendment demonstrations, election security, the January 6 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, and the 59th Presidential Inauguration.

Prior to HSEMA, Dr. Rodriguez served as Director of New Jersey's Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness from 2014-17, where he led statewide strategies, policies, and operations on counterterrorism, resiliency, and cybersecurity. While serving in New Jersey, his home state, Dr. Rodriguez led the office during the national rise of homegrown violent extremism and established close relationships with the private sector, federal government as well as state, and local law enforcement. Recognizing the critical role the public plays in stopping attacks before they happen, Dr. Rodriguez also increased the office's engagement with the public - building and maintaining key relationships with faith-based communities.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, he joined the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), where he became a senior analyst in its Counterterrorism Center. In this position, he



monitored terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia, closely collaborating with U.S. Intelligence Community partners at the federal, state, and local levels to identify and counter persistent threats to the United States and its allies. During his time at the CIA, Dr. Rodriguez also oversaw an analytic unit that handled global economic and energy security, as well as related counterintelligence and cyber threats. From 2009-11, while deployed at the U.S. Embassy in Brussels, Dr. Rodriguez was a key U.S. interlocutor with the European Union during the height of the Euro crisis. He has been recognized by the CIA and Director of National Intelligence for his leadership and professional achievements.

Dr. Rodriguez received a BA from Williams College and an MA and PhD in political science from the University of Notre Dame.





## **Commander Jason H. Bagshaw**

Homeland Security Bureau, Special Operations Division, DC Metropolitan Police Department  
Commander

Jason Bagshaw currently serves as the commander of the Special Operations Division where he oversees the Metropolitan Police Department's Emergency Response Team, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit, Harbor Patrol, Canine Unit, Domestic Security Operations Unit, Motor Carrier Unit, Harbor Patrol Unit, Air Support Unit, Horse Mounted Unit, Canine Unit, Planning and Logistics Section, Special Events Section, and the Traffic Safety and Specialized Enforcement Branch. Commander Bagshaw began his career with the Metropolitan Police Department in May of 2003 and upon completing his training at the academy, he was assigned to patrol in the Fifth District. During his time in the Fifth District, Commander Bagshaw spent three years with the Auto Theft Unit investigating the theft of motor vehicles. In 2011, Commander Bagshaw was transferred to the Gun Recovery Unit and focused on removing illegal firearms from the streets within the entire city. In 2013, Commander Bagshaw was promoted to detective and investigated robberies and felonies in the Fourth District before being promoted to sergeant in 2014. During his four years as a sergeant, Commander Bagshaw was assigned to various units to include the patrol in the Sixth District and First District, hiring of new officers in the Recruiting Division, and assisting with administrative function for the Professional Development Bureau and the Patrol Services South Bureau. In 2018, Commander Bagshaw was promoted to lieutenant and served with the First District for four months before being assigned to the Special Operations Division Planning and Logistics Section. During those four years, Washington, DC has hosted significant planned and unplanned historic events such as the 2018 Stanley Cup Finals and Victory Parade, the 2019 World Series and Victory Parade, the annual March for Life, 4th of July Celebrations, among many, many other demonstrations; Commander Bagshaw was integral in planning and assisting with the operations of these events. In 2021, Commander Bagshaw was promoted and remained in the Special Operations Division as the Captain of the Special Events Branch. In this role, he oversaw First Amendment demonstrations, activities and protests, planning of special events, traffic safety, and the MPD Motors Unit. On April 7, 2022, Police Chief Robert J. Contee



III promoted Bagshaw to the rank of Commander. Bagshaw has received numerous awards and recognition during his career with MPD, including Achievement Medals and Unit Citations. Most notably, in 2010, Commander Bagshaw was named “Officer of the Year” for the entire Department and in 2018, Commander Bagshaw was named as the “Lieutenant of the Year.” Further, in 2019, Commander Bagshaw was awarded the “Sworn Employee of the Year” for the Homeland Security Bureau. Commander Bagshaw holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Police Science from The George Washington University.



## Courtland Rae

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Washington Field Office

Courtland D. Rae currently serves as Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) of Counterterrorism Branch I for the FBI's Washington Field Office (WFO), leading domestic international terrorism operations. Rae entered on duty as a Special Agent with the FBI in March 2005. From 2005 through 2010, Rae was assigned to the New York Division, where he worked counterterrorism investigations. In 2010, Rae was promoted to Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) at the Counterterrorism Division (CTD), International Terrorism Operations Section (ITOS) I, Continental United States (CONUS) I, where he program-managed international terrorism matters for both the Boston and New Haven divisions. In 2012, Rae was selected to serve as an SSA for a Boston Division counterterrorism squad. In this capacity, Rae led the Boston Marathon Bombing Task Force, culminating in the successful prosecution of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev for his role in the attack. Rae reported as Assistant Legal Attaché in Ottawa/Toronto in 2016, supporting the international terrorism and criminal programs. Prior to joining WFO, Rae served as an Assistant Section Chief in CTD, Counterterrorism Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Section, leading online and physical HUMINT efforts for CTD.



## Craig DeAtley PA-C

Institute for Public Health Emergency Readiness at MedStar Washington Hospital Center  
Director

Craig DeAtley, PA-C, is the director of Emergency Preparedness at MedStar Washington Hospital Center, emergency manager for MedStar National Rehabilitation Hospital, and co-facilitator of Emergency Management for MedStar Health. Recently, he assumed administrative responsibility for directing MedStar Washington's Biocontainment Unit, one of only 13 Regional Emerging Special Pathogen Treatment Centers in the country and overseeing the \$3 million grant received from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response. Since 2006, he has served as the co-executive director of the Hospital Incident Command System's Education and Training (HICS) facilitated at MedStar Washington. The Center members are responsible for writing the 2006 and 2014 HICS materials. Prior to his current positions, Craig has served as an associate professor of Emergency Medicine at George Washington University specializing in Disaster Medicine and Field Operations for 28 years. From 1980-85 he was the Director of the George Washington University PA Program. In 1985 he was the first Director for the newly created EMS Degree Program at the University. From 1991 to 2021, he served as the assistant medical director for the Fairfax County (VA) Police Department. In that role, he was responsible for the coordination, supervision, and annual training of 12 police paramedics and 28 police EMTs. He also previously served as the assistant medical director of the United States Customs Service and as a medical specialist with the Metropolitan Medical Strike Team DC. From 1996 to 2021, he was a part-time affiliate attending physician assistant at Inova Fairfax Hospital's Emergency Department. In addition to being a physician assistant for 45 years, he volunteered as a paramedic and EMS supervisor for 35 years with Fairfax County Fire and Rescue member of their Urban Search and Rescue Team as well as the team's medical coordinator for 11 years.



## **Danny McCoy**

DC Fire and EMS, Homeland Security and Special Operations

Deputy Fire Chief

Daniel McCoy is a Chief Officer with over 25 years of combined fire service experience within the National Capitol Region. Chief McCoy is currently assigned as the Deputy Fire Chief of Special Operations and Homeland Security with the District of Columbia Fire and EMS Department. In this capacity he has provided administrative and operational oversight, leadership, and supervision of the Special Operations Division. His responsibilities consist of managing the following programs: Special Operations, Homeland Security, Logistics and Equipment, Technical Rescue, Foam Unit, and Marine Fire/Rescue. The Hazardous Material, Mass Casualty, and the Active Shooter programs are also included. From January 2017 to April 2020, McCoy served as a Battalion Fire Chief where he provided supervision of personnel in the Special Operations Battalion. His other responsibilities included commanding response teams, engaging community partners, protecting national landmarks, and coordinating responses with multiple agencies for WMD, CBRNE, active shooter, MCI, and urban search and rescue. Chief McCoy has been the Incident Commander on multiple National Special Security Events (NSSE's) and currently is the NSSE Fire Life Safety Subcommittee Chair for events within the District of Columbia.



## Danny McCoy

Division of Operations and Intelligence, DC HSEMA

Fusion Center Executive Associate Director

Danny McCoy is a U.S. Air Force Veteran with 24 years of experience in local, state and federal government operations—including emergency, intelligence, logistics, public works, and regulatory operations. Danny’s senior executive business acumen has been shaped by active duty, DoD contractor, and Government of the District of Columbia experience, having served as the Deputy Program Manager for U.S. Army Europe G2's Intelligence and Technical Support Services; Vice President of Operations for the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Warehouse and Property Accountability program; Operations Manager at the DC Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs; Chief Administrative Officer at the DC Department of Public Works; and presently as the Fusion Center Executive and Associate Director for the Division of Operations and Intelligence at DC’s Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA). As DC Fusion Center Executive, Danny provides executive management and oversight of HSEMA’s Situational Awareness and Strategic Intelligence Bureaus including oversight of (1) the District’s emergency management and homeland security operations; (2) situational awareness within the National Capitol Region for emerging or potential incidents; and (3) strategic analysis of regional threats and hazards. Additionally, Danny provides executive management and oversight of HSEMA's Facilities and Logistics Bureau, Preparedness Bureau, Safety and Security Bureau, and Readiness and Response Coordination Bureau. Danny holds a Bachelor of Science in Business degree from the University of Phoenix. He is a Certified Public Manager through George Washington University's College of Professional Studies and has completed GW's Executive Leadership Program. He has been awarded a certificate of completion in Executive Education for the Senior Executives in State and Local Government Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.



## David Povlitz

Arlington County Fire Department

Fire Chief

With more than 25 years of experience in fire, rescue and emergency medical services, David Povlitz was appointed as the Fire Chief of the Arlington County Fire Department in Virginia during November 2018. Arlington County Fire Department has nine stations with 375 employees serving 26 square miles. David's background includes information technology integration, emergency communications, training, and emergency management support. He also is an experienced incident commander, planning and operations section chief for large-scale incidents and complex events. He has more than 20 years of involvement with special operations including hazardous materials, collapsed building and rope rescue, as well as technical, marine, and dive rescue incidents. David has served the Anne Arundel County Fire Department in Maryland and retired as a division chief. He then moved to Alexandria Fire Department where he served as an assistant chief, focusing on administration. In another key area, Chief Povlitz has strong relationships with city, county, state, and regional public safety agencies. He has served on various Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments committees and workgroups, in addition to many programs within the Baltimore Regional Urban Security Initiative. David has interests in partnering with many departments and agencies to improve public safety. In addition, he sees many opportunities with deploying technology to reduce community and first responder risk within emergency services.



## **Dr. E. Reed Smith**

Arlington County (VA.) Fire and Police Departments

Operational Medical Director

Dr. Smith is currently the Operational Medical Director for the Arlington County (VA) Fire Department, an Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine at the George Washington University School of Medicine, and an attending physician at the Virginia Hospital Center in Arlington, VA. He attended medical school at the Georgetown University, completed his residency training in Emergency Medicine at the George Washington University, and has spent the last 12 years developing training and programs to address regional emergency preparedness and operational gaps in the National Capital Region. As faculty, he was the Program Director for the George Washington University Emergency Health Services program and then led the Division of Special Operations Medicine where he oversaw the development of unique custom educational programs and medical operations for civilian and military special operations teams. He was the operational medical director for the former National Medical Response Team - National Capitol Region where he helped to develop new medical response models to atypical disasters in the NCR and was a medical team manager for the Virginia Task Force-1 Urban Search and Rescue team. Additionally, he has served as the Medical Director for large scale events such as the National Marathon, the Nations Triathlon, the AT&T National Golf Tournament, and most recently the 2011 USGA US Open Championship. In his current position as OMD for Arlington County, he oversees all medical operations, provider education, QA and medical protocols, and has developed new programs including unique operational EMS sub-specialty teams and Rescue Task Force, an innovative pre-hospital response to active violence and explosive scenarios. Dr. Smith frequently presents at national and international medical conferences and delivers training to many groups ranging from tactical to operational to hospital based. Most recently, he co-founded and now co-chairs the non-profit Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care to facilitate medical knowledge transfer from combat to civilian use and is co-developing the Arlington County High Threat program. Reed is a former EMS provider and Navy Corpsman and has strong interests in Operational & Tactical Medicine.





## Ed Davis

Boston Police Commissioner (Ret), The Edward Davis Company

President and CEO

Edward F. Davis is the President and CEO of The Edward Davis Company, a business strategy and security services firm. Davis has brought together a team of security and technology solutions experts including former federal, state, local law enforcement, military, researchers and attorneys with strong connections to esteemed academic institutions, national and international governing and intelligence entities. The Davis team lends their expertise to Government and Fortune 500 companies on crisis response, risk management, site assessments, facility security design, audit and compliance, thought leadership and policy, government consulting, cyber/IoT mitigation and management and product strategy. Davis has been in law enforcement for 35 years. Davis served as the Police Commissioner of the City of Boston from December 2006 until October 2013. Davis led the highly successful response to the Boston Marathon bombing. Prior to that, Davis was the Superintendent of the Lowell Police Department. Commissioner Davis has also worked internationally, on police issues in Singapore, London, Northern Ireland, Jordan and Israel, and the Palestinian territories. Davis served on the Police Executive Research Forum's (PERF) Board of Directors and the Major Cities Chiefs Association board. He was a founding member and first President of the Massachusetts Major City Chiefs Association. In 2013, Davis testified before Congressional and Senate hearings on terrorism. In February 2016, Commissioner Davis testified before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs' hearing titled "Frontline Response to Terrorism in America." In 2015, Davis also testified for the defense as an expert witness in a Rhode Island court on police practices in a motion for a new trial on a twenty-five (25) year old homicide case. The incarcerated suspect was released after decades in prison. Davis has received a Masters Degree from Anna Maria College and Honorary Doctorates from Northeastern and Suffolk Universities and the University of Massachusetts at Lowell. Davis was a Fellow at The Institute of Politics, Harvard University.

## Elizabeth Appleton

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Victim Specialist

Beth Appleton joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 2015 where she worked as the victim specialist for the Knoxville Field Office. In 2018, Beth joined the Victim Services Response Team and has traveled to several mass violence incidents to support victims and their families in the immediate aftermath. In 2020, Beth transferred to the FBI Baltimore Field Office where she currently serves as the victim specialist for central and western Maryland.



## Gabe Elias

Commonwealth of Virginia

Statewide Interoperability Coordinator

Gabe Elias is the Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC) for the Commonwealth of Virginia. In this role, he advocates for collaboration and coordination across the emergency communications ecosystem, including operational communications, data sharing, alerts and warnings, and 911. As SWIC, he serves as connectivity between multiple regional, state, and federal governing bodies and committees working in the communications discipline. Prior to this role, he served for over 20 years managing technology, projects, and systems staff at the Charlottesville - UVA - Albemarle County Emergency Communications Center. He is a past president of the Virginia Chapter of the Association of Public Safety Communications Officials (VA APCO).



## **Heather McGaffin**

DC Office of Unified Communications

Heather McGaffin joined OUC in October 2020 as the Chief of Special Operations and Investigations and became the Deputy Director in February of 2022. She has over 20 years of public safety experience working in both the public and private sectors of the 911 industry and as a field responder. Heather has her Emergency Number Professional (ENP) certification through the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) and is a member of the Association of Public Safety Communications Officials International (APCO). She has helped emergency operations centers across the nation in organizational restructuring, training development and implementation, and Next Generation 911 migration. Heather received her B.S. in English from Radford University.



## James Farley

HSEMA

James “Tracker” Farley currently serves as an Interoperability Program Analyst in the Operations Division Readiness & Response Coordination Bureau. Mr. Farley’s duties entail serving as the agency’s Communications Coordinator (COM-C). This role entails fusing operator-driven requirements with Communications Unit Leader (COM-L) strategic directive and Communications Technician (COM-T) solutions. The end game of District interoperability is to ensure an optimized Primary, Alternate Contingency & Emergency (P.A.C.E.) communications ecosystem between the new District EOC at Half Street, field operations and COOP at the Unified Communications Center (UCC) building. Prior to coming onboard as a full-time employee Mr. Farley served as an intern and HSEMA contractor, supporting the former Preparedness Planning Division (PPD) and was detailed to serve the Communications Bureau and DC Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC) in the service of the District partners and stakeholders. Prior to joining HSEMA, Mr. Farley formerly served in the Department of Defense National Language Security Education Office (DLNSEO), supporting various language and culture training policy and programmatic projects for U.S. Armed Forces. Mr. Farley graduated magna cum laude with a B.A. Integrative Studies: Concentration National Security & Counterterrorism and an M.S. Conflict Analysis & Resolution from George Mason University (GMU). Mr. Farley graduated as part of the first DC cohort of FEMA’s National Emergency Basic Academy and continues to pursue emergency management training opportunities to enhance continued professional development and District interoperability. Mr. Farley looks forward to bringing to bear all his integrative academic, professional, and interpersonal experiences in service to HSEMA and the District of Columbia. Mr. Farley is honored to co-host the 2023 District of Columbia Interoperability Summit in assessing and applying lessons learned to modern real-world interoperable communications solutions.



## **Jerica Shackelford**

District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency

Associate Director for Mission Support & Chief of Staff

Jerica Shackelford serves as the Chief of Staff and the Associate Director for Mission Support at DC Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA) where she oversees critical functions of the organization which include the Finance, Human Resources, Grants, and IT bureaus. Additionally, she oversees the Resilience Bureau, which is responsible for the implementation of the District's Resilient DC plan and hazard mitigation programs. The Office of the Chief of Staff leads special projects that have an agency-wide impact. As part of that responsibility, Ms. Shackelford leads the agency's initiative to rebuild its enterprise system – CORE DC. Through this project, Ms. Shackelford is spearheading strategic discussions to better integrate emergency and steady state programs. Ms. Shackelford participates in a number of regional, national, and international groups that focus on emergency management and homeland security matters. This includes representation at the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) Homeland Security Executive Committee, MWCOG RESF-5 Emergency Managers Committee (Vice Chair), IAEM USA Board, IAEM Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Committee (Chair), and the Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN). During Ms. Shackelford's nearly thirteen-year tenure at the agency, she served in several EOC positions managing a wide range of events and incidents. Her experience includes COVID-19, presidential inaugurations, dozens of NSSEs, first-amendment and severe weather events. Ms. Shackelford served as the EOC Manager on January 6, 2021. She received her B.A. in Communication from Texas A&M University and is currently pursuing a Master's in Homeland Security from the Naval Postgraduate school.



## **Jim Schwartz**

Harvard Kennedy School, Program on Crisis Leadership

Senior Fellow

Jim Schwartz retired in 2021 after five years as the Deputy County Manager for public safety and technology in Arlington, Virginia. Prior to that he served in the Arlington County Fire Department for 32 years, the last eleven as Chief of Department. During his tenure with the fire department, he served in a variety of fire department positions including Assistant Chief for Operations, responsible for all response-related activities, including fire, EMS, hazardous materials and technical rescue response, incident management and operational training. In 2003, he was assigned to the Office of the County Manager where he established a new department of Emergency Management and served as its director until his appointment to Fire Chief in July 2004. The Arlington County Fire Department was the lead agency for the response to the September 11, 2001 attack at the Pentagon. Chief Schwartz led the unified command effort for the Pentagon incident. Mr. Schwartz is a senior fellow with the Program on Crisis Leadership at the Harvard Kennedy School and teaches in the Executive Education programs including, Leadership in Crises, the General and Flag Officer Homeland Security Executive Seminar, and Leadership in Homeland Security. Schwartz provides frequent lectures on Crisis Leadership for organizations such as U.S. State Department, FBI, Georgetown University, American University, George Washington University, and numerous international audiences; he also lectured as part the Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series on complex coordinated attack preparedness provided by FEMA from 2014 – 2018. Mr. Schwartz is a member of the International Association of Fire Chiefs Committee on Terrorism and Homeland Security which he chaired from 2008 until August 2014. He previously served on the Advisory Council for the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) and subsequently the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) at the National Counter Terrorism Center. He also served on the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee and was a member of the Advisory Committee for the Department of Homeland Security's first Quadrennial Review in 2010.



## **John Donnelly, Sr.**

DC Fire and EMS Department

Assistant Fire Chief

Fire and EMS Chief John A. Donnelly, Sr. was nominated by Mayor Muriel Bowser on September 4, 2020 to serve as the next Fire and Emergency Medical Services Chief and to lead the 2,100 member DC Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department. He was confirmed by the Council of the District of Columbia on December 15, 2020. Fire and EMS Chief John A. Donnelly, Sr. started his career with DC Fire and EMS in 1992 at Truck 16. Over the course of his career he has served at Rescue Squad 3, Tower 3, Battalion Fire Chief 2; as the Division Commander of Special Operations, Homeland Security, and Apparatus Division; and as a member of the Command Staff in Special Projects and Executive Officer Roles. In 2018, Chief Donnelly was promoted to the newly established Professional Development Bureau which includes the Human Resources Division which includes the Payroll and Compliance Offices, Professional Standards Division, Training Division, the Medical Services Division, and the Grants Office.



## **Justin Brown**

District of Columbia Department of Human Services

Deputy Administrator

Justin Brown is a Deputy Administrator at the District of Columbia Department of Human Services (DHS), where he leads the agency's Office of Emergency Management and is responsible for citywide disaster human services preparedness and mass care operations. While working for DHS, Justin led the establishment of the Office of Migrant Services - a response to the busing of migrants from the Southwest Border - and served on the District's leadership team for the Covid-19 response. During Covid-19 operations, Justin led a multiagency effort to provide emergency social support services to the community. Justin is a veteran of the Fire and EMS services, having previously worked as a firefighter, paramedic, and Battalion Chief in the DC Fire and EMS Department. Justin also served as a Deputy Fire Commissioner for the City of Boston, Citywide Interagency Coordinator (field operations) for the New York City Office of Emergency Management, and as a Technical Advisor in urban disaster management for the U.S. Forest Service in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Justin holds a Bachelor of Health Sciences from George Washington University and a Master of Urban and Regional Planning from Georgetown University. He was a member of the 2014 cohort of Harvard University's National Preparedness Leadership Initiative.





## Keil Green

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

Keil Green is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at LGI and a member of the Board of Directors. His appointment as CEO came after 20+ years with the company where he led corporate growth, including the transition of LGI to an employee-owned company. As CEO, Keil sets corporate vision and strategy and directs the company's growth and resources. His current focus is leading the company from a niche, small business into a growing leader in the public sector consulting space—while maintaining its well-established corporate commitment to public safety/national security missions. Keil is a recognized leader in emergency preparedness strategy. Since September 11, 2001, he has supported federal clients as a strategy lead for initiative ranging from Nationwide consultation and assessment efforts, major event planning and exercises in America's urban areas, and the design of a billion-dollar grant program. In each of these efforts, he has shown the unique ability to bridge the gap between the singular mandate of the federal government with the disparate capabilities of the nation's 70,000 public safety agencies. Keil is a graduate of the University of the South in Sewanee, TN, where he received a B.A. in Political Science.



## **Nicole Peckumn**

Office of the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice (DMPSJ) Chief of Staff

Nicole Peckumn serves as the chief of staff for the Office of the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice. Prior to rejoining DC Government, Nicole was an appointee of the Biden-Harris Administration at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. She was the top communications official for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, serving as the assistant director for public affairs. From 2016-2021, Nicole held various roles at DC Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency including an 18-month detail as Mayor Muriel Bowser's interim deputy communication director (February 2019-September 2020). Nicole was instrumental in the public information planning and response for the District's COVID-19 response, multiple National Special Security Events and First Amendment demonstrations, January 6, and the 2017/2021 Presidential Inaugurations. Prior to moving to Washington D.C., she led external and internal communications and branding initiatives in manufacturing, collegiate athletics, and public health. She earned a master's degree in communication leadership from Drake University and bachelor's degrees in journalism and exercise/sport science from Iowa State University.



## **Renee Gordon**

City of Alexandria Department of Emergency and Customer Communications

Director

Renee Gordon has served as the Director for the Alexandria Department of Emergency Communications since 2015. Previously, she was the Director of 911 and Emergency Communications in Baltimore, Maryland. She began her public safety career as a member of the Prince George's County (MD) Police Department and transitioned to public safety communications in 2008. Director Gordon holds a Master of Business Administration from Trinity University and is a graduate of the University of Virginia's Weldon Cooper Center, Public Safety Senior Executive Institute. Director Gordon is also a graduate of the University of Richmond Professional Executive Leadership School and is an industry leader empowering her organization as a certified professional in the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM). Renee is the Vice Chair of the FirstNet Authority Board. In addition, she holds several international public safety certifications.



## **Richard H Fiske**

Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety

Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC)

Mr. Fiske has over 30 years of public safety experience in Massachusetts, serving currently since 2021 as the Massachusetts Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC), responsible for the enhancement, development, and sustainment of all interoperable and operable public safety communications systems, policies, and standards in the Commonwealth as part of the leadership team at the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security. He also serves as an at-large member of SAFECOM, representing the National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators (NCSWIC). Previously, he was the Director of the Massachusetts State 911 Department's PSAP Operations Division, managing the departments Wireless 911 center which processed more than 2,000 911 calls per day. Before joining the state, after more than 17 years as a municipal Police Officer serving in multiple roles and divisions, Mr. Fiske served as the Director of 911 Emergency Communications and Emergency Management for the City of Worcester, MA, the second largest city in New England. A Massachusetts native, he attended college at both Becker College and Western New England University in Massachusetts, majoring in Criminal Justice, and holds multiple certifications and specialized training in Law Enforcement, Emergency Management, and Public Safety Communications.



## **Richard W. Vorder Bruegge**

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Senior Physical Scientist

Richard W. Vorder Bruegge is a Senior Physical Scientist in the Operational Technology Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation where he is responsible for overseeing science and technology developments in the imaging sciences, as well as consulting on other more general science and technology issues across the FBI. He has worked at the FBI since 1995 and has testified as an expert witness in state, federal, and foreign courts over 60 times. Dr. Vorder Bruegge has a Ph.D. and Master's degree in Geological Sciences from Brown University, as well as a Bachelor of Sciences in Engineering from Brown. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, and in 2010 he was named a Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology Fellow for his work in facial recognition and identification. From 2014 to 2021 served as Chair of the Digital & Multimedia Scientific Area Committee in the Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science and thus served as a member of the Forensic Science Standards Board. He previously served as the Chair of the Scientific Working Group on Imaging Technology (SWGIT, 2000-2006) and Chair of the Facial Identification Scientific Working Group (FISWG, 2009-2015).



## Robert Bohls

Federal Bureau of Investigation Assistant Special Agent in Charge

Robert Bohls is an Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) at the FBI's Washington Field Office, overseeing the Special Operations Branch. This includes the National Capital Response Squads (SWAT, Special Agent Bomb Techs, Op Med, Evidence Response Team (ERT), HERT, USERT, CAMEO, Command and Tactical Operations Center, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Crisis Management Team, Special Events, Crisis Negotiations Team), and all of WFOs stationary, mobile, and aviation surveillance teams. Mr. Bohls began his FBI career in 2007 as a Special Agent in the Jackson Division. While in Jackson, Mr. Bohls worked various criminal programs including gangs, drugs, and violent crime, earning Mississippi's "Top Cop" award in 2010. Mr. Bohls then transferred to the San Diego Division where he conducted violent gang investigations and was the recipient of the Attorney General's Award for Law Enforcement Excellence. In 2014, Mr. Bohls was promoted to Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) with the Transnational Organized Crime - Western Hemisphere Section. Here he oversaw drug investigations for the western region of the US. In January 2016, Mr. Bohls was promoted to Supervisory Senior Resident Agent (SSRA) with the Las Vegas Division. In this role, he supervised the Reno and South Lake Tahoe RAs, with responsibility over various FBI programs throughout northern Nevada. Following his time in the Las Vegas Division, Mr. Bohls became Unit Chief over the Analysis and Investigations Unit (AIU) in October 2018. While at AIU, Mr. Bohls oversaw the FBI's internal security investigations program for FBI employees, contractors, and TFOs, until he was promoted to ASAC at WFO in 2020. Mr. Bohls has a BS in Psychology from Utah State University and a Masters in Public Administration from the University of Utah. Prior to joining the Bureau, he worked as a police officer with the Provo Police Department in Utah and as a USAF reservist. Mr. Bohls is married with four children.



## **Robert Holman**

DC Fire and EMS Department

Medical Director

Formerly an Associate Dean of Medicine at Georgetown and Professor of Medicine, he served as Unity Health Care's Internal Medicine Discipline Director immediately prior to joining DC Fire and EMS as its medical director in 2016. Dr. Holman has helped lead the department's efforts in developing alternative destinations to low acuity 911 callers.



## Scott Brillman

Fairfax County 911

Director

Scott L. Brillman is the new director of Fairfax county Department of Public Safety Communications (DPSC). Also known as Fairfax County 911, DPSC is the largest public safety communications center in the Commonwealth of Virginia and one of the 10 largest in the United States. Fairfax County DPSC receives approximately one million calls annually. Scott Brillman was appointed Baltimore City’s Director of 911 in 2012, where he oversaw one of the busiest 911 centers in the country, handling 1.5 million calls per year. During his tenure the agency was recognized with the International 911 center “Team of the Year Award” from the International Association of Public Safety Communications Officials. In March 2020, Brillman was appointed Deputy Director of Emergency Management to help lead the COVID-19 response for the City of Baltimore. He also served as Deputy Director of Emergency Management from 2007 to 2012, where he helped to manage many large-scale emergencies in Baltimore. Prior to his appointment to Baltimore City 911, Brillman also served as a paramedic and mentor with the Baltimore City Fire Department for 20 years. He has maintained his paramedic certification and served as a Medical Specialist on Maryland’s Urban Search and Rescue Task Force. Brillman received a bachelor’s in emergency health services management from the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, and a master’s in management/executive leadership from Johns Hopkins University.





## **Scott Scheurich**

Ashburn Consulting LLC

Subcontractor for Fairfax County, VA

Regional Cybersecurity Coordinator

Mr. Scheurich has been supporting various regional programs, workgroups, and committees in the National Capital Region for more than 17 years. In that time, he has served multiple technical and management roles in the execution of regional, information technology funded by federal homeland security grants. Currently, Mr. Scheurich serves as the Regional Cybersecurity Coordinator (RCC) for the National Capital Region and interacts regularly with security officials in local, state, and the federal government to find common needs, solutions, and funding opportunities to manage cybersecurity risk within and across governments and partners. Prior to his current role, Mr. Scheurich served as the technical program manager for the Fire and Rescue CAD2CAD Service and the Identity and Access Management Service (IAMS) from their inception through operation. Mr. Scheurich works for Ashburn Consulting LLC, a small business in Northern Virginia aimed at providing information security and networking services to federal, State, and local governments and educational entities. Mr. Scheurich is a lifelong resident of Northern Virginia and a Hokie. When he is not working, Mr. Scheurich enjoys time with his family and plays golf.



## Sean Haglund

DHS

Mr. Haglund serves as Associate Director, Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In this role, Mr. Haglund manages OBP's programs aimed at building capability among the general public and across the public and private sectors to prevent, protect against, respond to, and mitigate bombing incidents. Additionally, Mr. Haglund coordinates Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) efforts across DHS and the Federal interagency. Prior to joining DHS, Mr. Haglund served as the Deputy Chief, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Requirements Support, Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense (CBRND) within the Joint Staff, J-8. Mr. Haglund was responsible for developing and integrating CBRND Policy, Doctrine and other non-material solutions through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and served as a primary advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters relating to Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. From 1990 to 2014, Mr. Haglund served in the U.S. Air Force as an officer in Civil Engineering, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Acquisition Program Management leadership roles. Mr. Haglund commanded a Civil Engineer Squadron at a Data Masked location supporting a research and development organization through the hazardous testing of numerous programs and the execution of presidentially directed missions. Additionally, he served on the Headquarters, US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) staffs, commanded several large EOD organizations, served two combat deployments in Iraq and was an adjunct faculty member at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies leading courses within the Seminar on Trans-Atlantic Civil Security and the Seminar on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism. As a program manager, Mr. Haglund was assigned to Headquarters, Air Force Special Operations Command, managing the \$4.5 billion CV-22 Osprey aircraft acquisition. In addition, he led the associated Special Operations



Command Light Strike Vehicle acquisition program. Mr. Haglund is a graduate of Air War College, and holds a Master of Arts in National Security Affairs-Homeland Security and Defense from the Naval Postgraduate School, a Master of Science in Industrial Operations Management from the University of Arkansas, a Master of Science in Business Administration from Central Michigan University, and is an alumnus of the National Defense University, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Program for Emerging Leaders. He is a Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) through the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM), a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) through the American Society of Industrial Security, a Project Management Professional (PMP), a Master CBRN Military Advisory Team (CMAT) leader through the DTRA Defense Nuclear Weapons School, and holds Defense Acquisition Workforce (DAWIA) Level III program management and Level II life-cycle logistics certifications. Mr. Haglund is married to Nicole Haglund and has three children; Kathryn, Aidan, and Ainsley.



## **Teddy Kavaleri**

Office of the Chief Technology Officer (OCTO)

Deputy CISO

Teddy Kavaleri is the Deputy Chief IT Security Officer (DCIO) at the District of Columbia's Office of the Chief Technology Officer (OCTO). OCTO develops, implements, and maintains the citywide information security platform and policies; the District's IT and telecommunications infrastructure; major citywide applications; establishes and oversees IT enterprise architecture and website standards for the District; and advises District agencies on technology solutions to improve services to businesses, residents and visitors in all areas of District government. In his most recent previous role, he was the Chief IT Officer (CIO) for the District's Office Of Unified Communications (OUC), responsible for 911 and 311 Telephony/CAD/CRM systems; Radio and Mobile Data Computing solutions supporting multiple agencies. He received his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Virginia Tech University and Master of Science from George Washington University in Engineering and Technology Management. Teddy is a technical expert in wireless communications and large-scale IT systems and applications. Teddy has 25 years of progressive technical and management experience.



## Tom Gagnon

### CISA

In August 2019, Tom joined Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) as an Emergency Communications Coordinator (ECC), supporting the Statewide Interoperability Coordinators (SWIC) for Region 3. Tom is a retired Marine, and during his career oversaw logistical support to localities following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Subsequent Marine Corps assignments afforded opportunities to contribute to disaster planning and to author the Marine Corps' manpower process for mobilizing reservists for defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). Following his military service, Tom joined Virginia's Public Safety and Homeland Security Office as the Interoperability Program Manager. During his tenure, he was appointed the SWIC and State Point of Contact (SPOC) for FirstNet Authority matters. While serving in those capacities, Virginia was the first state to opt-in to the FirstNet Authority's plan for a nationwide public safety broadband network. Additionally, the Commonwealth's Link to Interoperable Communications (COMLINC) system was reinvigorated, continuing needed interoperability between state agencies and localities. Tom received his Bachelor's Degree from the University of Delaware in English/Technical Writing and a Master's Degree in National Security Studies from the National War College. He also holds the Project Management Profession Certification from the Project Management Institute. Tom's current duties as an ECC afford him numerous opportunities to collaborate with state and local partners on numerous public safety communications projects. Leveraging the CISA technical assistance program, Tom coordinates additional resources to assist public safety practitioners with improving interoperability for their jurisdictions.



## Vince DeLaurentis

CISA Emergency Communications Division

Deputy Executive Assistant Director

Vincent DeLaurentis is the Deputy Executive Assistant Director for Emergency Communications within the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). He assumed this duty in April 2018, and leads CISA's efforts to understand, manage, and reduce risk to the cyber and physical infrastructure, to include national security, emergency preparedness, and public safety emergency communications. These efforts ensure emergency communications, comprising of land mobile radio, broadband, internet-protocol, 911 networks, priority communication services and more, are interoperable, secure, and resilient. Additionally, he is CISA's Component Requirements Executive (CRE) and representative on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Joint Requirements Council, ensuring agency capabilities mitigate operational gaps and meet mission needs and requirements. He also served as Acting Executive Assistant Director for Emergency Communications from September 2019 to October 2020. Prior to his current role, Vince served as the first Director of the DHS' Joint Requirements Council from October 2014 to April 2018. In this position, he connected operational requirements to the capability and acquisition needs for Department's broad portfolio of homeland security missions, including cybersecurity, infrastructure security, emergency management, law enforcement, immigration, marine safety, air travel security, and border protection. The Joint Requirements Council is charged to improve operational effectiveness and efficiency and inform the department in managing a \$140 billion budget. Vince has dedicated his career to public service, including 30 years in the U.S. Coast Guard. As a senior officer of the Coast Guard Commandant's command cadre, he led strategy development, budget formulation, operational capabilities, resource management and human resources activities in support of Coast Guard's nearly 60,000-member workforce and \$14 billion operational budget. A career cutterman, he spent 13 years at sea with four Commanding Officer assignments. As the Commanding Officer of the High Endurance Cutter HAMILTON (WHEC 715) in San Diego, California, he led the U.S. Coast Guard afloat task force command for Operations Unified Response, ensuring an effective international and multi-agency humanitarian response to the devastating 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Vince graduated from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mathematics, and holds a Master's Degree in Public Administration from George Mason University.



## **William Lessard**

Boston Emergency Medical Services

Captain

I have served the City of Boston as an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) with Boston Emergency Medical Services (EMS) for 35 years. Currently assigned to Professional Standards, I have specialized expertise in communications, dispatch operations, investigations, compliance and emergency operations. Prior to my assignment in Professional Standards, I was assigned to both dispatch and field operations, working as an EMT prior to my promotion to supervisor. I am the recipient of several Department awards including multiple Lifesaving Medals. I have worked more than 15 Boston Marathons and have responded to numerous large scale events including mass casualty incidents. During the 2013 Boston Bombings, I was assigned to the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC), now known as the Unified Command Center (UCC) at the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency.