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More Military Muscle For Homeland Defense

Providing Defense Support to Civil Authorities

Military Support Page 3

R. James Woolsey Vice President, BAH

Interview Page 4

Army National Guar Assets and Homeland Security

Military Support Page 7

Maine, Rhode Island, and Virgina

State Homeland News Page 9

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A NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

By James D. Hessman, Editor in Chief



Throughout the 20th century and into the 21st the nation's political and military leaders realized and usually followed a common-sense forward-deployment strategy--taking the battle to the enemy on *his* homeland rather than on America's own soil, in other words. That strategy was much easier to implement, of course, by the presence of

friendly nations both to the north and to the south and by the protective waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, which from a strictly naval/military point of view served as the world's largest moats.

The first successful large-scale enemy assaults against American forces on U.S. "soil" since the War of 1812 were the 7 December 1941 Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the sinkings, by Nazi U-Boats, of numerous U.S. and allied ships in the close-to-shore waters up and down the Atlantic Coast. The moats had been breached, but not quite broken. That situation changed abruptly when the Soviet Navy, under the leadership of Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, achieved near-parity with the U.S. Navy. In the 1970s and 1980s Soviet nuclear-powered submarines, and sometimes surface ships as well, patrolled routinely in the international waters just off both U.S. coasts, and in the Caribbean. Still, the comforting illusion persisted that the U.S. homeland itself was virtually immune from attack - except, of course, in a global U.S./Soviet nuclear confrontation that both sides conscientiously strived to avoid.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks exploded both the immunity myth and, with it, at least part of the rationale for the forward-deployment strategy. The U.S. homeland is now more vulnerable, in numerous ways, to enemy attack than it has been since the Revolutionary War. The attack could be incremental, piecemeal, bridge-bybridge or building by building. Subway trains, stadiums, crowded theaters, nuclear power plants, even grade schools, libraries, and universities all are among the most likely targets - and the most likely weapons are not long-range missiles and massive artillery shells but dirty bombs, easy-to-conceal canisters of poison gas, and everyday beatup passenger cars filled with deadly explosives.

One result of these and other changes is that defense of the U.S. homeland is now a major component of the overall U.S. defense strategy. All of the nation's armed services, and a growing and increasingly capable civilian army of homeland-defense professionals - most but by no means all of them assigned to the Department of Homeland Security - have joined forces and are working and training together to detect, prevent, and, if prevention fails, mitigate the consequences of additional terrorist attacks against the United States in the future.

To learn more about the expanded role of the U.S. military in homeland defense see the incisive reports by Robert Fitton and Brent Bankus in this issue of DomPrep Journal. And watch this space for future updates on a number of new policies and programs, of literally vital interest to all Americans, that are now only in the planning stage but will soon provide additional layers of protection against America's enemies, both foreign and domestic. ∇

Cover Photo: A U.S. Navy Sailor with the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) carries food supplies to victims of Hurricane Katrina at a pickup station in Bay St. Louis, Miss., Oct. 18, 2005. (U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 3rd Class Jon Hyde)

Providing Defense Support to Civil Authorities

By Robert Fitton, Military Support



Military operations are the sole responsibility of the operational chain of command which does not include the Military

Departments. While removing "operations" from the responsibility of the Secretary of the Army for this important purpose, the Committee agrees that each Secretary of a Military Department would retain authority to use military equipment and forces for activities such as disaster relief, response to domestic disturbances, public affairs, the operations of non-combatant forces, and many training activities. Excerpt from Public Law 99-433, 14 April 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986).

Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma have brought to the forefront of the national consciousness an aspect of disaster response sometimes recognized only by the immediate victims – namely, the significant role that the U.S. military (active and reserve personnel from all of the nation's armed services, and from the Army and Air National Guard) plays in responding to and managing the consequences of domestic disasters, both natural and manmade.

The hearings and investigations about the adequacy of the DHS (Department of Homeland Security) and FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) response to this year's hurricanes undoubtedly will continue for some time, as will the debate about the responsibilities of and possible misjudgments by the state and city officials involved.

By all accounts, though, it seems that the military units and leaders deployed to the Gulf Coast acquitted themselves extremely well. Only time will tell, however, if the comprehensive reviews of the federal response to the hurricanes that already have started will result in the Department of Defense (DOD) assuming an even larger and increasingly proactive role, as some experts have urged, in planning for and responding to future domestic disasters of similar magnitude.

A Duty "to Support and Defend"

Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution states that, "Congress shall have power ... to provide for calling forth the militia to execute laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasions." Article IV, Section 4, expands this authority: "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them ... against domestic violence."

The U.S. military serves to support and defend the nation, not only in time of war but also when domestic disasters occur. From the beginning, the U.S. armed forces, principally the Army, have provided support to civilian authorities when floods, riots, hurricanes, earthquakes, forest fires, and other disasters, natural or manmade, have required states, or the federal government, to call upon the National Guard and/or other armed services to help.

The basis for military support to civil authorities in times of crisis is codified in the National Security Strategy: "National security emergency preparedness is imperative ... a crucial national -security requirement." Also in the National Military Strategy: "Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, illegal drug trafficking, and other threats at home or abroad may exceed the capacity of other agencies and require the use of military forces."

A Primary Component of Homeland Security

The provision of Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) is a key component

of the U.S. homeland-security strategy. Natural disasters, major accidents, and terrorist threats present a complex and potentially catastrophic threat to the nation. The continuity of government (COG) element of homeland security requires providing for the continuity and restoration of all levels of government - federal, state, and local. At the federal level, COG ensures the integrity of constitutional authority; at the state and local levels, COG operations can facilitate the quick restoration of civilian authority, and of essential government functions and services. This can reassure citizens and will minimize the risk that military support for consequence-management activities might be misperceived as an imposition of undue military force.

DSCA cuts across the spectrum of military operations and includes, among other things, active and passive measures taken to protect the area, population, and infrastructure of the United States, its possessions, and territories by: (a) deterring, defending against, and mitigating the effects of threats, disasters, and attacks; (b) supporting civil authorities in crisis- and consequence-management operations; and (c) helping to ensure the availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of critical national assets.

Homeland security is enhanced through the military's rapid, effective, and often extensive response in support of civil authorities. DSCA enhances the nation's force-projection capabilities by employing military occupational specialties and equipment in real world missions.

Domestic Military Support in U.S. History

When the framers met in Philadelphia in 1787 to draft the U.S. Constitution, insurrection was a major concern. For the government to remain viable, it was deemed necessary that mechanisms

Interview: R. James Woolsey, Vice President, Global Resilience, Booz Allen Hamilton



The former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) provides his insights into why first responders must be constantly aware of the limitations of intelligence and information-sharing—and, consequently, on the need to emphasize resilience, particularly in the area of command and control, over pure prevention.

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be established to suppress rebellions or insurrections and enforce law. The so-called Shays' Rebellion of 1786 and the later Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 validated the need and set the stage for the fundamental principles guiding the use of the military to support civil authority.

Current interagency responsibilities in this area were established by Executive Orders that created the Federal Emergency Management Agency, assigned considerable authority to the agency's director, identified the agency's COG responsibilities, and transferred to FEMA certain missions previously under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army and the Army's chief of staff.

One of the principal missions of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is to provide assistance to civil authorities, when natural disasters or other emergencies occur, but only when the following guidelines are followed:

• Emergency preparedness and response is primarily a state and local responsibility. However, in instances when the nature of the disaster exceeds the capabilities of state and local authorities, the USACE

may provide help to save human life, prevent immediate human suffering, or mitigate property damage (under separate authority – Public Law 84-99).

- The Corps gives emergency assistance top priority and provides immediate response, using every resource and expedited procedure available to it. Assistance is limited to the preservation of life and protection and commercial of residential developments, including public and private facilities that provide public services. Exclusive assistance to individual homeowners and businesses, including agricultural businesses, is not authorized. However, during periods of extreme drought, such assistance may be provided to farmers and ranchers under certain circumstances. Under certain conditions, rehabilitation assistance also may be available for eligible flood-control structures.
- Because USACE is divided by drainage basins into regional divisions, and by smaller drainage basins into districts, it can provide an immediate response to disasters in almost any area of

the country. USACE personnel are assigned to various field offices scattered throughout each district. During disasters, therefore, USACE personnel in any locale may be quickly mobilized to assist in response and recovery work.

Emergency operations managers have been appointed to each division and district to carry out all emergency actions. Each is responsible for maintaining an emergency organization of trained specialists. Of perhaps greater importance, however, is the fact that each district has a single point of contact for all emergency activities.

Civilian Control of the Military

As with all military operations, final decision-making authority rests with civilian leaders. When and how best to provide military support is a critical issue facing the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense (DOD), which adheres to the following policy principles in acting on requests for military support:

- 1. Absolute and public accountability of the officials involved in the oversight of process is required, while also respecting the constitutional principles and civil liberties of the U.S. system of government.
- DOD must remain in a supporting role to the lead civilian agencies involved (Domestic Situations: Department of Justice/FBI-crisis and Department of Homeland Security/ FEMA-consequence management; Overseas Situations: Department of State).
- DOD support should emphasize the military's natural roles, skills, and structures – e.g., the ability of the armed services to mass mobilize and to provide logistical support.
- 4. DOD should not purchase resources

that do not directly support its primary warfighting mission.

The Military Support Process

The President and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) establish priorities and determine what DOD resources will be made available for domestic support. Commanders ensure that DOD resources are used judiciously by adhering to the following principles:

- Civil resources are applied first in meeting the requirements of civil authorities.
- DOD resources are provided when response or recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of civil authorities (usually as determined by DHS/FEMA, but an exception can be made when goods or services cannot be provided as conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise, and is in the best interest of the U.S. government).
- DOD specialized capabilities (e.g., airlift and reconnaissance) must be used efficiently.
- Military forces remain under military command and control under the authority of the SecDef or DOD Executive Agent at all times.
- The DOD units involved do not perform any function of civil government unless absolutely necessary – and then only on a temporary basis, under conditions of Immediate Response.
- Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, military missions will have priority over DSCA missions.

Other Factors in the Equation

Following are some additional factors that affect how DOD provides support for domestic operations in times of crisis:

1. When a disaster occurs, local

authorities (for example, city fire fighters and police) are almost always the first to respond. However, if the magnitude of the disaster exceeds the capabilities of local authorities, the state government also responds. A significant share of the state's response capabilities are provided by that state's own National Guard forces, which operate under the governor's control and at the direction of The Adjutant General (TAG) of that state. Most National Guard units have enormous capabilities they can use in responding to disasters.

BSI, a military installation of any service or defense agency - in close proximity to an actual or projected disaster area

- 2. Almost all of the disasters and emergencies that occur in the United States are handled by the state in which the disaster occurs, and therefore do not require federal assistance. However, under what are called Emergency Management Assistance Compacts, over 50,000 personnel (mostly National Guard) from all 50 states and the District of Columbia deployed to the states along the Gulf Coast to help those states deal with the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
- 3. DOD involvement in disaster relief usually begins with a presidential declaration, which is issued after a request has been received from the governor of a state. Here there also are some exceptions. Even prior to a presidential declaration, for example, FEMA can request, and has requested, the pre-deployment of certain personnel and some critical supplies. In addition, when the Secretary of Homeland Security declares an

Incident of National Significance, DOD and other federal departments may be asked to deploy. Finally, even without a presidential emergency or disaster declaration, the president can direct the Department of Defense to commit resources for a period not to exceed 10 days.

- 4. For operational purposes, DHS/ FEMA designates a Principal Federal Official or Federal Coordinating Officer to coordinate the on-scene federal effort at a Joint Field Office. In addition, DOD may issue an Execute Order, at the direction of the SecDef, designating the supported Combatant Command (usually the U.S. Northern Command), establishing necessary supporting DOD commands, services, and agencies for the mission, and requiring the combatant commander to appoint a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), who will be directed to coordinate all of the DOD support provided. If the severity of the disaster warrants, a Joint Task Force also may be established.
- There are usually five phases of a typical DSCA operation: Phase I: Pre-deployment; Phase II: Deployment; Phase III: Support to civil authorities; Phase IV: Transition to other federal agencies; and Phase V: Redeployment.

The Function of Base Support Installations

There will generally be at least one Base Support Installation (BSI) used in each disaster for which military support is provided. A BSI is a military installation of any service or defense agency – in close proximity to an actual or projected disaster area – that has been designated to provide interservice (joint) administrative and logistical support to DOD forces deployed in the area. Federal military and civil assets may be positioned at or near the BSI.

USNORTHCOM designates the BSIs, working in coordination with the military services. Selection is based on, among other factors, the base's geographic proximity to an operation and its functional capabilities.

Although specific support requirements will vary widely, depending upon the nature and scope of the domestic emergency, BSIs may be tasked to provide or coordinate for a long list of supplies and services for units – e.g., a brigade of as many as 2,000 troops (in a worst-case scenario; approximately 600-1,200 in an average scenario) - deployed on a DSCA mission. Among those supplies and services would be: transportation (personnel, as well as buses and trucks); food, water, ammunition, fuel, oil, repair parts, and other consumables; communications equipment (for command and control operations); and large open areas that can be used as bivouac sites where food, laundry, and basic subsistence services (including latrines and showers) would be available.

The BSI also may be directed to provide and/or coordinate emergency medical services, airfield operations for helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, the contracting for and purchase of supplies and services, the maintenance of essential equipment, the establishment and management of forward assembly areas in or near the disaster site, and even the provision of administrative, logistical, and transportation support for DHS/FEMA civilian Urban Search and Rescue teams (each of which consists of about 60 people plus 60,000 pounds of equipment and four working dogs).

The "Immediate Response" Exception

There are certain crisis situations in which a unique set of circumstances allows military commanders to react immediately, prior to any official declaration of the crisis. These situations permit what is called an "Immediate Response" mission and allow a DSCA type of reaction to imminently serious conditions that are beyond the operational capabilities of local civil authorities.

The primary objectives of DOD responses in such situations are to save lives, prevent human suffering, and stop or at least mitigate massive property damage. Once an immediate-response operation has been initiated, though, the installation commander must inform the Office of the Secretary of Defense, through service or command channels, as soon as possible. The installation commander also should record all incremental costs associated with the operation (for potential reimbursement later). For practical purposes it is anticipated that most if not all immediate-response operations will be of relatively short duration - i.e., normally no longer than 72 hours.

To summarize: The United States has a time-tested and important tradition of civilian control of the use of military force – and, as a corollary, there are strict limits on the military activities permitted within the geographic limits of the country. Balancing that valued tradition with the need, at various times, for military support in response to major disasters, including acts or threats of terrorism within the American homeland, requires carefully considered decisions by the president himself and by the senior officials of the Department of Defense.

The U.S. armed services are uniquely equipped to provide an effective blend of skilled personnel and equipment to support federal, state, and local jurisdictions in times of crisis. For legal, constitutional, and other reasons, though, military resources usually are not and should not be requested until federal, state, and local agencies have exhausted their own resources and the crisis remains resolved.

As the nation and the world continue to move into the 21st Century, the topic of federal response to international terrorism will continue to be a dynamic issue affecting all Americans. However, given the nature of the potential threats and likely military missions involved in fighting the Global War on Terrorism it seems unlikely that even the most thorough preparations can cover *all* possible scenarios.

For that reason alone, it is essential that adequate response measures be taken at the outset of a disaster, natural or manmade, both to minimize casualties and to prevent unnecessary damage to property. A broad spectrum of consequence-management programs and processes also must be in place that will provide the capabilities for local, state, and federal authorities to respond immediately and effectively. Existing local, state, and national response systems provide a solid foundation for which DOD can provide additional, and frequently essential, support.

The U.S. armed services can and will continue to provide reliable and responsive support to civil authorities – under the clearly defined guidelines mandated by the nation's elected leaders. The military's extensive experience in supporting civil authorities during peacetime disasters, in national-security emergencies, and for special events enhances the security of the U.S. homeland – and has kept the nation's military in the forefront of domestic disaster response.

Current force-projection plans require the ability to respond quickly and decisively to events, anywhere in the world, threatening the interests of the United States and its citizens. In the Age of Terrorism it seems increasingly probable that those events may well occur within the homeland of the United States itself.

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Army National Guard Assets and Homeland Security

By Brent Bankus, Military Support



Since their inception during the nation's colonial era the "Militia" – later known as the "National Guard" – has forged a long and distinguished history of not only service

to the nation during times of national emergencies, but also service to the governors of the states establishing and supporting militia/guard units in times of disaster affecting their home states. That history was embellished significantly during the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center, and the Pentagon, when Army and Air National Guard units answered the call to duty not only by protecting the skies over the nation's capital but also such critical-infrastructure sites as airports and nuclear power plants.

The militia tradition started prior to the Revolutionary War when a number of towns and cities established and maintained their own defense forces for missions ranging from the guarding of homes from Indian attacks to more traditional military operations such as the battles fought against British forces during the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. The legacy of service established in those years carried on through the end of the 19th century, with locally sponsored militia units proving themselves to be increasingly effective at providing support both to their home states and to the federal government.

However, beginning with the Spanish American War in 1898, militia units started to be called on for federal service more and more frequently, and often to be used routinely in out-of-state operations. These changes raised a number of concerns at both state and national levels, and led to the passage of several pieces of legislation to help the militias and regulate their use more consistently. The Dick Act of 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916 were among the most important laws passed in this area. These landmark acts mandated that the "organized militia" would henceforth be called the "National Guard," and provided both federal recognition and subsequent funding for weapons, equipment, and training.

A Codification of Legislative Intent

In addition, the two laws codified several issues specifying the length and location of service for National Guard units. The intent of the nation's lawmakers was to ensure that, when called upon for federal service, National Guard units and personnel would be both equal under the law with their active-duty counterparts and, insofar as was possible, possessed of similar combat capabilities.

Ongoing realignment resulted in assignment of the National Guard to a larger role in U.S. homeland security

The practical effect was that, from that time on, the National Guard would be both a state and a federal military force, with individual units owing allegiance first to the governors of their respective states, and then to the president of the United States. As a corollary, National Guard units were therefore required to be proficient both as a fighting force and as a state emergency-response force that could effectively train for and cope with natural and manmade disasters within their respective states on missions ranging from the fighting of forest fires and local "flood duty" assignments to assisting local law- enforcement agencies during prison riots.

During federal emergencies – World Wars I and II are the most obvious examples – National Guard units made up much of the nation's combat power in both the Pacific and European Theaters of War. Later, during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Army and Air National Guard both provided additional and much-needed troop strength and air assets to augment the nation's active-duty forces in these supposedly limited conflicts.

New Threats, and An Updated Strategy

That tradition continued throughout the rest of the 20th century, but the fall of the Soviet Union and disintegration of the Warsaw Pact changed almost all contingency plans, naval/military operational requirements, and the spectrum of likely threats. The U.S. military, particularly the U.S. Army, began to rethink its previous strategies and force - structure needs to better answer the new threats beginning to emerge just over the horizon.

With the demise of the Central Front in Europe the most likely threat would no longer be a "Fulda Gap" outbreak, with hundreds of Soviet tanks rolling through the German countryside and the U.S. V Corps leading the NATO defense. Instead, and particularly since the dawn of the 21st century, Islamic extremists were becoming the principal perpetrators of worldwide violence. It was inevitable, therefore, that after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. homeland a comprehensive strategicdefense review and realignment of federal military responsibilities and resources would be required.

One of the more significant changes in the resulting (and ongoing) realignment that followed was the assignment to the National Guard of a larger role in U.S.

homeland security. The realignment started in 1998 under the Clinton administration when the National Guard Bureau established a number of specialized units specifically structured to assist first responders in the event of an "incident" involving weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

These units, first called Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection or RAID teams, consisted of 22 fulltime National Guardsmen per state - assigned from either the Army or Air National Guard who would be federally resourced, trained, and exercised. Each of these National Guard teams would be commanded by a lieutenant colonel and would be able to provide unique DOD-level expertise and capabilities to assist state governors - as major components of the state emergencyresponse structures being established - in preparing for and responding to so-called CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) incidents.

One reason for establishment of the RAID teams – later renamed Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) – was to give individual states units that could rapidly deploy to assist local incident commanders in determining the nature and extent of an attack or incident, provide expert technical advice on WMD response operations, and help identify the need for and support of follow-on state and federal military-response assets.

Their primary mission, though, is to support civil authorities in the event of a WMD or NBC (nuclear, biological, or chemical) incident. Within the scope of their duties and responsibilities, CSTs can identify dangerous agents and substances, and assess both current and projected consequences. In addition, they can provide expert professional advice on the response measures required and assist civil authorities with requests for military support. Primary mission is to support civil authorities in the event of a WMD or NBC incident

The first 10 teams were based in Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, California, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington, with each of the teams originally fielded assigned to a specific FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) region. The establishment of an additional 17 teams - based in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia - was announced in January 2002. When the force has been fully fielded there will be 55 certified teams, two of which will be headquartered in California.

A New Weapon in the Arsenal

The most recent additions to the growing number of National Guard units preparing for possible use in the Global War on Terrorism are the "Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield-Explosives Enhanced-Response Force Packages" - or CERFPs for short. The announced goal is to have at least one such unit immediately available in each of the 12 FEMA regions. To date, CERFP teams already have been established in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Florida, Illinois, Texas, Missouri, Colorado, Hawaii, and Washington. As regional assets, the CERFPs are on call to respond to intrastate emergencies through what are called Emergency Management Assistance Compacts.

Unlike the members of WMD-CST units, most CERFP personnel are assigned

from previously existing units and are "traditional" or "M-Day" troops with civilian jobs. Each CERFP unit consists of approximately 100 to 120 members, assigned from both the Army and the Air National Guard, and has been assigned the primary missions of casualty decontamination, medical triage, and search-and-rescue operations. Most CERFP team members belong to civil support and/or patient decontamination teams; to medical, engineer, or chemical units; and/or to counter-drug aviation assets. Because of their flexible structure, each CERFPs has a robust capacity to incorporate other National Guard personnel or physical assets e.g., fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and/ or transportation, infantry, and military police units.

Because they are state assets, CERFP units usually will be activated for State Active Duty. However, they also can be activated, under Title 10 of the United States Code, as federal units. Whether assigned to state or federal service, any CERFP units activated will be placed under the jurisdiction of a specific military commander.

The establishment and training of the units described are but two of the initiatives the National Guard has taken to meet the changing threat to the nation, and to individual states and cities, posed by the forces of international terrorism, and follows in the proud tradition, started more than two centuries ago, of citizen volunteers serving both their home states and, in times of national emergency, answering the "call to arms" of the federal government when needed.

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Maine, Rhode Island, and Virginia

By Adam McLaughlin, State Homeland News



Maine Assembles Task Force to Assess Disaster-Preparedness Capabilities

In an effort to refine the state's existing preparedness strategy, the Maine State Legislature has commissioned a task force to examine the state's current level of homeland-security preparedness and disasterresponse capabilities. The task force also was directed to identify gaps in the state's emergency-preparedness plans and to suggest ways to better allocate resources.

The commissioning of the task force was preceded by a full day of hearings in Augusta last month that included presentations from the state's senior officials in the fields of public safety, health, and emergency response. Members of the legislature expressed particular concern over: (1) The state's security needs in the areas of law enforcement, emergency preparedness, public health, port and airport security, and the security of sensitive targets; (2) Spending priorities and any gaps that might exist between equipment, personnel and training needs, and the funding available; and (3) The impact that the deployment of National Guard and Reserve units may have had on state security and preparedness.

"The review is especially important in light of reductions in the amount of federal money being sent to rural states such as Maine for homeland security," said state Rep. Stanley Gerzofsky (D-Brunswick), cochairman of the task force. "I do not know if we have resources to patrol our ports in Portland or Rockland," he said. "I do not know how well the federal government is doing to keep track on what is going through the Gulf of Maine, but as a state official, I would like to know."

In the past, the task of meeting the state's homeland-security needs has been assigned primarily to the Maine Emergency

Management Agency – whose director, Arthur W. Cleaves, said that he welcomes the review and does not see the task force as "second-guessing" his agency's work. "If there are things we should do better by having a task force take a look at ... then the more [oversight] the better," he commented.

Rhode Island Conducts Mock Disaster Exercise To Test Interagency Coordination

Emergency-response personnel representing Barrington, Bristol, Warren, East Providence, Providence, and the Rhode Island State Police participated in a full-scale mockdisaster exercise at Barrington High School in late October in an effort to improve disaster-response coordination between state and local jurisdictions. The exercise, planned and managed by the Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency, was designed to prepare state and municipal agencies to work together more effectively in the event of a real disaster.

The exercise scenario simulated the release of a dangerous chemical agent in the school's auditorium. Student volunteers – who needed parental consent to participate – role-played the victims, displaying various symptoms of exposure, while a local hazardous materials team entered the school along with members of a Special Weapons and Tactics unit. The "victims" were transported to a site where members of the East Providence Fire Department, who were dressed in personal protective equipment, had set up a number of decontamination trailers to handle the patients.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Director Nathan Rogers, who oversaw the exercise, explained the importance of such drills. "Many different agencies are coming together to try and make safe this situation," he commented. "Practice," such as that provided by the exercise, "is essential in order to be able to handle an actual crisis."

Virginia Creates Homeland Security Simulations Training Center

Governor Mark R. Warner has announced the creation of Virginia's Emergency Management Training, Analysis & Simulation Center (EMTASC), which is devoted to the command and operations management side of homeland-security training.

"This new facility will combine worldclass expertise and state-of-the-art modeling and simulation for training, analysis, and operational support for disaster management and homeland security situations," Warner commented. "As our prayers go out to the citizens of the Gulf region who have been devastated by Hurricane Katrina, that terrible storm reminds us again of the importance of this critical emergency-management training and simulation."

The EMTASC charter calls for the center to employ cutting-edge modeling and simulations tools in its efforts to assist clients with needs assessments and exercise designs - but the center's clients will be able to design simulated exercises focusing on their own specific needs. Officials said that the type of training planned not only will challenge participants to respond to dynamic scenarios and actions in real time, but also will explore the second- and/or third-order effects of the decisions that are made. The modeling and simulation tools used will provide a real-time perspective that enables those at the command and management levels to review a broad spectrum of lessons learned that can be used in real-world applications.

The center initially will be housed – until new facilities are built – at Old Dominion University's Virginia Modeling, Analysis, and Simulation Center. EMTASC will be ready to conduct its first training in January 2006, officials said. Initial emphasis will be placed on sites and localities within the state of Virginia but the center will open up its services to a national client base soon thereafter. **V**