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The concept of a whole community approach has been recommended for years. However, it has perhaps not been more important than it is today. Compounding events, or disasters within disasters, are why emergency planners stress the importance of planning for the worst but hoping for the best. Well, the time to implement these plans is now. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic does not appear to be ending anytime soon. However, life must go on. “Normal” seasonal disasters like wildfires, hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods will not wait for communities to replenish supplies, reallocate resources, and hire more staff. Human-caused threats may escalate as bad actors take advantage of physical and technological vulnerabilities that the pandemic exposes. The common primary, secondary, and tertiary effects of smaller threats worsen when compounded with the pandemic response.

This edition of the *DomPrep Journal* addresses the various ways in which communities can come together to not only respond effectively to the pandemic, but to other scenarios that are certain to arise. Before being able to gain communitywide buy in to any disaster response, it is important to understand how various stakeholders view the threat and its potential consequences. With regard to COVID-19 or other major events, determining what is considered “acceptable losses” to those stakeholders will help determine a course of action that will maximize support for the response.

Education and trainings also need to include various stakeholders. After all, no community threat can be addressed without help from various disciplines. For example, emergency management and homeland security have a lot of overlap that should be addressed with an all-hazards educational approach. Educational and training efforts tend to evolve over time and change with the times. However, there are some core lessons that should be revisited and reimplemented into current training efforts. The National Planning Scenarios from 2006 are one example of core trainings that have been practically forgotten in some jurisdictional planning efforts.

Response is another way that community stakeholders can join forces to protect each other from common threats and bad actors. For example, active shooter preparedness provides opportunities for law enforcement and other community stakeholders to work together to develop trainings and methodologies that better prepare all citizens. Human trafficking is another example of a threat that can occur almost unnoticed if community stakeholders do not know signs to look for. During a pandemic, this type of threat can escalate without a whole community approach.

The bottom line is that, with a whole community approach, communities will be better prepared to face whatever threats present, as well as whenever and wherever they occur. Modern compounding threats do not happen in silos, and neither should the preparedness and response efforts to create viable solutions for addressing the threats and mitigating the consequences.
Dear DomPrep Readers,

Since day one on 11 November 1998, DomPrep has been and continues to be a publication for preparedness and resilience professionals with operational and strategic responsibilities. Since then, we have published many beneficial articles on pandemics, terrorism, natural disasters, chemical weapons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), active shooter(s), opioids, special events, cybersecurity, etc., etc., etc. So, when local, tribal, state, and federal authorities said, “I didn’t see a bio event coming,” I took it personally and sadly considered our work to be a failure.

DomPrep has not been alone trying to drive awareness of the biothreat and its broad array of dangers. Others, especially the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, tried to advise and influence elected officials and policy makers of a certain biological incident, be it naturally occurring or by evil intent. The government even warned itself, albeit unsuccessfully. The second National Preparedness Goal clearly states, “A virulent strain of pandemic influenza could kill hundreds of thousands of Americans, affect millions more, and result in economic loss. Additional human and animal infectious diseases, including those undiscovered, may present significant risks.” Additionally, President Donald Trump’s own National Biodefense Strategy states Goal 1 is to “Enable risk awareness to inform decision-making across the biodefense enterprise” and to “assess the risks posed by research, such as with potential pandemic pathogens, where biosafety lapses could have very high consequences.”

In spite of those warnings along with so many others for decades, preparedness seemed to go out the window in March 2020. Reflex, recoil, and panic replaced executing “The Plan.” The United States as well as many other nations pursued a deny, delay, and blame strategy. Politicians commandeered the microphone and blocked those on their staff with operational experience who could provide calm by revealing The Plan. Investors lost confidence and markets plunged. Others lost confidence as well. Personal protection equipment (PPE), detection, surveillance, and decontamination stockpiled caches among other essential supplies were surprisingly found to be inadequate to meet the many cries for help. The world witnessed our health care workers donning garbage bags and bandanas in lieu of proper and adequate protective gear. Government officials locked down the country to flatten the curve thereby hoping to avoid hospital surge. With those moves, they once again showed the world how fragile our resilience is.

The first sentence of my email asking DomPrep’s readers to take a survey troubled a few readers. For this, I apologize if I offended anyone. My comment, “There has been a failure
by elected and policy officials, on all levels of government, to adequately understand and prepare for COVID-19,” was not intended to be political. It was not. The fact that the lack of preparedness contributed to more than 100,000 fatalities, small businesses closing, record filings for unemployed benefits, and the creation of unprecedented amounts of unsecured fake money by the United States Treasury is an undeniable problem, not a political talking point. The printing of money is a bipartisan affair with future serious consequences for everyone.

It is what it is.

The topic of acceptable loss, while unpleasant for many, is a sober look into consequence management. Deciding when and how to stop the lockdown is difficult and should be made by the subject matter experts from numerous fields, not solely politicians. Unfortunately, in today’s hyperpolarized world, many respondents to the following survey results look at this emergency management/public healthy decision through a political perspective, either protecting or criticizing their favorite politician or position. For this, I am both sad and sorry to share. We live in a volatile world right now, but we should be better than this.

The following quote helps me to better understand our current state of division. It was written in a recent commentary by Jonathan Sumption published in London’s The Sunday Times:

*The lesson of Covid-19 is brutally simple and applies generally to public regulation. Free people make mistakes and willingly take risks. If we hold politicians responsible for everything that goes wrong, they will take away our liberty so that nothing can go wrong. They will do this not for our protection against risk, but for their own protection against criticism.*

I would like to thank DomPrep’s talented, dedicated, and diverse readers for braving through the many hours of service, as we progress through this and other, imminent “unforeseen” incidents. Stay safe. Stay healthy.

Very Respectfully,
Martin (Marty) Masiuk
Publisher@DomPrep.com

*Click here for the Acceptable Loss in a Pandemic report.*
An All-Hazards Educational Approach to Emergency Management
By Paula D. Gordon

The nature and scope of the emergency management field can be defined in a variety of ways. An all-hazards definition of emergency management encompasses some essential homeland security concerns. A conceptual framework then helps bring together an understanding of the challenges facing those in the emergency management and homeland security fields when an all-hazards definition of emergency management is used.

Emergency management can be applied to emergencies of any possible origin – emergencies that can impact the lives of hundreds, thousands, or millions of individuals. However, elements of the emergency management cycle, as they tend to be defined, may not be well-known to people outside the field of emergency management (e.g., within the newer field of homeland security). In addition, those in homeland security may have educational and professional backgrounds that differ notably from those in emergency management. Public service experience and hands-on involvement in addressing emergency situations may also differ substantially. With disparate backgrounds, experiences, and public service orientation among those in emergency management and homeland security, the All Hazards Emergency Management Cycle (see Fig. 1) – including elements of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery – provides a way of looking at emergency management while accommodating and integrating key elements of concern that are shared by those in both fields.

A Typology of Emergencies of Differing Levels of Severity

Developed in the early 1980s, the Typology of Emergencies (see Table 1) was created to illustrate the numerous possibilities that exist when considering emergencies of differing levels of severity. It was developed in part from a perceived need to help decision makers exercise realistic expectations when considering a full range of possible scenarios, including worst case scenarios. The typology was developed to help decision makers expand their thinking when assessing possible worst scenarios along a variety of parameters. This offers a way to assess these scenarios in far more realistic ways than had been the case in the past.
An Impact Scale’s Applicability to All-Hazards Emergency Management

The Washington, DC Year 2000 Group (WDCY2K) was a networking organization composed of members from the public and private sectors – including government, business, nonprofit organizations, and academia – with interests in Y2K-related challenges. In 1998, the WDCY2K created the Y2K Impact Scale as a survey instrument to learn the different ways in which its membership was assessing the possible impacts of Y2K.

Originally called the Homeland Security Impact Scale, the All Hazards Impact Scale – ranked 0-10 – is a conceptual tool adapted from the Y2K Impact Scale for educators, researchers, policymakers, and practitioners:

0. No real impact on national security, economic security, or personal security
1. Local impact in areas directly affected
2. Significant impact in some areas that were not directly affected
3. Significant market adjustment (20%) and drop; some business and industries destabilized; some bankruptcies, including increasing number of personal bankruptcies and bankruptcies of small businesses, and waning of consumer confidence

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Emergency</th>
<th>Number of Dead &amp; Injured</th>
<th>Roles of Government</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Characteristics of Care</th>
<th>Skill &amp; Training Needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Scale</td>
<td>Scores</td>
<td>Local, State, and Regional</td>
<td>Surge of capabilities</td>
<td>Manageable</td>
<td>Surge capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Scale</td>
<td>Hundreds</td>
<td>All levels of government</td>
<td>Modified</td>
<td>Normal to minimal</td>
<td>Networked surge capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Scale</td>
<td>Thousands</td>
<td>All levels of government</td>
<td>Modified to makeshift</td>
<td>Normal to minimal</td>
<td>Networked surge capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catastrophic Scale</td>
<td>Millions</td>
<td>All levels of government</td>
<td>Mostly makeshift</td>
<td>Minimal or worse</td>
<td>Make do capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mega-Catastrophe</td>
<td>Multi-millions to billions</td>
<td>Remaining vestiges of government</td>
<td>Totally makeshift</td>
<td>Minimal if existent</td>
<td>Improvisational skills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Economic slowdown spreads; rise in unemployment and underemployment; accompanied by possible isolated disruptive incidents and acts, increase in hunger and homelessness

5. Cascading impacts including mild recession; isolated supply problems; isolated infrastructure problems; accompanied by possible increase in disruptive incidents and acts, continuing societal impacts

6. Moderate to strong recession or increased market volatility; regional supply problems; regional infrastructure problems; accompanied by possible increase in disruptive incidents and acts, worsening societal impacts

7. Spreading supply problems and infrastructure problems; accompanied by possible increase in disruptive incidents and acts, worsening societal impacts, and major challenges posed to elected and non-elected public officials

8. Depression; increased supply problems; elements of infrastructure crippled; accompanied by likely increase in disruptive incidents and acts; worsening societal impacts; and national and global markets severely impacted

9. Widespread supply problems; infrastructure verging on collapse with both national and global consequences; worsening economic and societal impacts, accompanied by likely widespread disruptions

10. Possible unraveling of the social fabric, nationally and globally, jeopardizing the ability of governments to govern and keep the peace

This adapted scale provides a common frame of reference for recognizing, identifying, analyzing, and discussing key factors that can be considered by those tasked with formulating and implementing policy. The All Hazards Impact Scale can be used in various ways:

- To help decision makers, planners, analysts, and practitioners air differences in perspectives concerning the impact that an emergency has had or may likely have.
- To serve as a common framework for discussing different perceptions of a current or potential event’s impact.
- To help clarify differences in perspective that key actors and stakeholders may have concerning an event.
- To help those in decision-making roles arrive at a consensus as to the seriousness and extent of the impacts of an event.
- To understand, assess, and manage specific events, challenges, and possibilities.

**Response Collaborations**

The differences in experience and professional backgrounds between those in the fields of emergency management and homeland security were especially notable after 9/11. Those who became involved in homeland security efforts at that time did not tend to come from the field of emergency management. Owing to the differences in backgrounds, a gap became apparent between those in the then separate fields. These differences still exist to some extent today within the multi-discipline, multi-jurisdictional efforts required to tackle modern emergencies and disasters.
When persons with such different backgrounds find themselves working on the same disaster, it can be hard to arrive at a common understanding of the mission and goals, not to mention arrive at a consensus concerning the steps that might be needed to address an emergency, particularly one of unprecedented scope. Such differences were particularly apparent when FEMA ceased being an independent agency and became part of the Department of Homeland Security. For example, the conflict that ensued both before and following Hurricane Katrina is particularly well documented in a series of articles that appeared in the *Washington Post* in December 2005.

The Typology of Emergencies, the All Hazards Emergency Management Cycle, and the All Hazards Impact Scale can be helpful tools in emergency management and homeland security. They can help individuals and organizations in various ways:

- To develop multidimensional perspectives concerning emergencies of differing levels of severity and impact;
- To provide a deeper understanding of the differences between catastrophes and lesser emergencies, the various plans that need to be in place, and the numerous actions that need to be taken;
- To help deepen an understanding of scenarios that have unfolded as well as spur imagination for scenarios that could unfold;
- To aid those in decision-making roles to act more proactively and realistically than in the past, particularly regarding catastrophic and other unprecedented events.

A framework that accomplishes these tasks for disasters of any size is important, but most importantly when it comes to catastrophic events that involve significant failure of major elements of the critical infrastructure. Understanding the nuances between disasters, jurisdictional plans, and necessary actions is critical. After all, emergency management and homeland security should be complementary to one another and not fundamentally at odds.

**Expanding Course Content to Cover Multi-Tiered Disasters**

Following are some topics involving emerging issues and realities that should be incorporated into the content of a curriculum that features an all hazards approach to emergency management:

- The variations of the terrorist and anarchist mentalities
- The differences in pre- and post- 9/11 perspectives concerning the nature and implications of the terrorist and anarchist threats
- Pandemics – including flu, Ebola, Zika virus, and coronavirus
- Drug abuse, addiction, and the opioid crisis as a national public health disaster
• Humanitarian disasters – including homeless encampments
• Catastrophic hurricanes, tornados, and floods
• The New Madrid Fault and the San Andreas Fault
• The triggering of earthquake faults by man-made factors
• The implications of the Japan earthquake and Fukushima Disaster for nuclear power plants in the seismically sensitive zones in the U.S.
• Wildfires caused by drought, environmental degradation and neglect, and/or other man-made causes
• Climate changes
• Changes in the gravitation of the Earth and magnetic North
• Solar storm activity
• Asteroid and meteorite activity
• Electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
• Cyber-related threats and challenges, including lessons learned and unlearned from Y2K
• Blackouts and cascading infrastructure impacts
• GPS and satellite interference, natural and man-made
• Impact-type approaches that focus on prevention, preparedness, mitigation, resilience, sustainability, and recovery
• Implementation of a culture of preparedness
• Preparedness and planning for worst case catastrophic events

How narrowly or broadly emergency management educators define the nature and scope of emergency management will shape the future of the field, the roles that professionals in the field assume, and the competencies they develop. Educators are in roles of responsibility for helping prepare those who aspire to careers in emergency management and public service become as effective as they can be in those roles. Educators also can do much to advance the expertise and knowledge of those who have already accrued considerable experience in the field. This article provides an overview of one perspective on what an all-hazards approach to emergency management can encompass.

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“Are we prepared?” is a simple question with a not-so-simple answer. There are generally two times this question arises: (1) when funding is being requested, and (2) after an incident occurs where the preparedness comes under review. Both timings are appropriate, but arguably not the best time to raise the question. The best time to ask this question is that “sweet spot” between a request for funding and an actual need arises. However, this ideal time is frequently missed or avoided. Some would say it is human nature to avoid tough questions unless forced to face them; other times, it is because of the preparedness issue conflicting with other priorities that comprise the agendas of most agencies, governments, and private sector managers.

Fruitful discussions of preparedness usually revolve around the concept of risk and its management. Those in the preparedness business understand that risk is a mix between two balances: (1) threat (frequency or likelihood of an occurrence and the consequences if it comes to fruition); and (2) cost (protection, prevention, mitigation) vs. benefit (degree of mitigation or avoidance altogether). These discussions appear to be straightforward but, like preparedness itself, are not typically simple.

As an example, consider a venue’s preparedness to potential active shooter attacks. Assume further that the location in question is a retail store that is dependent on foot traffic throughout the store. The determination is that an active shooter attack has never occurred on this property. However, it could occur and, if it happens, the consequences could be significant. One of the protection strategies proffered is to allow access to the store only via one doorway that is protected by both an armed guard and metal detection processes. This protection controls ingress and would project a deterrence posture and facilitate an immediate threat mitigation presence. One argument against the proposal is that the direct cost to implement the measure is very high, prohibitively so.

Moreover, the indirect loss associated with this measure is the certainty of a decrease in foot traffic and the resulting sales reduction. This loss is the direct result of potential customers not feeling as welcome in the modified environment. The proposed measures would likely reduce the consequences of an active shooter attack but would require financial costs that are too high. On a side note, another issue arises. An active shooter attack is a particular type of attack, one that involves one or more hostile assailant employing firearms as weapons. Consider
a scenario where the attackers use weapons other than guns. Terminology does matter. Unless the discussion is specific to firearms, consider the term “active violence” as a broader approach that is inclusive of other weapons.

**Planning for a Pandemic**

The active violence scenario is important and one for which organizations and individuals should prepare. Unless the attack is coordinated (multiple locations) and/or complex (numerous weapon types or tactics), it is generally location specific in terms of prevention and protection, and more generalized if discussing the response mission. In contrast, consider the catastrophe of a pandemic. By its very nature, a pandemic or epidemic is pervasive, directly impacting communities, organizations, and families across a large geographical area – multiple states or countries. This type of event has occurred in the United States in 1918 (H1N1), 1957/1958 (H2N2), 1968 (H3N2), 2009 (H1N1pdm09), and now 2019/20 (COVID-19). Questions arise regarding the degree of preparedness of any particular state or the United States as a whole for the latest virus-driven pandemic. Unfortunately, this discussion did not occur during the so-called “sweet spot” timeframe. Instead, this discussion occurred (or at least was attempted) in the early part of this decade.

The bombing in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on 19 April 1995 served as one wake-up call regarding preparedness in the context of terrorist attacks and the use of weapons of mass destruction (CBRNE). Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act (Section 1402 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1966 – PL 104-201) on 23 September 1996. This act of Congress did many things, of which the establishment of the Office for Domestic Preparedness and the assessment of the nation’s 120 most populated cities for preparedness were significant. After the 9/11 attacks against the United States, President George W. Bush (#43) issued Homeland Security Policy Directive 1 (HSPD 1) on 29 October 2001. HSPD 1 established the Homeland Security Council to coordinate homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies. Later, after the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, President Bush issued additional HSPDs, including HSPD-8, on 17 December 2003. The purpose of HSPD-8 was:

*This directive establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities.*

HSPD-8 put into operation many activities. It addressed training and exercises, equipment needs, development of a National Preparedness Goal, and the start of an effort to develop capabilities across all-hazard preparedness.

**Revisiting the National Planning Scenarios**

The preparedness capabilities development effort tied to the National Planning Scenarios developed by the Homeland Security Council. This effort began in late 2001 and continued concurrently with the HSPD 8 efforts. Ultimately, draft 21.3 was labeled as the “final draft” in March 2006. The National Planning Scenarios included 15 all-hazard scenarios for use as planning tools. The national scenarios were not inclusive of all possible or probable events
by design. They were of a mix that would likely encompass all of the critical capabilities required to handle any significant disaster, attack, or catastrophic event. HSPD-8’s efforts used the national scenarios as the basis for determining key or target capabilities as well as anticipated resource needs and other related preparedness efforts. Of the 15 national scenarios, Scenario #3 specifically addresses pandemics. Within that context, the Target Capabilities List (TCL) identified the following capabilities that have key ties to pandemics:

- Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation
- Laboratory Testing
- Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
- Responder Safety and Health
- Isolation and Quarantine
- Emergency Public Information and Warning
- Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment
- Medical Surge
- Medical Supplies Management and Distribution
- Mass Prophylaxis
- Fatality Management
- Economic and Community Recovery

An example is the Respond Mission Capability: Medical Surge. Specific to pandemics, selected examples of planning assumptions identified were:

- Pandemic is pervasive and not localized.
- Worst case scenario would produce 733,000 patients hospitalized on any given day.
- Up to 20 percent of those hospitalized (146,600 patients) are critical and will each require a critical care bed and mechanical ventilation, necessitating staff to patient ratios of 1:2 registered nurses (RN) (73,300 RNs), 1:10 physicians (14,660 MDs); 1:5 respiratory therapists (29,320 RTs). Ratios should be consistent with State/sub-State regions.
- 80 percent of those hospitalized (586,400 patients) are non-critical and will require a general medical bed, necessitating patient to staff ratios of 1:40 physician (14,660 MDs) and 1:20 RN (29,320 RNs).
- Vaccine availability will be insufficient and time to produce additional vaccine unacceptably long.
- Antiviral drug production will be surged.
- Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) will be depleted.
- There is a critical need for containment measures to prevent additional disease spread. Specific counter measures such as social distancing, masks, and hand hygiene should be instituted.
Because of the limited supply and production capacity, there is a need for explicit prioritization of influenza vaccine based on the risk of influenza complications, the likelihood of benefit from vaccination, role as an influenza pandemic responder, and impact of the pandemic on maintenance of critical infrastructure.

Primary prevention including masks, hand hygiene, and social isolation may be the primary mode of preventing the spread of disease if vaccine and viral agents are not available in adequate quantities.

Development of the National Planning Scenarios occurred as a response to the newly formed Homeland Security Advisory Council following the 9/11 attacks and one of the council’s initial efforts to advise the president regarding steps to improve the nation’s preparedness capabilities. Subsequently, these scenarios served as a foundation for the creation of the TCL in large part as a response to Congress’ stated needs for a means of measuring the nation’s progress concern for preparedness efforts primarily funded through appropriations.

The work began in earnest in 2005 but, for some reason, ended without formal adoption of nor subsequent evolution of the target capabilities’ progress. To be sure, there were many skeptics of the TCL, especially regarding its associated measures and metrics, both of which were identified as guidelines only. In April 2020, within the context of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, several questions seem clear and are ripe for discussion but even more in need of solutions:

- Did America as a whole, and its states specifically, adequately plan for its fifth pandemic since 1918, in light of the National Planning Scenarios and the TCL?
- How different were the planning assumptions of the TCL (specifically Medical Surge) and COVID-19 (e.g., 146,600 critical patients requiring ventilators)?
- Should the United States consider another look at the National Planning Scenarios and the TCL’s planning assumptions as part of the planning and preparedness process?

No answers yet, just questions for everyone to ponder in the weeks and months ahead.

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Active Shooter Preparedness: Beyond Run/Hide/Fight

By Chad Hyland

Run/Hide/Fight or Avoid/Deny/Defend – no matter which mantra is taught/trained, there is one unfortunate constant between both methodologies: the shooting has begun, and there is an imminent loss of life occurring at the workplace, school, church, grocery store, or wherever the active shooters have selected their targets. Thorough understanding of these methodologies is certainly important during an active shooter event. Often, bystanders freeze in disbelief that the incident is happening to them. This is not the common fight versus flight response. There is initial shock to the system. Repetition through training and exercises will create that imbedded response in the cerebellum to create the muscle memory needed for all bystanders to react and Run/Hide/Fight or Avoid/Deny/Defend. Not to dissuade from bolstering preparedness through this training, the fact remains that lives are being threatened when the response is initiated. A true active shooter preparedness plan needs to go beyond the Run/Hide/Fight or Avoid/Deny/Defend reaction.

Prediction of human behavior can seem complex. It can seem overwhelmingly daunting when put into the context of an active shooter event in which the incident can be over in less than five minutes. However, these shootings did not start with the first shot. The shooting did not begin when “all of a sudden, he took a gun out and started shooting everyone.” Examine the facts of the Columbine High School shooting on 20 April 1999. This is the shooting that coined the term “active shooter.” The assault did not start on April 20. It did not start at 11:19 a.m., when one of the two killers yelled, “Go! Go!” It did not start the morning of the attack, while they were carrying explosive devices that were set to detonate. It did not even start in 1999. In fact, the killers started posting violent blogs in 1996, which started the chances for intervention and prevention.

In 1998, the killers created a “Hit Men for Hire” video. They started to obtain weapons and hone their bomb-making skills. These were all precursors of events to come that were missed. This was further substantiated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) report, *A Study of Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the United States Between 2000 and 2013*. The study, released in June 2018, found that many active shooters engaged in behaviors that signaled impending violence in the weeks and months prior to the attack. The FBI found that, on average, each active shooter displayed four to five concerning behaviors over time that were observable to others around the shooter.

Too often, an active shooter program’s “success” is measured by how familiar the occupants are with the reaction when the incident has begun. There is a sole focus on Run/Hide/Fight. Although the response is necessary, lives are being lost at that point. The National Preparedness Goal is “a secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover
from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.” This goal is applied to continuity of operations (COOP) throughout the United States. Communities and businesses will develop preparedness plans for a variety of disasters, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding, winter storms, etc. However, this goal must be applied to active shooter events by developing protocols in each of the five mission areas of the National Preparedness Goal.

**Prevention**

A company must think beyond insider threat as someone who will initiate cyberattacks against their company. An active shooter is a form of insider attack. The psychopathy of these offenders is vastly different than a serial killer. Ted Bundy was charming. Edmund Kemper was friends with law enforcement. Dennis Rader was a church leader and leader of a Boy Scout troop. Nikki Giovanni, a professor at Virginia Tech, said “there was something mean about this boy” when referencing Seung-Hui Cho (2007 shooter). If a person recognizes behaviors as problematic but takes no action, the opportunity for intervention is missed. Preventing an attack requires the observation of pre-attack indicators, or PAINs. When PAINs are observed, caution may be warranted and action taken to consider the context of the warning signs in order to determine if a threat assessment is needed. The PAINs must be available to all members of the community involved in the preparedness planning. As an active shooter progresses on a trajectory toward violence, these observable behaviors may represent critical opportunities for detection, intervention, and disruption. A shared awareness of the common observable behaviors demonstrated by active shooters may help to promote inquiries. These PAINs include:

- Preoccupation with theme of violence or fascination with/asserting ownership of firearms;
- Intimidating others;
- Cross boundaries, such as excessive calls or emails;
- Verbalized problems at home or financial problems;
- Marked performance decline or unexplained increase in absenteeism;
• Repeated violations of policies or resistance and overreaction to changes in policies/procedures;
• Notable changes in personality, mood, or behavior and/or noticeable unstable, emotional responses;
• Giving away personal possessions;
• Showing noticeable decline in personal hygiene, increased use of drugs/alcohol, or unkempt appearance and dress;
• Threat of suicide or self-harm;
• Empathy with individuals committing violence; and
• Behavior that is subject to paranoia.

Protection
Having a workplace violence policy seems intuitive in today’s society. However, the depth of the policy must encompass more than just prohibitive actions. The previously noted FBI report shows that the most common response when concerning behavior was observed by others was to communicate directly to the active shooter or do nothing. As noted in the previous mission area, there are pre-attack behaviors that, if recognized, could lead to the disruption of a planned attack. Accurate and early reporting that allows for a well-timed intervention could be instrumental in resolving issues of workplace incivility before they have the opportunity escalate into physical violence. Processes and procedures for employees that observe PAINs must be detailed in the workplace violence policy.

The workplace violence policy must detail a threat assessment program and team. The identification of a potential perpetrator, assessment of the risks of violence posed by a given perpetrator at a given time, and management of both the subject and the risks that he/she presents to a given target are all identified through the formulation of a Threat Assessment Team (TAT). The TAT’s objective is to use internal agency specialists to prevent violence from occurring, such as human resources, security personnel, and Employee Assistance Program (EAP) personnel. The TAT serves as a central convening body that ensures that warning signs observed by multiple people are not considered isolated incidents and do not go undocumented.

Mitigation
Deploying countermeasures to mitigate the threat of an active shooter is only the first step. With any strategy, response, procedure, and technology, a robust training program must be developed. Faith in the technology deployed as a countermeasure must be unquestioned. The countermeasures must be tested on a bi-annual basis. For instance, a fire drill does not only test the occupants’ response to evacuate the building. It also tests the fire annunciator panel to ensure it is operational when needed. If a public address system or mass notification system has been purchased as a countermeasure for active shooter events, it must be known that the equipment will work when the time comes.

Inclusion of first responders is necessary for familiarization of the building design, floor plans, and any breaching equipment that may be necessary. As the subject matter experts,
they can work with property management to identify additional actions that must be taken that may not be known to the layperson. For example:

- How do the office telephone numbers and address appear when 9-1-1 is called?
- Has a reverse phone tree been developed so first responders can trace the phone number that initiated 9-1-1 response to a specific office in the event the caller cannot talk?
- Has a master key or access control card been created and stored in a secured location for first responders to utilize during an event?

There may be other tools that can help first responders. For instance, the Virginia Tech shooter chained the doors. This inhibited law enforcement response because bolt cutters were needed. This is something that can be purchased and stored in the pre-staged equipment area for first responders.

**Response**

Although knowledge of and focus on Run/Hide/Fight is the basis for this article, other aspects must also be considered. During the run aspect, occupants perhaps should not report to their normal rally point. As in law enforcement, there is a traditional and a dynamic response to active shooter events. During a fire or other evacuation incident, the traditional response is acceptable to report to a rally point. However, active shooter is a dynamic response. The FBI report indicated that 22 of the 23 incidents that occurred in business environments were perpetrated by a current or former employee. These employees know the rally point locations. If the perpetrator is count driven (maximum number of casualties) versus target driven (seeking one target and eliminating those in the way), there is an increased risk in reporting to a known location. The Columbine High School perpetrators staged explosive devices to explode to maximize their deadly impact.

Events over the past years have also demonstrated the potential for complex and devastating attacks in crowded gathering places, known as hybrid targeted violence. These acts of violence may involve a team of attackers operating at one or more locations simultaneously using a combination of various weapons, including vehicles. Al-Qaida endorsed the Pulse Nightclub lone wolf operation and proclaimed that it would inspire others to do the same. Occupants cannot report to their common, known rally point during these dynamic incidents. Developing an alternate rally point, such as a designated phone number to call following the incident, is critical in maintaining the safety of the occupants once they are out of the building.
Bleeding remains the leading cause of death in active shooter incidents. The Pulse Nightclub shooting in Orlando report showed fatalities resulting from severe blood loss. The Hartford Consensus summarized it best by stating, “No one should die from uncontrolled bleeding.” Until law enforcement has neutralized the threat, emergency medical services may not be able to enter the facility. Time is critical. Death from severe blood loss can occur from 20 seconds to five minutes. As noted earlier, these events may be over in that amount of time. Also, a shot is fired, on average, every fifteen seconds once the event begins. Every bystander carries a set of tools at all times to control hemorrhage – his or her hands. Learning the techniques to apply pressure, applying a tourniquet, or applying a hemostatic bandage is critical to saving lives. Training in hemorrhage control should take its place alongside training to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation and the use of Automated External Defibrillators. A bleeding control kit must be available. The recommended location is with the AED. Classes are available via http://www.stopthebleedingcoalition.org or http://www.bleedingcontrol.org.

Recovery

Recovery efforts are greater than activation of a continuity of operations or business continuity plan. The immediate reunification with loved ones is not always possible following an active shooter incident. However, family members must be provided with timely, accurate, and relevant information. Lessons from previous events suggest that establishing a team of professionals that would assist and provide services to family members significantly reduces the anxiety of family members, streamlines communication capabilities, and shares accurate information. A Family Assistance Center (FAC) team must be established to serve as a centralized information hub for first responders. The FAC must be prepared to speak with family members about what to expect when reunited with loved ones and ensure effective communication with those who have language barriers or need other accommodations, such as sign language interpreters. Psychological first aid (PFA) training must be provided to the FAC. It is important to provide rapid psychological support to victims and survivors who may have been forced to remain in hiding, in lockdown, or prevented from leaving the scene until giving statements to investigators. PFA training can be provided in person or online. The Psychological First Aid: Field Operations Guide provides information to help survivors immediately in the aftermath of a traumatic event.

In-depth plans have been developed for numerous manmade and natural disasters. These plans encompass mitigating factors as well as recovery components for after the catastrophic event occurs. This same approach must be taken with active shooter events. A plan cannot be based solely on Run/Hide/Fight. Lives are being lost the second this response is initiated. Following the National Preparedness Goal’s five mission areas will develop a substantial preparedness plan with the goal of disrupting and intervening prior to an actual event.

Chad Hyland is a retired police officer from Virginia. He served as a SWAT operator, K9 handler, and instructor in numerous disciplines, including active shooter. He has trained multiple police agencies at all levels in the police response to these events. Since retirement, he served as a private sector supervisory security manager and as the business continuity manager for a nationwide company prior to his return to the public sector. He now serves in a supervisory capacity to a security team that administers all security disciplines, including emergency management and continuity of operations. His instruction in active shooter mitigation continues, to include being a certified instructor in bleeding control from the American College of Surgeons.
These are challenging times. The immediate impacts of the coronavirus pandemic are impossible to ignore when viewed in terms of the sickness and death it has brought upon the world community. It continues to impact the global economy and social norms. The long-term impacts of this virus and subsequent mitigation efforts may not be completely understood for quite some time. What is known is the pandemic has impacted almost every aspect of daily life, from social distancing rules, interrupted supply chains, longer waits at the supermarket, school closures, cancelled milestones, record unemployment, remote learning, and telework to the closure of places of worship. The COVID-19 pandemic has been a transformative event.

The coronavirus pandemic has led to increased risk of financial fraud, cybercrime, and the exploitation of the fear and uneasiness experienced. The digital systems people utilize to socially interact, conduct their business, and in some cases seek medical help all face increased risk of falling victim to a criminally motivated scheme of attack. Negative economic impact, increasing loneliness, and isolation are some of the unintended consequences produced by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, one must pay attention to how the resulting economic downturns and business closures may impact the dynamics of human trafficking – both globally and domestically.

As of 20 June 2020, almost half a million people worldwide have died due to COVID-19, and over 8 million positive cases have been confirmed. The United States has over 2.2 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 with more than 119,000 deaths attributed. The level of infectiousness of COVID-19 has moved nations worldwide to mitigate its spread by enforcing the closure of non-essential businesses and institute mandatory lockdowns.

**Human Trafficking’s Dire Statistics**

The ever-increasing prevalence of human trafficking around the world can be considered a humanitarian pandemic in itself. Human trafficking is defined as “the crime of carrying someone into slavery by force or by fraud, regardless of whether or not the person goes willingly with the trafficker.” According to statistics from the U.S. Department of State’s 2012 Trafficking in Persons Report human traffickers prey on vulnerable populations such as marginalized groups, single mothers, children, and individuals who experience significant economic and environmental hardships. The International Labor Organization stated in 2017 that, “human trafficking is one of the fastest-growing forms of illegal enterprise around the world, generating over US$150 billion unlawful profits every year.” Additionally, human trafficking is predicted to soon become the largest criminal industry in the world.
According to the 2019 Statistics From the National Human Trafficking Hotline (NHTH):

- Approximately 71% of human trafficking victims reported to the hotline were being exploited in the commercial sex trafficking industry.
- Additionally, of the total 11,500 number of reported human trafficking cases to the hotline, approximately 81% of the victims were female, and 22% were minors.
- From a total of 8,248 sex trafficking cases reported to the NHTH in 2019, the main venues of sex exploitation were: illicit massage/spa business (15%), pornography (9%), residence-based commercial sex (7%), and hotel/motel-based (6%).
- “Trafficking occurs to adults and minors in rural, suburban, or urban communities across the country. Victims of human trafficking have a diverse socio-economic backgrounds, varied levels of education, and may be documented or undocumented.”

Upon reviewing the above human trafficking statistics published by the NHTH in 2020, one can observe that in 2019, the most utilized venues of sex trafficking relied on physical establishments. Only 9% of the reported venues were predominantly internet-based (i.e., online pornography channels). As systematic lockdowns due to COVID-19 continue to take place internationally, human traffickers become motivated to explore different avenues of deriving profit from exploited victims. Commercial sex traffickers now offer additional options for subscription-based services.

Children, in particular, face increased risk of abuse and exploitation and are more vulnerable than ever in the wake of COVID-19 as the efforts, resources and focus of many have shifted. The increased risks are due to stay-at-home restrictions, increased time spent online often unsupervised (e.g., gaming, videoconferences, social media), and decreased opportunity for mandated reporters to notice signs of abuse (e.g., teachers, social workers). Many child predators have altered their methods to fully exploit these and other opportunities. The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent restrictions are viewed as a prime opportunity to prey on children and the vulnerable.

On 30 April 2020, Tatiana Kotlyarenko, an advisor from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE), stated: “I’m already hearing that victims are being forced to participate in even riskier activities to earn money for traffickers, that they are facing higher levels of violence, and also that they’re in more debt [to their traffickers] every day.” An official statement issued by the OSCE on 3 April 2020, also warned that, “trafficking for sexual exploitation is increasingly moving online where traffickers can keep their revenue intact and enhance the isolation of and control over victims.” Echoing the previous statements, on 24 April 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) told ABC News, the FBI has been recently investigating “a lot” of child exploitation and human trafficking cases in New York, where the victims trafficked for sex were advertised as being “virus-free,” via online channels.
Between 24 February and 20 March 2020, an INTERPOL-led operation rescued more than 130 human trafficking victims – mainly women and children. These victims were being transited by terrorists in Southeast Asia. Karel Pelán, assistant director of INTERPOL’s counterterrorism unit, stated: “The COVID-19 pandemic will not stop terrorist and organized crime groups from pursuing their activities, which means law enforcement operations must, and do, continue.”

**The Impact of COVID-19 on Key Risk Factors for Human Trafficking**

According to the Global Protection Cluster (GPC), approximately 75% of humanitarian operations worldwide have stopped due to international lockdowns, curfews, and other measures taken in response to COVID-19. Among the emerging trends resulting from the reduction of worldwide humanitarian operations, the GPC reports, “boys, girls, young women and men are reported as being more exposed to violence, sale, trafficking, sexual abuse and exploitation during the COVID-19 pandemic.” As governments divert assets to mitigating the spread of COVID-19, human traffickers are emboldened to exploit an increase in new potential victims – vulnerable populations – and slower responses from law enforcement.

On 7 June 2019, a paper published in the Health Security journal attempted to articulate the connection between disease outbreaks and human trafficking. According to the publication, “in addition to the disruption of family structure such as orphaning, disease outbreaks can cause or amplify several other well-documented trafficking risk factors, from poverty and unemployment to the breakdown of the rule of law.” To mitigate the increased incidence of human trafficking and exploitation, the GPC, and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) offer communication and training resources to vulnerable communities around the world. In the United States, the Polaris Project and the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) similarly provide different outreach channels and e-courses to combat human trafficking amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), has been monitoring the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on victims of human trafficking, as well as the operations of organized criminal groups that traffic in persons. The response of the UNODC to the crisis of human trafficking includes grants to NGOs that offer services to victims of trafficking during the COVID-19 pandemic and personal protective equipment for victims and anti-trafficking units. According to the UNODC, affiliated NGOs report an increase in “loan sharks promising low interest loans to [vulnerable populations], increasing the possibility of debt-bondage.” As more people lose their jobs during the COVID-19 crisis, one should not only expect an exacerbation of historically prevalent risk factors for human trafficking but the exploitation of new ones (i.e., online recruitment of vulnerable individuals).
In January 2020, INTERPOL rescued 232 victims of human trafficking in West Africa. Upon interviewing 65 male victims, INTERPOL discovered that all of the men “had been recruited online from Ghana and promised ‘decent work’.” Among the victims saved by INTERPOL, 46 minors were being sexually exploited and forced to beg. On 23 March 2020, the FBI published an official statement warning, “due to school closings and social distancing enforced to mitigate COVID-19, children will potentially be exposed to an increased risk of child exploitation via online channels.” The problem is global, and its complexity derived from many socioeconomic and geopolitical factors.

**Everybody Can Help Fight Human Trafficking – Whole of Community Approach**

In cooperation with local and international law enforcement, the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), UNODC, not for profits such as NCMEC and NGOs like the Polaris Project facilitate online courses to help communities understand the warning signs, risk factors, and mitigation strategies associated with human trafficking. To alleviate the operational limitations of organizations that serve victims of human trafficking during the COVID-19 pandemic, community members can also volunteer to aid in efforts of prevention, education, recovery, and delivery of much needed social services to victims of this type of abuse.

Private sector tools and capability can and, in many cases, do yield much influence in this humanitarian effort. Government and law enforcement officials need help from a whole of community approach. Lexis Nexis Risk Solutions and the National Center of Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) serve as an example of this essential partnership. Launched in November 2000 and donated by LexisNexis Risk Solutions in response to a critical need of photo distribution when a child goes missing, the ADAM Program is used by NCMEC to quickly distribute missing child posters to specific geographic search areas. ADAM stands for Automated Delivery of Alerts on Missing Children and named in honor of Adam Walsh. This program is open to the public for individuals, law enforcement, and businesses to sign up and receive missing child alerts in their areas. More awareness raised about this program can significantly help in the recovery efforts to find missing children. There are over 1.3 million recipients in the program (U.S. only), which has helped recover close to 200 missing children and assisted in the recovery of countless others.
The DHS strategy to combat human trafficking serves as a valuable resource and offers a sound framework and strategy of adopting the principles of prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership as a comprehensive approach to save lives and rebuild those adversely affected by abusive actions. The tracking of actual abuse cases and the efforts of law enforcement are also hampered by a reluctance of victims to either self-report or cooperate with police investigations. As evidenced by the increased coercion of victims into sex trafficking as a source of income for gang-related activity, victims may view their actions as a simply a means to making money and a way of life, although misguided, it remains a prevalent factor. Gang-related participation in sex trafficking is a lucrative venture and viewed as very attractive business because of the relatively low or limited risk. Criminal cases against them are difficult if not impossible to make largely because those being exploited do not identify as victims.

Additionally, often due to deeply rooted mistrust of police (based on cultural and socioeconomic reasons) and a legitimate threat of violence perpetrated on themselves and their family by gang members, victims often do not cooperate with efforts to assist and bring the perpetrators to justice. A robust community outreach and training program is vital to teach people that human trafficking exists often in their very own communities and reinforce the message of that only through a collaborative approach by people of all professions (public, private, law enforcement, and civilian) will help curb this pandemic of total abuse. An abuse that consumes and touches upon the sexual, physical, mental, emotional, and the overall essence of an individual.

If suspicions of abuse and human trafficking exist, people are encouraged to contact their local police immediately and can also report to the NCMEC’s Cyber TipLine or call 1-800-THE-LOST. An effective training and education outreach campaign established by public-private partnership is the Blue Campaign, which helps raise community awareness of the problem.

Lastly, although not by any means the final recommended action necessary to help curb human trafficking, the continuation and improvement of information sharing platforms is recommended between public and private institutions, police, federal law enforcement agencies, community, civic, and educational organizations. A collective approach and the leveraging of technology to improve the application of the principles of prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership is necessary.

Renewed partnerships and increased formalized agreements between nations is paramount in the identification and dismantling of the organized criminal groups who profit from this illicit trade and degradation of human beings. Like any for profit business, the bottom line for groups engaged in the trafficking of persons is to remain profitable. This operational principle applies to the organized networks engaged in human trafficking. The success of law enforcement in dismantling these groups rests in their ability to strike at their sources of funding, negate their profits and seize their illicitly gained and assets.

The capacity of law enforcement to effectively disrupt criminal groups that are often entrenched in complicated networks and afforded degrees of anonymity across borders can be greatly influenced by the assistance of the private sector and the technological tools it
has at its disposal. Strategic investigations are a requisite to combat the pandemic of human trafficking. Large-scale criminal investigations often involving multiple jurisdictions targeting domestic and international human trafficking rings require large amounts of data, actionable intelligence, and improved analytics.

Upon reviewing the data thus far presented, one can understand how the international efforts to save lives in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic have inadvertently exacerbated the risk factors for the trafficking and exploitation of vulnerable individuals. As states, anti-trafficking units, and humanitarian organizations adapt to the operational constrictions of an unexpected global emergency – COVID-19 – the lessons learned may lead to the creation of better infrastructure for combatting human trafficking in the future. Additionally, the current crisis of human trafficking – aggravated by a global health emergency – should serve as a call to action to ordinary people, as everybody can contribute to the fight against human trafficking. “Human trafficking and child sexual exploitation is criminal and has no place in our free society,” says the January 2020 DHS Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking, The Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor and Child Sexual Exploitation.

**How to Help – Useful Resources**

- [National Center for Missing and Exploited Children](https://www.missingchildren.org)
- [ADAM Program](https://www.lexisnexis.com), LexisNexis Risk Solutions
- [20 Actions for 2020](https://polarisproject.org/20-actions-for-2020), Polaris Project
- [COVID-19 Resources, Services, and Support](https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus), Anti-Trafficking, Office on Trafficking in Persons
- [Our Approach](https://www.globalfundtoendmodernslavery.org), Global Fund to End Modern Slavery
- [How to Help – STOP-IT Initiative Against Human Trafficking](https://www.stopthetraffik.org), The Salvation Army
- [The STOP APP – Report Human Trafficking](https://www.stopthetraffik.org/app), Stop the Traffik

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